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ABSTRACT
LUX OCCIDENTALE: THE EASTERN MISSION OF THE
PONTIFICAL COMMISSION FOR RUSSIA, ORIGINS TO 1933
by
Michael A. Guzik

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017
Under the Supervision of Professor Neal Pease

Although it was first a sub-commission within the Congregation for the Eastern Churches
(CEO), the Pontifical Commission for Russia (PCpR) emerged as an independent commission
under the presidency of the noted Vatican Russian expert, Michel d’Herbigny, S.J. in 1925, and
remained so until 1933 when it was re-integrated into CEO. The PCpR was given authority over
the spiritual and material mission to Soviet Russia, including refugees who had fled the
Bolshevik Revolution. While most studies concerning the Catholic Church and Russia are
religious or political histories which focus, respectively, on martyrdom or the contest between the
so-called free world and Communism, this dissertation is instead a social history which employs
religious anthropological categories.
The dissertation argues that soft-Orientalist dynamics were at play in the PCpR through
the structures which it managed and engaged– especially the Russian Catholic Church of the
Byzantine-Slavonic Rite, and through its mission of evangelization as it managed forms of
worship, taught Catholic belief– especially as formulated by Vladimir Soloviev, and enforced
codes of behavior– especially concerning clerical celibacy and marriage. The sense of the
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barbarity of the Bolshevism, which at one point was compared to Islam, justified for the
members of the PCpR their sense of superiority over the Russian people.
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Chapter 1
Soft-Orientalism and the Writing of Catholic-Russian History

The history of the Catholic Church and Russia has been, rightly so, a story of conflict.
The Catholic Church has been a foreign element with respect to Russia, ranging from the faith of
benign foreigners– nonetheless an other– to the faith of competitors and enemies. The schism
between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches1 themselves, each of which regarded themselves as
the True Rome, intensified this conflict, and was further complicated when the monk Filofei of
Pskov wrote Grand Prince Vasilij III of Moscow in 1510, “‘...two Romes have fallen, but the
third stands, and there will never be a fourth.’”2 While in the same letter Filofei assured his new
political ruler that he [Vasilij] was the most beloved of God, the defender of the true and

1

It is important to note that this dissertation will follow the convention used by Catholic
and Orthodox theologians in regard to distinguishing “Orthodox” from “orthodox, “Catholic”
from “catholic”, and “Tradition” from “tradition.” “Tradition” (with a capital “T”) in both
churches signifies that which has been handed down from ancient times and is considered to be
essential to matters of faith and morals, and therefore cannot be altered or abandoned. Many
equate the concept of Tradition with the “Rule of Faith” articulated by Irenaeus. Contrarily,
“tradition” (with a minuscule “t”) signifies that which has been handed down, perhaps even from
ancient times, but is not considered to be essential to matters of faith and morals. Correlatively,
Orthodox (with a capital “O”) connotes a member of one of the Byzantine, Syriac, or
Chalcedonian Rite Churches, and orthodox (with a minuscule “o”) connotes a Christian who
believes what is in the Tradition, without alteration. Catholic (with a capital “C”) connotes a
Roman Catholic or a Christian who is a member of a church in communion with Rome, while
catholic (with a minuscule “c”) connotes a Christian who is not “sectarian” or “heretical,” but
who is regarded (usually by his/her own magisterium), as a member of the one, true church of
Christ. In depth analysis of these issues is presented by Francis A. Sullivan, S.J., The Church We
Believe In: One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic (New York: Paulist Press, 1988). The term
“Christian” will be used contextually, and connote a person or community which accepts the
Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed of 381, popularly known simply as the Nicene Creed. Thus,
depending upon the historical era, it might be used to indicate all Christians, or it might be used
to indicate Protestants or any non-Catholic.
2

Wil van den Bercken, Holy Russia and Christian Europe: East and West in the Religious
Ideology of Russia, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1998), p. 146.
1

uncorrupted faith, and the only monarch destined in justice to rule over all Christians, the Holy
Roman and Byzantine Emperors had also believed this for centuries. Even the Roman Pontiffs
would make similar claims to universal sovereignty within both the temporal and spiritual
spheres since the Middle Ages.3 In short, within all three Romes, a legal relationship existed
between their respective political and religious authorities and the people they governed. This
prompted Professor Wil van den Bercken to note, “Rome is everywhere.”4 Yet, these three
Romes are not the same.
In spite of political and religious similarities, these “Romes” have become symbols of
difference. Rome is “western”; Constantinople (now Istanbul) and Moscow are “eastern.” Rome
is the seat of the Pope and of Catholicism. Constantinople (Istanbul) is the seat of the Orthodox
Ecumenical Patriarch, the new “first among equals,” and of Pan-Orthodoxy. Moscow is the seat
of the Russian Patriarch and of Russian Orthodoxy. The differentiation between the three Romes
implies not only separate– and separated– existence, but also self-sufficient5 symbolic meanings.
Part of that meaning is constructed by descriptive words used to differentiate western from
eastern. The words themselves matter.

3

Note for example, Unam Sanctum by Boniface VIII, promulgated on 18 Nov 1302,
which many church historians have understood to contain one of the most extreme claims to
papal political and religious authority; cf. Papal Encyclicals Online, Unam Sanctam, last
modified March 18 2014. http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Bon08/B8unam.htm.
4

van den Bercken, p. 149.

5

According to Christian ecumenists, self-sufficiency is a technical term which describes
the attitudes of churches, whereby each thought that it had the fullness of truth and the most
likely– if not the sole– means for salvation. A useful but general account of the ecumenical
movement is given by Thomas E. Fitzgerald, The Ecumenical Movement: An Introductory
History (Westport, CT: Praeger Conn, 2004).
2

In Trent and All That: Renaming Catholicism in the Early Modern Era, John O’Malley
argued that names are not merely labels of differentiation; they suggest a deeper meaning. In
other words, names are symbols which introduce historically contextualized significance, through
which, that which is named is interpreted and understood. O’Malley then goes on to analyze the
historiography of what he calls “Early Modern Catholicism,” in which the “Reformation” and
“Counter-Reformation” are the chief characteristics. He argues that while some names have
disappeared from historical discourse due to a variety of factors, others have endured. These
terms have either achieved a certain neutrality over time or have remained politically-charged.6
The problem of politically-charged names and terminology is certainly present when
analyzing the historical forces which the three Romes symbolize, when they converge or clash in
what Timothy Snyder has labeled the “Bloodlands.”7 For example, while terms such as “Uniate”
and “Eastern Rite” have fallen out of usage, their replacement with “Greek Catholic Church ”
and “Ukrainian Catholic Church ” does not lessen the political and religious tensions surrounding
the existence of Byzantine Rite Catholic Churches in Ukraine, caught somewhere between Polish
Roman Catholicism, Russian Orthodoxy, and Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The name “Russian
Catholic” appears contradictory as an east-west amalgam, and “Byzantine-Slavonic Rite” is
unavoidably a politically charged term because of the attitudes of Polish nationalists, Soviet
officials, and Russian Orthodox bishops and priests.
Ethnic, national, and religious tensions have existed in these “Bloodlands” for centuries,

6

John W. O’Malley, Trent and All That: Renaming Catholicism in the Early Modern Era
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 1-3, 125-26.
7

Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic
Books, 2010).
3

but have reached a certain apex in the twentieth century. Before the average person was
motivated to do violence to his or her neighbor, s/he had to believe that the view of the Other was
wrong and even dangerous in comparison with the his or her personally held truth. Thus, it is
important whether one calls the major city in what is now western Ukraine Ëüâ³â (L’viv,
Ukrainian), Lwów (Polish), Ëüâî¢ (L’vou, Belarussian), Ëüâîâ (L’vov, Russian), Lemberik
(Yiddish), Lemberg (German), Lvovas (Lithuanian), or Leopolis (Latin). Different names help
create difference and separation in the same locale. Neighbors might have lived in the same
geographical location but in different worlds, each in a sense governed by a different Rome.
Thus, the choice of names in this dissertation must be a conscious one, with the intention
of not being co-opted by the attitudes of the people, movements, and ideas being examined. This
will be determined within context. The choice of one name rather than another is not meant to
reinforce any particular agenda or ideology that is being analyzed. Within quotes, the names
chosen by the historical actor will be preserved. Such consciousness is necessary, given the
dichotomies and divisions which are a part of universal, not just Eastern European, history.
While Jenõ Szûcs and Julianna Parti noted that the origins of the division of Europe into
Eastern and Western areas emerged in the twelfth century as a consequence to the Schism of
1054,8 Piotr Wandycz further noted that this division became politically significant due to the

8

Jenõ Szûcs and Julianna Parti, “The Three Historical Regions of Europe,” Historica
Academiae Scientarium Hungaricae 29, no. 2/4 (1983): 132-133.
4

contest in Russia between Westernizers and Slavophiles.9 However, Oscar Halecki,10 Piotr
Wandycz,11 and Larry Wolff12 asserted that the earliest and first meaningful division within
European history was not an east-west, but a north-south divide, which emphasized the cultural
and political primacy of the Roman Empire– especially the Western Roman Empire– and its
inheritors.
Deno John Geanakopolos, followed this basic logic in Byzantine East and Latin West.13
While accepting the primacy of the basic north-south divide before the Renaissance, he critiqued
the east-west divide, challenging the assumption of western primacy by shifting the locus of high
culture and civilization away from Rome to Constantinople. He argued that what made the Latin
west truly great was its Byzantine influence, in contrast to what western scholars erroneously
argued, based on false claims such as a simplistic Caesero-papism and the false assumptions such
as the theological supremacy of Roman Catholicism.14 Because Geanakopolos argues that

9

Piotr S. Wandyz, The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the
Middle Ages to the Present (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 2.
10

Oscar Halecki, The Limits and Divisions of European History (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1962), p. 35.
11

Wandyz, The Price of Freedom, p. 2.

12

Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the
Enlightenment (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 4.
13

Deno John Geanakopolos, Byzantine East and Latin West: Two Worlds of Christendom
in the Middle Ages and Renaissance (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
14

Philip Sherrard draws attention to these deficiencies in Greek East and Latin West: A
Study in the Christian Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959). Less
sophisticated and more polemical is John S. Romanides, Franks, Romans, Feudalism, and
Doctrine: An Interplay Between Theology and Society, Patriarch Athenagoras Memorial Lectures
(Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1982).
5

western greatness is built upon a Byzantine foundation, his act of refutation inadvertently
reinforces the assumption of western primacy or supremacy.
With the advent of history as an academic discipline in the late nineteenth century, it
often worked congruently with the nationalist project into the twentieth century.15 While
Marxists rejected the nationalist project in favor of class-based histories, they too were swept up
in nineteenth century academic and political movements.16 Both nationalist and Marxist
historians often employed what Ireneusz Karolewski and Andrzej Suczycki have called the
genealogical model of national development to explain the rise of nation states.17
Generally speaking, the narrative strategy of nationalist historians often essentialized the
nation by anthropomorphizing it: a nation incubates in pre-history, is born into history, survives
its trials of growth, and finally reaches maturity when various ethnic groups are folded into the
nation which speaks one language, lives on one territory governed by one state, and is able to
defend itself against neighboring states. Although the realization of this teleological aim is
portrayed by nationalist historians as matter of romantic drama; its failure or impediment is
portrayed as tragedy.18

15

Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak, eds., Historians as Nation-Builders: Central and
South-East Europe (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), pp. 9-14.
16

John Barker, “Marx,” chap. in The Superhistorians: Makers of our Past (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982).
17

Ireneusz Pawe³ Karolewski and Andrzej Marcin Suczycki, The Nation and Nationalism
in Europe: An Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). These authors name
for models utilized to explain the source and development of national identity: functional,
rationalist, genealogical and constructivist. However, historians generally use only the latter two.
18

Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
6

Conversely, Marx thought the achievement, even to a degree, of the nationalist
teleological aim was erroneous and doomed to failure. He noted, “‘Hegel remarks somewhere
that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He
forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.’”19
Generally speaking, the narrative strategy of Marxist historians essentialized class
structures and narrated a cycle of oppression and liberation within the framework of dialectical
materialism: human society moved from primitive communism into the experience of oppression
as nation states were born, developed, and reached maturity, the penultimate stage of
development. Marxist histories promised full communism in the final stage– its telos– when
humanity would mature such that governments and classes would wither away, and people would
produce according to ability and consume only according to need. This is not unlike the
Christian narrative, in which humanity began in the Garden of Eden, sinned, and is on the way to
the parousia, both a natural and supernatural telos for Christians.
For both the nationalist and Marxist historians, teleology was an important aspect of the
historical narrative.20 History was going somewhere, and it was evident to these historians that
not everyone was at the same place in the historical time line. Western European nations and
peoples were regarded to be more advanced, Eastern European nations were regarded to be less

19

Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in The Communist
Manifesto and Other Writings, intro. and notes by Martin Puchner (New York: Barnes and Noble
Classics, 2005), p.63.
20

Both the Catholic magisterium and Orthodox primates and bishops understood history
to have a teleology, but not one rooted in the temporal order. Their understanding of history
could best be explained by Augustine, The City of God: Against the Pagans, ed. and trans. R.W.
Dyson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
7

advanced, while colonized peoples– especially in Africa and Asia– were regarded to be least
advanced. Ernst Breisach summarized this presumption through a quote from G.W.F. Hegel:
“the East knew and to the present day knows that only One is free; the Greek and Roman worlds
knew that some are free; the German world knows that all are free.”21 In contrast, scholars are
still pre-occupied with the unfreedom of Russia.22
Edward Said has argued that this style of thought reached a certain maturation through the
experience of, and reflection upon, European imperialist expansion, which by the end of the First
World War, had claimed 85% of the Earth.23 Europe was at the forefront of human progress; all
others lagged behind, but especially the Orient which Europe had colonized. He asserted that the
idea of the Orient was the product not only of European travelers, explores, and colonizers, but
also of European academics– especially historians and anthropologists. As such, Orientalism
was not so much discovered as constructed to reinforce European (primarily but not exclusively
French and British) cultural and political superiority, which cast the “Oriental” as the less
civilized, exotic Other. For the Europeans, this included a moral mandate, to “take up the white
man’s burden.... to serve [their] captive’s need... [their] new caught, sullen peoples, half devil
and half child.”24

21

Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1983), p. 232.
22

Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, The Slave Soul of Russia: Moral Masochism and the Cult of
Suffering (New York: New York University Press, 1995).
23

Edward W. Said, Orientalism (1978; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 1994), p. 127.

24

Rudyard Kipling, “White Man’s Burden,” in The Complete Verse, foreword M. M.
Kaye (London: Kyle Cathie Ltd., 2002), p. 257.
8

Larry Wolff correlatively argued that western European notions of their cultural and
political superiority also existed with respect to the generally Slavic areas of Europe, which were
also deemed to be Eastern. Because the Slavs and the non-western minorities who lived in
Eastern Europe were understood to be less barbaric than Arabs and Africans, Wolff described
this Western European view of the Slavic world as having undergone a demi-Orientalization, the
overall attitude of which could be termed soft-Orientalism. He argued that while the “Near
East,” “Middle East,” and Africa are always Other in European histories, Eastern Europe is “a
paradox of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, Europe but not Europe.”25 Given the shifting
nature of the European-ness of Eastern Europe, where the region begins is also shifting.
Identifying which “western” countries exist on the border of Eastern Europe–and therefore
civilization– becomes noteworthy as an academic exercise and a political act of inclusionexclusion. Indeed, Francis Dvornik remarked, “It is unfortunate that in reviewing the historical
evolution of Europe it is customary to speak of traditions distinctly Eastern and Western: the
distinction marks a tragedy. The distinction is conventionally accepted as something necessary,
as something that has always operated in the history of Europe, as an unaccounted-for
imponderable.”26
Even historians writing before the linguistic turn27 noted a certain arbitrary character in

25

Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, p. 7.

26

Francis Dvornik, “Western and Eastern Traditions of Central Europe,” The Review of
Politics 9, no. 4 (October 1947): 463-4.
27

This is understood not to be a single shift, but a series of shifts in methodological
thought by historians whereby they began to apply principles of linguistic philosophy to history;
cf. Judith Surkis, “When Was the Linguistic Turn? A Genealogy.” The American Historical
Review 117, no. 3 (June 2012): 700-22.
9

dividing east from west, and that “dichotomic divisions into West-East, as well as centreperiphery, oversimplify many historical problems.”28 Firstly, on the sphere of the Earth, east and
west are compass orientations relative to magnetic north. With a circumference of approximately
25,000 miles (or 40,000 km), if one travels far enough in either direction, one ends up where one
started. Geographically speaking, Europe is more or less the western peninsula which juts off of
the world island. However, identifying exactly where it begins is impossible. Since the closest,
clearly identifiable geographic feature is the Ural Mountains, thinkers have conventionally
marked the geographic border between Europe and Asia. Practically speaking, this is unhelpful.
The use of a purely geographic category to define Europe presents both political and
cultural problems. With regard to the former, the Ural Mountains split what we understand
contemporarily to be Russia, but not the Ukraine.
Historiographically, a purely geographic definition of Europe is rather unhelpful, as it
does not take into account human activity in the political, social, cultural, and religious realms.
Defining Europe by taking into account those themes not only imbues a deeper understanding
and meaning of Europe, but also value. Implicit and explicit comparisons have helped to
highlight regions or themes, but often at the cost of social and cultural ranking. For example, in
November 1877, Fyodor Dostoevsky lamented, in his defense of the Pan-Slavic and PanOrthodox movement, that the great western powers looked upon his countrymen as a “cunning

28

Henryk Samsonowicz and Antoni M¹czak, “Feudalism and Capitalism: A Balance of
Changes in East-Central Europe,” chap. in East Central Europe in Transition: From the
Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Century, ed. Antoni M¹czak, Henryk Samsonowicz, and Peter
Burke (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 6.
10

and barbaric Great Russian race.”29 While the theme of barbarity will be developed by Michel
d’Herbigny and utilized by the Pontifical Commission for Russia (PCpR)30 in the 1920s and
1930s, a contemporary example of the soft-Orientalist attitude about which Dostoevsky lamented
can be found in a publication of a lecture given by Sir Arthur Evans at Sion College in 1874.31
Evans defined Eastern Europe using racial criteria in a travel log narrative, a popular
trope in the European colonial era.32 He began his by admitting that he, his brother, and a friend
had lost their way in “the wild parts of the Austrian province of Carniola”33 and had received
help from the “cottagers [who] came out and gathered round... in a ring, just as so many
sheep....”34 Evans noted:

...the Slavs have gone their way and we [the English] have gone ours. Our
languages have branched off in different directions till... the speech of our
race is utterly unintelligible to a member of the other. Still, blood is thicker
than water, and even at the present moment it may be well to remember that,

29

F.M. Dostoievsky, The Diary of a Writer, trans. and annotated by Boris Brasol (New
York: George Braziller, 1954), p. 898.
30

Pontificia Commissione per la Russia.

31

Sir Arthur Evans, The Slavs and European Civilisation: A Lecture Delivered at Sion
College, Feb. 23, 1878 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1878).
32

Knut Hamson began his travel log of his 1903 Oriental adventures in St. Petersburg; cf.
In Wonderland, trans., with an intro. and notes by Sverre Lyngstad (Brooklyn, NY: Ig Publishers,
2004). Although this style of writing is no longer considered a serious academic exercise, it has
not disappeared. Note Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through
Yugoslavia (New York: Viking Press, 1963) and Victoria Clark, Why Angels Fall: A Journey
Through Orthodox Europe from Byzantium to Kosovo (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
33

Evans, p. 3.

34

Ibid., p. 4.
11

though the Slavs are not so near of kin to us as the Germans or the Norsemen,
they are yet our cousins. The Turks, on the other hand, are not related to our
Aryan family at all.... Speaking generally, [the Slavs] are behind the other
European nations , Teutonic and Romance, in civilization and social and political
development; but it would be unwise to argue from this that they are incapable
of attaining to the highest civilization.35

Evans argued that the social and political retardation of Slavic development is due
primarily to geography, which has placed them on the borderlands of Europe– from the Baltic to
the Black to the Aegean– to act as the de facto buffer against “Asiatic Barbarism.”36 Secondly,
Evans asserted that Slavic social organization has also regarded their development. While
western European society is built upon the nuclear family, the Slavic world is built upon the
extended family, a “group of families,” or “family communities” in which property is held in
common.37 In other words, Evans charged Slavs with tribalism. This, he asserted, instills within
them an incapacity for organization and a susceptibility to the “half-developed social institutions”
of socialism and communism. Slavs are therefore generally lazy and prone to anarchy, from
which they are rescued by the firm rule of Emperors imposed upon them.
For Evans, Slavic, eastern Europe is clearly less civilized and developed than western
Europe; it needed non-Slavic rulers (such as Rurik) to organize the Slavic nations politically.
Yet, eastern Europe is considered superior to the Orient (Asia) because the Slavs are the cousins
of the Western Europeans, whose influence has imposed a helpful social order and raised the
level of culture. The Slavic world is at once included and excluded from Europe, the paragon of

35

Ibid., pp. 5-6.

36

Ibid., p. 12.

37

Ibid., p. 7.
12

civility and culture.
In the midst of the First World War, Friedrich Naumann argued in Mittel-Europa that
Central Europe is in the penultimate stage of its historical development, based upon a political
rather than a racial framework.38 To this end, he identified three stages in German history. The
first is the pre-Napoleonic stage, in which “nothing north of the Alps could be compared to
Rome, Constantinople, Moscow, Paris, or London, for all our mediaeval towns lacked the
crystalizing power of a ruler.”39 The second is the post-Napoleonic stage in which Naumann
found himself: a Germany which has not realized regional hegemony. He asserted that the
contemporary difficulties faced by Germany and Austria-Hungary were due in part to the victory
of the Kleindeutsch notion over the Grossdeutsch in the construction of Imperial Germany, and
that post war difficulties would be remedied or prevented by the acceptance of the Grossdeutch
principle. For Nauman, the creation of this Greater Germany would usher in the final stage of
German history. Germany would finally achieve its telos of regional hegemony, and act as a
catalyst to advance the condition of non-German minorities in the region. Slavs are marginalized
both politically and culturally, preserving “soft-Orientalism,” while Germany is portrayed as the
eastern-most bastion of western civilization.
All of this, of course, depended upon a German victory during the Great War, which was
not to be. The First World War ended in defeat for Germany and Austria-Hungary, and a
politically significant Central Europe super-state did not emerge. With the added destruction of

38

Friedrich Nauman, Central Europe: A Translation by Christabel M. Meredith fromt eh
original German of Mittel-Europa, trans. Christabel M. Meredith (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1917).
39

Ibid., p. 52.
13

Imperial Russia, quite the opposite emerged. A series of smaller states with contested borders
were created, and their existence raised the question of the natural character of Central Europe.
Thinkers such as Evans and Nauman clearly manifest a soft-Orientalism as they understood
Eastern Europe to be an ethnically, religiously, and nationally diverse region, economically
backward, with a need to be managed imperially. However, other thinkers– such as those who
follow– thought Eastern Europe to be a region with a diverse character more properly managed
by diverse states which sought to overcome economic, social, and political retardation imposed
by imperial rulers. Soft-Orientalism was again inadvertently preserved here, in the decades-long
argument for the value of Eastern Europe.
In the Borderlands of Western Civilization40 Oscar Halecki defended the political and
cultural character of these regions by creating new regional categories, which define Central
Europe and re-imagine which nations are included in and excluded from Western civilization.
Halecki generally equated Christianity with Western civilization,41 which provided a broad unity
for Europe, while simultaneously sub-dividing Europe into four regions: Western, West Central,
East Central, and Eastern.42 Halecki maintained that the heritage of Western and Central Europe
could be traced to Rome, and while Eastern Europe was governed by the Third Rome, it owed its
heritage to the Second.43

40

Oscar Halecki, Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East Central Europe
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952).
41

Halecki revisits these themes in his later work, The Limits and Divisions of European
History (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962).
42

Halecki, Borderlands, pp. 4-5.

43

Ibid., p. 46.
14

Halecki used religious identity, specifically Catholicism and Orthodoxy, to manage the
theme of inclusion and exclusion. Catholicism– in both Roman and Byzantine varieties–
allowed the nations of the ancient Rzeczpospolita, the Second Polish Republic, and even the
Polish People’s Republic to be counted with the west, i.e. as fully European. Orthodoxy pushed
Russia and some of the peoples who could have been Catholic but chose Orthodoxy, to the
fringe. Halecki applied this logic to his history of Poland, which he portrayed as a Catholic and
western country suffering domination by the USSR.44
Halecki used ethnic factors to distinguish West Central from East Central Europe, the
former being predominantly German and the latter predominantly Slavic. Central Europe can
have complex ethnic characteristics, yet retain a common character because of a common
political experience. While Nauman argued that Central Europe was unsuccessful due to a lack
of a single, unifying empire, Halecki argued that Central Europe was successful precisely
because its political diversity, i.e. its composition of several empires (Prussian, Polish, Austrian,
and Ottoman), gave it vibrancy. Halecki argued that East Central Europe became politically
successful because France (a Western European power) wooed Poland (an East Central European
power) as an ally as a means to contain the Holy Roman Empire (a West Central European
power). However, pressure from Sweden, Russia, “Germany”, and the Ottoman Empire
prevented full participation in such an arrangement. Soft-Orientalism remained an essential part
of the narrative. Polish success was due in part to France, and its failure due in part to Eastern
European Russia and the Islamic, i.e. non-European, Ottoman Empire.
Halecki maintained that the success of East Central Europe was destroyed in the
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eighteenth century, and that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the East Central European
corridor itself collapsed.45 As West Central and Eastern Europe consolidated, they swallowed
Polish territory and began to pressure the Ottoman Empire. The Eastern Question shifted from
how to manage a successful, expansionistic empire to how to manage this “sick man of
Europe.”46
Ultimately, Halecki argued that the collapse and disappearance of East Central Europe
was an aberration, and that it was not natural that Germany and Russia should border each other
in the nineteenth century. Although Halecki does not include the coincidental development of
nationalist histories as a scientific enterprise as part of his analysis, this is as important as the
political collapse. Western, West Central, and Eastern nationalist historians could justify the
ascendency of their states as a natural consequence of the failure of East Central European ones.
The brief existence of independent states during the interwar period in this East Central
European corridor for Halecki was the rebirth of the so-called natural state of affairs,47 but was
cut short when these states were brought under the Soviet sphere of influence. Halecki
concluded with that a “new era might be inaugurated for all of those who today [1954] suffer in
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East Central Europe....”48 The reference to “Soviet barbarity” further pushes Eastern Europe
toward exclusion while simultaneously preserving the primacy of western European status.
Francis Dvornik nearly concured when he wrote in 1974 about the inhabitants of this region,
“Today their past is their only inspiration in carrying on the struggle to preserve their national
identity. Nowhere more than in Central and Eastern Europe is it true to say that modern
development can only be understood in the light of medieval history.”49
In 1947, Francis Dvornik asserted that, “...Central Europe only includes the Germans
from the Rhine to the Oder, the Czechs, the Magyars, the Slovenes, and the Croats,” excluding
the Poles due to their policy of repudiating as much as possible any alliance with the Empire and
with the Czechs. In The Making of Central and Eastern Europe (1974), Dvornik adjusted his
earlier understanding, and in a sense recombines the categories of West Central Europe and East
Central Europe as Central Europe. Russia remains in the East. While Dvornik always regarded
Central Europe as European, Russia remains subject to the soft-Orientalist inclusion/exclusion
dynamic, even as he argued for a fundamental unity among Slavs which not even religion could
disrupt.50 Dvornik consequently argued that this pan-Slavism did not originate in nineteenth
century Russia, but that
Tsarist Russia... did not succeed in profiting fully from the Pan-Slav idea. It
is an irony of history that the regime which succeeded the tsarist autocracy
inherited even this idea from tsarist Russia and was able not only to make a
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reality of the dream of the Ruriks in 1939 and 1945, when it united all “Russian”
votèiny with Moscow, but also to profit from the Pan-Slav sentiments to extend
its sway over all Slavic lands in the name of a new “orthodoxy.”51

Jenõ Szûcs and Julianna Parti propose a similar, but not identical geopolitical division of Europe.
They divided Europe into Western, Central, and Eastern regions. They maintained that
Western Europe is the product of Roman Catholicism having been folded into a German political
culture, which had in turn built upon Roman Imperial conquest. Russia remained eastern, as an
Orthodox region untouched by this dynamic. Central Europe, therefore, exists between the
German and Russian worlds.52
They bolstered their category of Central Europe by noting that after 1500, a “very sharp
line of demarcation” along socio-economic lines emerged, and after another five hundred years, it
was “as if Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt had studied carefully the status quo of the age of
Charlemagne on the 1130th anniversary of his death.”53 This same line is, generally, the eastern
boundary of Charlemagne’s realm.54 Prosperity is perpetually found west of the line, and poverty
to the east. Although this is not essentially a moral judgment, the assertion that the west is
seemingly naturally more affluent implies superiority over and against the east; soft-Orientalism
is therefore preserved.
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While these previous historians– writing before the linguistic turn– considered the
character and borders of Europe historically, historians writing after the linguistic turn have often
utilized what Karolewski and Suczycki call the constructivist model, which presents the modern
nation state as something which emerged in the modern era, rather than as an essentialized
something which had its roots in the past.55 Succinctly, this model assumes that nations and
nation states emerged and developed from unique formative events.56 Constructivists argue that
markers of identity– including nationalism and religion– are subjectively created in time and not
objectively discovered over time. Consequently, the categories by which nations and religions
are analyzed are also themselves created. Considering such categories from an historiographical
rather than an historical framework would better illustrate not only the “dialectical relationships
between borders and their states,” but also the nature of “symbolic geographies, namely the
construction of imaginary borders between civilizations.”57
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Piotr Wandycz, in the historiographical introduction to The Price of Freedom, did
precisely this. There, he teased out the theoretical strains which separate East from West.58
While recognizing the fluidity and arbitrary character of categories dependent in different degrees
upon the East-West dichotomy, Wandycz recast the method in dealing with East Central Europe.
He noted that in an East-West dichotomy, a clear and firm geographic divide between west and
east, even in gradations, is at best incomplete. Wandycz proposed to complement the models
proposed by Halecki and Szûcs (he did not mention Parti) which advocate a West, East-Center,
East paradigm with one

borrowed from economics and popularized by Hungarian scholars. It is based
on the notion of center, semi-periphery, and periphery, and has the advantage
of showing that countries that belong to the East-Central group have socioeconomic counterparts in the West, South, and North.59

Wandycz defined the core as “Italy, northern [France] and part of south-eastern France,
the Netherlands, west and part of southern Germany, and southern England,” a description which
he rephrased as a “longitudinal strip from Palermo through Naples and Antwerp to London,”60
justified by the character of its development, the effect of its achievements, and its density of
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population. Wandycz noted that if nineteenth century GNP per capita were to be considered,
Switzerland and Sweden would be added to this core, and the characteristics which comprise this
core would also be true in the twentieth century.
The semi-periphery exists on both sides of this strip, not just east of it: “southern France,
Spain, Portugal, Brandenburg, Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland,” and the periphery “would
include Scandinavia, Lithuania, Russia, and the Balkans.”61 This does have the advantage of
invalidating an East-West sensibility, as well as creating a core which does not reinforce
nationalist historical claims made by the great nineteenth century colonial powers of Britain,
France, and Germany. Its weakness is its reliance on national demarcation in the eastern semiperiphery. The placement of Lithuania within the periphery and preserving the peripheral status
of Russia are good examples.
While modern Lithuanians, for example, would not want to claim a cultural heritage with
Poland– especially in the twentieth century– the Rzeczpospolita is the common heritage of Poles
and Lithuanians, as well as Belarusians, Ukrainians, and some Jews. A tension then arises when
the evaluation economic and cultural factors are not congruent.
Lastly, Russia remains on the periphery, and not unlike the Near East. Wandycz, quoting
George Vernadsky, notes: “‘if Russia is Europe,’... ‘she is only partly so.’ Muscovite autocracy
and the subordination of church to the state was alien to the western tradition. So was the
Ottoman system based on Islam.”62 And so the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion remains, as
does the soft-Orientalist ranking of Eastern European states based on comparison with the west.

61

Ibid.

62

Ibid., p. 3.
21

In the effort to refute the second class status of “Eastern Europe,” scholars have not only
preserved the east-west dichotomy, but also the latent value judgments present within that
dichotomy. Wandycz at least is conscious of this dynamic.
The works above which have sought both to define, and to create sub-categories of,
Europe have sought to demonstrate the value of “Eastern Europe” in some way or another.63
Generally, such value is imparted by demonstrating how the area in question has some link to, or
resemblance of, the west, thereby indirectly preserving the primacy of Western Europe and
inadvertently perpetuating the soft-Orientalism against which they seek to defend Eastern
European peoples.

These categories have, in turn, contextualized the work historians have done

on the Catholic Church and its relationship to Russia or the Soviet Union. Histories of the
Russian Catholic Church, also known as the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite, comprise a discrete and
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sparse sub-field within this study.
The Russian Catholic Church, though a Byzantine Rite church, was unlike the Greek
Catholic Churches which re-entered communion with Rome in the Union of Brzeœæ in 1596. The
Greek Catholic Churches claimed a genealogy which its members traced to the Apostolic Era,
and its union with the church was itself the aim of the Roman Curia. The Russian Catholic
Church, contrarily, was a partial-creation of the Catholic Church in the early twentieth century
not as an end in itself, but as a means of evangelization and the conversion of Russia to
Catholicism, which Neal Pease has correctly called “‘sheep stealing’ on an unheard-of scale.”64
As such, political and religious factors are inextricably interwoven in this history.
While it is arguable that all religious movements are political– at least to a degree– due
to their involvement in the public forum, the Catholic management of the Byzantine-Slavonic
Rite in the Second Polish Republic and Soviet Russia was an undeniably and intensely political
operation, even if officials in the PCpR denied political motivations or goals. Historians who
examine the Russian Catholic Church deal simultaneously with religious and political factors.
The weight they give to those factors and how they define them is more a matter of accent than
clear differentiation and demarcation of regnum and sacerdotium. Thus, histories of the Russian
Catholic Church fall into either the Political School or the Religious School, each of which has
sub-categories.
Histories of the Political School assume the Catholic Church to be an international
institution distinct from national governments but part of the social structure of nations, due to
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the nature of its magisterium. This magisterium is comprised of all Catholic bishops regardless
of rite, the first of which is the Bishop of Rome, the Pope, who by virtue of his office has both a
primacy of honor among, and juridical primacy over, other bishops. By virtue of its authority to
teach the Catholic faith, the magisterium also has authority to govern its Catholic faithful,
requiring that they believe certain dogmatic and doctrinal propositions and to behave in accord
with those propositions, and worship publically in accord with canon law. While this is a
religious phenomenon, it has clear political ramifications: bishops promulgate policy and manage
their dioceses and Catholic institutions within their dioceses. Additionally, bishops also
represent their diocese to the Vatican, and such representation often includes national aspects of
the culture in which their diocese exists. More officially, the papacy is recognized by
international lawyers to be a sui generis institution even after the loss of the papal states;65 it
therefore has a secretary of state, sends nuncios, and receives ambassadors.
The national policy of various states, vis-a-vis Catholicism, ranges from friendly and
cordial to hostile and confrontational. With regard to the Russian Catholic Church, interested
state views have tended toward the latter. To narrate this history of the Russian Catholic Church,
the Political School can be sub-divided into the Ostpolitik, Espionage, and Eastern-National
Schools of thought.
Within Ostpolitik histories, the Russian Catholic Church is but a small part of the Eastern
foreign policy of the Vatican. Although the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite is rather insignificant in
these histories, the themes it illustrates are congruent with the larger themes of Vatican-Soviet

65

Robert Graham, S.J., Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State on the
International Plane (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 7-8.
24

diplomacy.
Robert Graham argued that the foreign policy of the Vatican has as its primary aim
evangelization. Concretely, this means the preservation if not the expansion of the organs of
evangelization: first the Catholic Church, secondly other Christian churches, and finally, other
religious associations. Second, the Holy See desires to ensure its right to evangelize. Third, the
Holy See desires to advocate for the people whom it wants to evangelize, for either their material
and spiritual well-being.
With regard to Russia, Constantine Simon noted the early association of Catholicism with
the Poles through the false Dmitri established a foundational precedent of antagonism during the
later half of the sixteenth century.66 Russia is ultimately beyond the realm of Roman
Catholicism. However, the partitions of Poland, in which many Catholics suddenly found
themselves within Russia, both reinforced this association of Catholicism with Poles and
politicized it. While historians have noted that the hierarchy did not defend the Polish
nationalist cause against the new Orthodox rulers of eastern Poland in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries,67 Graham asserted that even after the rapprochement between Russia
and the Holy See after 1870, “the relations between Rome and St. Petersburg were never very
easy, especially in questions relating to Russian Poland.”68 Poland was– and remained– a
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stumbling block of Vatican relations to Russia.
While the military and political action of Russia (and Prussia and Austria) against the
Polish Rzeczpospolita prompted an ideological crisis between the Vatican and Tsarist Russia,
Graham argued the converse was true between the Vatican and Soviet Russia. He asserted,

the source of the conflict is, of course, ideological. On the one side there
stands the Soviet Union, which, to its missionary program of worldwide
revolution, joins doctrinal and practical atheism as a fundamental of its
expanding political system. Opposite, there stands a worldwide religious
organization two thousand years old which has the tenacity that only religious
faith can give to human beings which, confident in its destiny, does not reckon
in terms of years but of centuries. The effect of this tension is felt in almost
every domain and in almost every country.69

Graham argued that persecution of Catholics in Russia by the Bolsheviks is a natural
consequence of atheistic communism. He analyzed the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite only through its
exarch, Leonid Feodorov, whose incarceration and death he recounted. Correlatively, Graham
analyzed the missions of 1925 and 1926 of the French Jesuit Michel d’Herbigny, who failed to
create a strong underground Roman Catholic Church in the Soviet State.70 For Graham, the
Vatican is the hero and the Soviet government is the villain which victimizes not only Catholic
missionaries, but its own people.
Hansjakob Stehle also understood the conflict chiefly in ideological terms, describing the
ostpolitik of the Vatican as a crusade, which in the long run, became associated with the anticommunist foreign policy of Nazi Germany based on mutual foreign policy goals: the defeat of
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“Bolshevism.” Stehle argued that, in turn, the Soviets viewed any Catholic conduct on Soviet
soil as a threat to their sovereignty. Stehle only mentioned the Russian Catholic Church
obliquely, through an examination of Leonid Feodorov– similar to that of Graham– and the
Russicum, which he asserted was

connected with a ‘Russian-Catholic’ church... placed entirely at the service
of preparation for an imaginary future. Here only Russian was spoken and
dress was in the style of the Orthodox priests. D’Herbigny himself, shortly
before his trip to the Orient, grew a beard because– so the Pope had told
him– ‘for the Russians a beard is also a medium of apostleship’...71

Stehle constructed a much more checkered narrative: the aggressive foreign policy of the
Vatican dovetailed with the Soviet assumption that their continued existence was always
threatened by the west.
While these histories contain little that is exotic about Vatican foreign policy toward the
east, the soft-Orientalist dynamics which place Russia on the fringe of a more developed Western
Europe remain in Ostpolitik histories. Both Orthodox and Soviet Russia are opposed to
Catholicism on ideological grounds and are hostile or even violent toward Catholics. The
character of the Russicum reinforces this separation on both theological and cultural grounds.
With respect to the Soviet Union, Espionage School histories narrate the hidden side of
Vatican foreign policy: the use of spycraft for intelligence gathering and counter-intelligence to
defeat of atheistic communism and Soviet Russia, the chief organ for its survival. These
histories resemble those concerning the modern nation-state, focusing on the mechanisms of
71
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spying employed by the Vatican, and their positive or negative effects in the Papal contest with
Communist secret and espionage services, e.g. the Soviet NKVD, GRU, KGB, the East German
STASI, and the Polish SB.
David Alvarez created a “new direction in intelligence history by investigating the place
of the Vatican, the world’s oldest but smallest power, in that history. The result is the first
detailed description of the intelligence history of the Papacy”72 from the close of the Napoleonic
Wars to the conclusion of the Second World War. Alvarez paid virtually no attention to the
Russian Catholic Church, except to consider the behavior of Michel d’Herbigny as head of the
Pontifical Commission for Russia and the creation of the Russicum.
Alvarez treated d’Herbigny as a Vatican spy and spymaster, although he never overtly
labeled d’Herbigny as such. He described the bishop physically as one would a spy, a “tall, slim
figure in nondescript civilian clothes [who] slipped out the rear door of the Moscow hotel” and as
a “tall stranger [who] leaned forward and in a conspiratorial whisper disclosed the purpose that
had brought four strangers together in a small Catholic Church in the shadow of a police
fortress.”73 Alvarez also narrated the activity of d’Herbigny as a clandestine operation meant to
create an underground Catholic Church– akin to a spy ring– which would survive the Soviet
anti-religious program. The use of the Assumptionist priest Pie Neveu by d’Herbigny– who had
secretly consecrated Neveu a bishop in the shadow of NKVD headquarters– as an intelligence
operative, rounds out d’Herbigny as the spymaster whom Pius XI consults for reliable
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information concerning the Soviet Union. Correlatively, Alvarez recounted the Deubner Affair,
the sensational possibility that the Soviets had found their way into the Vatican via the personal
secretary of d’Herbigny. Alvarez clearly interpreted the possibility as reality. His treatment of
the Russicum is more subtle. While Alvarez acknowledged it as a seminary, he portrayed it as an
intelligence academy, noting

the new college’s program of study, with its emphasis on total immersion
in Russian language, history, and culture (to the point where the students
spoke only Russian and affected the long beards of Russian Orthodox clergy),
probably raised eyebrows in the offices of the OGPU, where intelligence
offices may have wondered if this was a seminary or a training school for spies.74

Similarly, Eric Frattini examined Vatican espionage from the sixteenth century to the late
twentieth century through an analysis of the Holy Alliance, “the Vatican’s espionage arm,”
renamed “the entity.”75 Despite the fact that the Soviets regarded members of the Russian
Catholic Church as Vatican spies,76 he did not examine it. Rather, his history is a sensational and
even irresponsible spy story. His treatment of the Russicum is illustrative.
Frattini placed the creation and management of the Russicum under the Holy Alliance as
an espionage school, rather than under the Pontifical Commission for Russia as a seminary for
the training of missionaries for Russia, in effect completely validating the claims of the OGPU.
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He even claimed “in a final phase of preparation, two members of the Polish army trained the
“recruits” in parachute tactics so they could be dropped from airplanes into different parts of the
Soviet Union.77 Correlatively, Frattini accepted without question that Alexander Deubner was an
OGPU agent who successfully penetrated the Vatican.78
John Koehler examined the issue of Soviet spies in the Vatican.79 Like Frattini, he did
not examine the Russian Catholic Church in spite of Kremlin concerns. Likewise, he did not
examine the conduct of d’Herbigny, the role of the Russicum, and perhaps most egregiously, the
Deubner Affair.
Although histories of the Espionage School range from irresponsible to solid scholarship,
all of them create or rely upon an exotic atmosphere through which Vatican efforts to evangelize
Eastern Europe, while relying on the same dichotomies that mark Ostpolitik histories: the
political, theological, and cultural marginalization of Russia. While Ostpolitik and Espionage
School histories treat the relationship between the Catholic Church and Russia mainly from an
international perspective, the Eastern-Nationalist School treats that relationship on a more
localized level.
Pedro Ramet argued that the portrayal of church-state relations behind the iron curtain has
reinforced a false dichotomy which pit church and state against one another. He rightly
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complicates the understanding of church-state relations by demonstrating: 1. both churches and
states are themselves factionalized, 2. federalized religious policy, especially in Yugoslavia (but
also true in the USSR) was uneven, 3. the shifting availability of international connections of a
church to its sister churches also shifted state policy, 4. the spread of neo-Protestant groups also
factionalized churches, and 5. the ability of the Vatican to impose itself on the local level through
its bishops varied from country to country.80
Although Ramet did not examine the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite, he did consider issues
surrounding Russification, with which, for example, the Second Polish Republic was concerned.
The Tsars had demanded that Latin be replaced by Russian as both the ecclesial and liturgical
language of the Catholic Church inside of Russia as an effort to “sap Polish and Lithuanian
nationalism...”81 He later pointed out that the Bolsheviks were “absorbed with the task of
assailing the Old Order to which the Russian Orthodox Church was organically tied...”82 By
extrapolation, Russian Catholics in Poland would be unwelcome because of their Russian-ness,
and unwelcome in Soviet Russia as a Vatican-protected remnant of the Old Order.
Neal Pease considered the Byzantine Slavonic Rite as an aspect of church-state relations
in Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter. In regard to Russian Catholics, Pease showed the tense and
often antagonistic relations between the Second Polish Republic and the Vatican concerning the
presence of things Russian in the Second Republic, or things Russian which would affect the
future of the Second Republic. From the perspective of the Polish Government, Pease argued,
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the existence of the Russian Catholic Church complicated the chauvinistic Polish policy toward
eastern minorities by offering an alternative to Latinization or membership in a Polish
autocephalous Orthodox Church, especially when “one quarter million Polish Orthodox had
adopted Latin Catholicism.”83 For Pease, Poland may be the eastern outpost of Catholicism, but
it had no desire to be a Vatican agent or dupe.
Dennis Dunn argued in The Catholic Church and Russia that the divide between the West
and Russia can be traced to the schism between the Byzantine and Roman Churches and Mongol
control of Muscovite lands. Dunn argued that the Orthodox Church in Muscovy worked in
tandem with the absolutist rule of the Romanovs, and that this theologically justified absolutism
came into conflict with the “Catholic Church’s insistence that it be free to preach the gospel, to
inspire change in individual lives, and judge governments in light of Christ’s teachings.”84 He
further contended that Soviet commissars acted similarly to Tsarist officials in three ways: (1)
both Tsarist and Soviet officials were absolutist in their style of government; (2) they understood
Catholicism to be the religion of their enemies, and (3) they nonetheless used the Catholic
Church for political advantage: modernization by the Tsarists and material relief by the Soviets.
The treatment in this work of the Russian Catholic Church is also limited. Dunn gave
brief mention to the series of visits by d’Herbigny, and emphasizes his effort to set up the
structure of an underground Catholic Church.85 Dunn also examined Feodorov as a link between
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the Vatican and “Russian Uniate Catholics.”86 Lastly, Dunn noted that in the 1970s and 1980s,
there were “attempts to revive the Russian Uniate Church, but the effort was more symbolic than
practical, and, generally, only the Latin liturgy was practiced.”87
Antoine Wenger similarly observed in Rome et Moscou, 1900-1950, that great political
tension existed between Russia and Roman Catholicism, and painted a portrait of struggle and
survival. Contrarily, in Catholiques en Russie, Wenger narrated their outright persecution.88
However, in Rome et Moscou, Wenger contended that Catholicism is a foreign religion for nonRussian peoples in Russia. In regard to the Russian Catholic Church he, like other historians,
examined the clandestine mission of d’Herbigny to create an underground Catholic Church,89 and
the difficulties of Leonid Feodorov.90 However, he also examined the cases of Russian converts
to Catholicism Nicholas Alekseivich Tolstoi (not a relative of the great novelist Leo), Alexis
Zetchanikov, and Jean Deubner (father of Alexander Deubner of the “Deubner Affair”).
Tolstoi, an Orthodox priest greatly influenced by the writings of Vladimir Soloviev and
the son of the master of ceremonies of the Russian imperial court, converted to Catholicism.91
Zertchanikov also converted through personal study, and was placed in charge of managing the
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liturgical rite inside of Russia.92 Deubner acted as a clandestine Catholic missionary within
Russia.93 Wenger noted that their acceptance of the tenets of Catholicism, at odds with statemanaged Orthodoxy, put them in real peril. Additionally, their desire to celebrate liturgy in
accord with the Byzantine Rite put them at odds with mainstream Catholic thought, although
Rome forbade the conversion of Russians to the Latin Rite. Although Wenger mentions these
liturgical dynamics, he did not analyze them in depth, and utilized the standard dichotomy of
Rome vs. St. Petersburg/Moscow– West vs. East.
The Ostpolitik, Espionage, and Eastern-National subdivisions within the Political School
portray Tsarist and Soviet Russia at best as political rivals, and at worst, political enemies of the
Catholic Church, and understand the rivalry between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches as the
medium through which this rivalry is played out. These histories argue that the chief motivation
for this political rivalry is ideological. Before the October Revolution, the ideological contest
occurred between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity. After the October Revolution, it occurred
between Catholic Christianity and Soviet-style communism. Histories of the Religious School
also utilize these themes, but these are marked by a focus on the church qua church which is
engaged in the rivalries noted above, rather than emphasize these rivalries. Like the Political
School, the Religious School is also has sub-divisions: Descriptive, Iconic, and Topical.
Descriptive Histories do not argue clear theses, but seek to paint identifying markers of
the Russian Catholic Church in general portraits. These descriptions range from marginally
helpful to useful and enlightening.
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The least useful is [The] Russian Catholic Church,94 which is a collection of Wikipedia
articles on the topics of the Russian Catholic Church, Russia, the Catholic Church, Patriarch, and
Exarch. The article on the Russian Catholic Church is a two page summary of its origins,
history, structure, and post-soviet revival. Slightly more helpful are the sparse descriptions
which appear in the two editions of The New Catholic Encyclopedia.
The first edition of The New Catholic Encyclopedia portrays the Russian Catholic Church
as an Orthodox Church in communion with Rome, saying only, “Catholic Russians of the
Byzantine rite number only about 3,000 and owe their beginnings to the embryonic Russian
Catholic Church of the Byzantine [Rite, sic!], begun in Russia in the first quarter of the 20th
century under Exarch Leonid Feodorov (1879-1935).95 This single sentence is found within the
section on Byzantine Catholic Churches. The second edition of The New Catholic Encyclopedia
allots a small section to the Russian Catholic Church, comprised of three sentences. In addition
to the above, the second edition says, “the Russian Catholics never mustered enough numbers or
support to have an independent hierarchy. There are two Russian Byzantine Catholic parishes in
the U.S.”96 This is inaccurate; the unofficial list of parishes published by the Society of St. John
Chrysostom of Ayatriada Rum Katoliki Kilise97 lists as parishes of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite:
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St. Michael’s in New York City, Our Lady of Fatima in San Francisco, CA, St. Andrew’s in El
Segundo, CA, and Christ the Redeemer in Chicago, IL. Though it lists Sts. Cyril & Methodius in
Denver, CO, that parish has closed. Additionally, Our Lady of Kazan in Boston, MA and Christ
the Redeemer in Chicago, IL are listed as closed in 1974 and 2003, respectively. Likely, the two
parishes referenced in The New Catholic Encyclopedia are St. Michael’s in New York City and
Our Lady of Fatima in San Francisco, which Donald Attwater emphasized in his presentation of
the Russian Catholic Church in America.98
Donald Attwater provided a useful introduction in a two volume work on the “Eastern
Churches,” first published in 1935 and revised and updated in 1961 to provide a pan-optic
description of the non-Latin Churches. The basic category of classification are those churches in
communion with Rome which he examined in volume I and those not in communion with Rome,
which he examined in volume II.99 Attwater devoted a short chapter to the Russian Catholic
Church, tracing its genealogy from baptism of Kiev, which he dated “about the year 989,”100
through the Council of Florence and the experience of the some members of the sect of
ñòàðîêàòîëèêè (literally “Old Catholics”) whom he called the “Old Believers.” He then shifted
to serialized descriptions of important persons who popularized the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite in
Russia, i.e. Vladimir Solovyev, Leonid Feodorov, Andrew Szepticky, Anna Abrikosova, and
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Nicholas Alexandrov. He followed this with a short review of the survival of the church through
a presentation of its parishes across the world. Part of the narrative includes the persecution of
the Russian Catholic Church both under the Tsars and under the Soviets, but does not proffer any
meaningful conclusion concerning such suffering. Presumably, the importance is self-evident.
Somewhat useful is Windows Westward: Rome, Russia, Reunion by Stephen Gulovich, in
which he expressed as his aim to “give a true picture of the historical background of the Christian
Near East,”101 and in so doing, argued that reunion between Rome and Russia is most possible
and likely through the Byzantine (Greek) Catholic Rites, which he mistakenly classified as the
Byzantine-Slavonic Rite. If this fundamental mistake is forgiven, his argument is politically
provocative. Written in a popular tone and beginning with descriptions of church architecture
and the Divine Liturgy, Gulovich recounted a general history of Byzantine Catholicism, in which
he argued that “its curse and nemesis was political intrigue..., [as] Russian political and
ecclesiastical leaders considered it Russia’s sacred mission to... convert the whole world to the
Orthodox Church.”102 The existence of Byzantine Churches in union with Rome is both the
clearest symbol against, and obstacle toward, this goal, which explains this persecution.
Correlatively, Gulovich noted,
The more the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite will flourish, the
sooner will the reunion of these separated peoples be effected. Conversely,
any injury inflicted on that Church will indefinitely postpone reunion.
Would that all Catholics, of all rites, understood. [sic!]103
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By accident, Gulovich demonstrated that the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite serves as a litmus test of
Orthodox-Catholic, Russian-Western, relations.
The best presentation of the Russian Catholic Church is accomplished by Florentyna
Rzemieniuk in Koœcio³ katolicki Obrz¹dku Bizantyjsko-S³owiañskiego (Neounia), or The
Catholic Church of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite (Neounion).104 Her aim, minimally, is to
recapture the memory of the Byzantine Slavonic Rite in a meaningful way, with its struggles in
the Kresy and in Harbin in Manchuria during the interwar period. While an excess of articles on
Eastern Church topics appear in popular journals, scholarship on the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite is
sparse. Even in her conclusion, she noted, “a lack of many kinds of works on the subject of the
Byzantine-Slavonic Rite exists in Polish and foreign historiography” (W polskiej zagranicznej
historiografii brak jest jakichkolwiek opracowañ na temat Koœcio³a katolickiego obrz¹dku
bizantyjsko-s³owiañskiego.)105 She presented (1) the origins of the Russian Catholic Church, (2)
its struggles in the Second Polish Republic concerning its Russian spirituality, its political
involvement, its contest with the Orthodox Church, and its struggle with the Greek Catholic
hierarchy, and (3) its struggles in Harbin as an entity caught between the USSR and China. Her
diocese-by-diocese analysis resembles the methodology used in other works of Church History;
n.b. Unia w Kuraszewie by Miko³aj Dawidziuk, which reconstructs the interwar experience of
the Russian Catholic Church in Kuraszew.106 Rzemieniuk primarily demonstrated the culturally
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indistinct position of the Russian Catholic Church in the Second Polish Republic. On the one
hand, the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite was not Polish, and in many cases, unwelcome. On the other
hand, it did have support in some quarters. Furthermore, using the center-periphery model,
Rzemeniuk argued that the Russian Catholic Church may have existed on the periphery– in the
kresy and in Harbin, but the Pope was nonetheless its head. The chief weakness of her work, as
well as the other descriptive histories, is that the significance of the Russian Catholic Church and
its experience is at best inferred. Iconic histories seek to remedy this by conveying the
significance of the description being relayed.
These iconic histories utilize religious imagery, overtly or covertly relying on the
Christian scriptural dichotomies portrayed in the final judgement: good and evil, truth and
falsehood, victim and perpetrator, i.e. the powerlessness in union with Christ and the powerful in
league with Satan. Iconic histories of the Russian Church have precedents in works such as
[The] First Victims of Communism: White Book on the Religious Persecution in Ukraine.107
Hide Me Within Thy Wounds: The Persecution of the Catholic Church in the USSR by I.
I. Osipova108 sought to recover the historical memory of the titular problem. Presumably, it is
written chiefly for former Soviet citizens. Similarly, The Forgotten: Catholics of the Soviet
Empire from Lenin through Stalin by Christopher Zugger sought to remind westerners of the
supposedly forgotten, and therefore marginalized, experience of suffering of millions of
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Catholics of every rite, “to bring an awareness of the complexities and marvels of the Soviet
Catholic Church...”109 These books are moral narratives intended to laud the virtuous, suffering
Catholics (of every rite) and condemn the vicious Soviets.
Osipova contextualized the persecution of Russian Catholics by reminding the reader of
the historical precedents of the Tsarist regime, the policy of which was “deliberately to portray
the Catholic Church as exclusively Latin and even Polish. Partly as a result of this, many
Orthodox were “firmly convinced that the ‘Uniate’ concept was a Polish Jesuit Papist plot to
seduce the Orthodox into Catholicism.”110 Any attempt at union, i.e. rapprochement between the
Russian Orthodox and Catholic Churches would be treason, and a betrayal of Russian society and
culture. Once Patriarch Tikhon expressed public support of real ecumenical dialogue with the
Catholic Church in the summer of 1920– in the midst of the Polish-Soviet War– the GPU began
its surveillance of the Russian Catholic communities both in Petrograd and Moscow.111
Osipova continued with the reports of informants, trials, and with life in prison camps for
those not executed. The moral charge against the Soviets of false arrest, torture, and
imprisonment, i.e. persecution, is made by an analysis of the judicial process and the experience
of the condemned. With regard to evidence, Osipova noted that it was collected by the
surveillance of the secret police, and questioned how voluntary a “‘voluntary collaborator’”112
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recruited from within the Russian Catholic Church would be. Additionally the reports do not
contain the natural language of those interrogated; rather, observations and information is shaped
into the standard trope of secret police reports, which used politically charged words used to
describe covert Catholic activity, such as “‘expose’, ‘win over’, ‘inform’, etc.”113
In regard to the experience of the condemned, the lengthy analysis of the experiences of
Catholic and Orthodox Christians in Solovki Prison and of the GPU preoccupation with the
Russicum are meant to show that Soviet attitudes were greatly in error. Osipova noted that
while the Exarch Leonid Fyodorov did not think universal rapprochement was possible between
the Catholic and Orthodox Churches outside of the action of grace, Fyodorov did notice that both
Catholic and Orthdox priests in the prison did, “in the end [become] ‘brothers in the Faith’.”114
In regard to the Russicum, Osipova marshaled evidence to demonstrate that its graduates were
not Clandestine Vatican agents, but were priests committed to serving the Catholic Church,
which meant in part the opposition to (atheistic, materialist) communism.115
Unfortunately, the book does not conclude but simply ends after the consideration of a
priest freed in 1955. However, Osipova has made her point: Russian Catholics suffered
unjustly. To further her point, she included photographs of the victims at the end of the book.
Osipova believed that the evidence largely speaks for itself. Contrarily, Rev. Christopher Zugger
constructed what a theologian might term a “passion narrative,” a narrative of redemptive
suffering of Catholics of every rite in Russia. Although Zugger did not explicitly use theological
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terminology, his underlying theme is one of theodicy, i.e. finding theological meaning in
suffering.
Zugger utilized Christian imagery which would resonate with the historical agents
themselves. He contextualized his analysis of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite by comparing Exarch
Feodorov and his flock to the “‘passion bearing saints’” Boris and Gleb, “who accepted death at
the hands of a renegade brother prince rather than plunge Rus’ into civil war and destruction.”116
Zugger provided a description of the Russian Catholic Church– a much richer description than
that found in the Descriptive Histories mentioned above– in which its members are portrayed as
suffering at the hands of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Soviet Government, and Polish
Roman Catholics. References to the Russian Catholic Church are found throughout the book;
however, he focused on the Russian Catholic Church in Chapter 13, “The Passion Bearers of the
Russian Catholic Exarchate.” This book is also an update and expansion of the monograph by
James J. Zatko, Descent into Darkness” The Destruction of the Roman Catholic Church in
Russia, 1917-1923,117 in which the fate of the Russian Catholic Church is attached to the Roman
Rite, and not woven into a narrative about Catholics in Russia.
The strength of this monograph is its ability to synthesize multiple themes in a chaotic
atmosphere into a comprehensible, unified narrative. Its weakness is its meager conclusion of
hope for the future, symbolized by the return of the Holy Cross Cathedral in Uzhgorod to Greek
Catholic use in 1991. Catholics of every rite did survive these persecutions, yet strategies for
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survival employed by Catholics– with the exception of reference to their hardy faithfulness– are
only minimally present in the narrative. While Iconic Histories seek to impart meaning by overt
or implicit allusion to Christ-like suffering, Topical Histories impart meaning in other ways, by
the study of restricted and distinct aspects of the Russian Catholic Church, rather than by a grand
overview and analysis.
Konrad Sadkowski examined the role of religion in the construction of national identity.
In an article examining the construction of Ukrainian national identity Che³m region from 19181939 and its conflict with Polish governmental religious policy, Sadkowski used the bishop of
Lublin, Maryan Leon Fulman, as an exemplar of normative Polish episcopal attitudes toward
minorities. Sadkowski demonstrated that these attitudes were shifting, becoming more
emotionally charged over time. He noted that while the Roman Catholic Clergy of the Lublin
diocese opposed the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite as a “‘Russifying’ instrument,”118

Bishop Fulman initially supported conversion to the Roman rite (and
Polonization), but when this failed by 1930 he became a proponent of
the Byzantine Slavonic rite as an instrument for proselytizing the Orthodox.
When this too proved a failure and Orthodox priests continued to arrive
in the Che³m region allegedly to provoke Ukrainian nationalism, Bishop
Fulman’s position toward the Orthodox clergy converged with his clergy’s.119

Sadkowski examined the related problem of relationship of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite
and the Roman Catholic clergy as agents of Polish national identity in “The Roman Catholic
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Clergy, the Byzantine Slavonic rite, and Polish National Identity: The Case of Grabowiec, 193134.”120 This reworks the issues considered in the previous article, but argues

the association between religious affiliation and national identity– i.e. Latin
rite Catholicism with Polish identity, Orthodoxy and Greek Catholicism
with Ukrainian identity and Orthodoxy with Belarusian identity– was too
powerful by the early twentieth century for the Vatican to override with an
overly theorized vision of a new religious harmony under its canopy.121

While the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite was not meant to be political, and its clergy was exhorted to
avoid anything that might be construed as political, the very existence and activity of the rite
itself was understood to be a Russifying agent, and therefore it was unavoidably political.
Sadkowski did more than demonstrate how, and even why, Polish Catholic clergy worked against
the neo-union; he raised important questions about the nature of the relationship between
Catholicism and Polish national identity without providing any answers.
Leon Tretjakewitsch examined the often overlooked problematic nature of Catholic, i.e.
Vatican, attempts at reunion through a biography of Michel d’Herbigny. Tretjakewitsch argued
that d’Herbigny and his contemporaries demonstrated an “unwillingness or inability... to learn
from history, [causing] them to repeat many mistakes of the past and therefore also to reap
largely the same results.”122 Tretjakewitsch noted that in spite of a short lived Catholic-Orthodox
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dialogue, any possibility of open discussion to lay the groundwork for reunion was impossible.
Polish political hostility, the political machinations of d’Herbigny, Catholic ecclesiological
assumptions of theological primacy and ecclesial self-sufficiency, and erratic and even
contradictory strategies for reunion made not only dialogue but any ecumenical activity counterproductive for reunion. Tretjakewitsch even noted the hostile opinion of the supposed
Russophile d’Herbigny toward Dostoevsky, finding “little or no merit in [Dostoevsky’s] novels,
[and identifying] Lenin and Trotsky as “‘spiritual sons of Dostoevsky.’”123 While Tretjakewitsch
clearly demonstrated the reasons for the failure of reunion between the Catholic and Russian
Orthodox Churches, he did not explicitly consider the problem as one of cultural prejudice.
Vincenzo Poggi introduced the theme of cultural prejudice in the concluding chapter,
“Pregiudizio culturale e ricchezza dell’Oriente Cristiano” [Cultural Prejudice and the riches of
Eastern Christianity”] of Per La Storia del Pontificio Istituto Orientale: Saggi sull’istituzione,i
suoi uomini e l’Oriente Cristiano [Concerning the History of the Pontifical Oriental Institute: A
Determination of the Institution, its Men, and Eastern Christianity].124 Poggi, proposed that the
roots of this prejudicial sense of superiority can be traced to the Middle Ages and more
specifically to Possovino, who in his opinion best exemplified this prejudice.125 However, Poggi
narrated the history of ecumenical activity as slowly moving away from this cultural prejudice,
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having its “splendors and disgraces” (“fasti e nefasti”) without making them clear in this rather
short chapter.
Overall, Catholic and Western histories of the Catholic Church and Russia utilize a
victim-victimizer model, in which the church is the victim and Russia and/or the Russian
Orthodox Church is the victimizer. In this way, the virtue of the Catholic Church is maintained
even if it makes mistakes, and the vices of Russia push it toward the traditional sense of
barbarity. Religiously, the predominant narrative is that of martyrdom of the Church, and under
the Soviets, with other churches as well. Politically, the predominant narrative is of conflict,
intrigue, and struggle, all of which seem to function as prologue to the Cold War. This
dissertation will differ, both in form and content.
The analysis of the conduct of the PCpR under the leadership of Michel d’Herbigny will
eschew the traditional religious and political analyses, which have preserved the victimvictimizer model of history. Rather, this dissertation will analyze how soft-Orientalist attitudes
of the members of the PCpR affected the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and
Russia between the years of 1925 and 1933, when the PCpR was an independent commission.
The PCpR existed within the Congregation of the Oriental Churches (CEO) since 1922,
and after it was re-integrated into CEO in 1934, existed until its suppression in 1993. More or
less, the life span of the PCpR was congruent with that of the USSR. Because Vatican archives
make available materials for consultation only up to 1939, a study which ends on the threshold of
the Second World War would leave an analytical narrative hanging. Examining the PCpR while
it was independent, from 1925-1939, gives a discreet view into the mentality of the PCpR. The
narrative can focus primarily on its relationship to Russia, with Vatican politics in the
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background, rather than have to shift the focus in 1934 to include that as well.
The analysis of this cultural history will utilize the categories employed by cultural
anthropologists in their study of religion: (1) creed, i.e. theoretical belief concern divinity, and
the relationship of the divine with the mundane which underlies the religion and provides a
foundation for the following elements, (2) code, i.e. the expected behavior required by the
religion, and (3) cult, i.e. the worship of the divine. Although a synchronic analysis would
provide a clearer understanding of the development of the mission of the PCpR and the PCpR
itself, the analysis will be diachronic, as it presents more clearly how soft-Orientalist attitudes
were at play in the aforementioned development. Within the context of that diachronic analysis,
infrequent references will be made to provide a minimal sense of the synchronicity of events.
This dissertation argues that the PCpR both utilized and perpetuated soft-Orientalist
attitudes present in Western European culture from the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The chief difficulty in making the case is how strongly to tease out the theme of softOrientalism. None of the members of the Catholic Church outrightly said they thought Russians
were a lesser people, though the constant concern about the suffering of Russia due to the
barbarous situation comes very close to making such an admonition. The difficulty is how to
make such a case prudently: Make it too strongly, and it becomes caricature. Make the case too
weakly, and it becomes inconsequential. Being co-opted by either extreme would render the
dissertation another means of conveying soft-Orientalism rather than an analysis of it.
Practically, the dissertation consists of five (5) chapters and a brief conclusion. This
chapter, Chapter 1, has presented the historiographical importance of the overall project. The
creation of understanding of Europe itself has been, in part, an exercise in soft-Orientalism, in
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which the historical narratives of the Catholic Church and Russia have contributed. Chapter 2
examines the logical question of why the Catholic Church needed a specific commission to deal
with Russia, when it had not needed one before. Succinctly, the PCpR was created out of the
sense that Russia, even before the Bolshevik Revolution, was becoming ripe for evangelization
and conversion to Catholicism. Chapter 3 examines the structural aspects of the PCpR and
Russia, and so includes those aspects of cultic worship, which help not only to form ecclesial
structures which not only conveyed, but themselves symbolized, soft-Orientalist attitudes.
Chapter 4 examines the creedal beliefs of the PCpR, which chiefly utilized the Russian
theologian Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900), who had himself appropriated and internalized softOrientalist attitudes. Chapter 5 examines the code of behavior– laden with soft-Orientalism–
which the PCpR employed in its aid to Russians and Russian refugees, the needs of which arose
from the post-Revolutionary barbaric situation in which they found themselves.
Practically, a brief note concerning the citation of archival materials is in order. Unlike
many archives, the holdings of the various archives of the Vatican are not numbered, and each
archive within the Vatican has its own system of cataloging its holdings. Therefore, citations
within this dissertation are constructed such that evidence may be easily found within the system
of each individual archive.
The archives of the Segretaria di Stato della Santa Sede per gli Affari Ecclesiastici
Straordinari (AA.EE.SS.), organize materials by country (such as Russia or Polonia), or by
Vatican bureau (such as the Pontifical Commission for Russia– PCpR). Within those subholdings, documents are archived by box and then folder. Within each folder, documents have
been stamped with page numbers. Thus, a footnote entry such as “AA.EE.SS., PCpR 1/3: 86”
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would mean that the reference data is held in the AA.EE.SS. archives, in the subsection dealing
with the Pontifical Commission for Russia, in the box #1/folder #3, on page 86.
The Vatican Secret Archives, or the ASV, organizes its sub-headings similarly, which are
in turn organized by year. Within those sub-holdings, documents are archived by box and folder.
Thus, a footnote entry such as “ASV Seg. di Stato (1920) 9/3: 12” would meant that the
referenced data is held in the Vatican Secret Archives, in the sub-holdings for the Secretary of
State in the year 1920, in box #9/folder #3, on page 12. The archives held at The College of the
Holy Cross in Worcester, MA, and the archives of the Congregation of the Eastern Churches
(CEO) are, relatively speaking, small, and requests are made directly to the archivist and by
appointment.
Documents in the AA.EE.SS, ASV, and CEO are predominantly reports made for internal
consideration. They include internal memoranda, minutes of meetings, copies of letters to– and
letters from– various ecclesiastical officials, copies of various moto proprii, and newspaper
clippings deemed important to consider. When placed within the culture of the “Romanitas” of
the Vatican, they are quite revealing of the motivations and practical business of the Eastern
Mission of the Vatican.
This history of the PCpR should have wide appeal. The ecclesiological and intellectual
themes should interest various scholars of religion: historians, anthropologists, and theologians,
while the examination of Russia should interest various scholars of the region. That being said,
the history of the PCpR really begins in the Levant.
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Chapter 2
The Holy Land, Modernity, and Modern Nationalism:
The Vatican Discovers Russia as Mission Territory

In Chapter 1, we saw how histories of the Catholic Church and Russia arise from and
perpetuate soft-Orientalist dynamics which render Eastern Europe as an internal other, more
civilized than the peoples of Asia or Africa, but less advanced than the peoples of Western
Europe. While Larry Wolff argued that these dynamics developed during the Enlightenment,1
they continued into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and were qualified by modernity,
nationalist movements, and the colonial project. The issue of modernity in Russia (or the
accusation of its lack thereof), and the essential connection between Orthodoxy and Russianness
(championed by the Slavophiles yet widely held in Russia), placed Russia– geographically and
culturally– on the fringe of a modernizing Europe. The Westernizer-Slavophile debate
confirmed the Russian acceptance of this ambiguous relationship to Europe. The Vatican, beset
with its own problems with modernity and the nationalist movements of Western Europe, came
to have an ambiguous relationship with Europe in its own way, also due to modernity, nationalist
movements, and the colonial project.
Both the nationalist and colonialist movements utilized religion to further particular
agendas; correlatively, the Catholic and Orthodox Churches contended independently with that
interplay. The Russian-Orthodox identity and Russian characterization of Catholicism as “the
Polish Faith” complemented the assertion that Orthodox Russia and the Roman Catholic Church
were irreconcilable. Yet, within the long nineteenth century and particularly in the Eastern
1

Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the
Enlightenment (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).
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Mediterranean Basin, the Catholic Church realized the potential for, and developed an interest in,
the conversion of Orthodox Russia to Catholicism.
From the Catholic perspective, such a union was theologically possible, although the
language of union was spoken from a position of theological superiority; the dissident Orthodox
Churches were to abandon their errors and return to the One, True, Church of Christ. Rome and
Constantinople had been in communion in the early Church, so the possibility of re-union
existed. Establishing communion between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Catholic
Church was more problematic.
The Patriarchate of Moscow established in 1325, after the formal schism of 1054. Lines
of communication between the Vatican and the Muscovite Patriarch were practically nonexistent, although some communication did occur. Perhaps the most relevant example is when
Ivan III (1440-1505) declined Papal overtures of union.2 However, the Russian religious
imagination– which thinks of Great Russia (Muscovy) as having an essential, historical
connection to Little Russia (Ukraine) and White Russia (Belarus)– claims that all of Russia
received Christianity in 988, with the baptism of Kiev. If this were the case, then Russia would
have been in communion in Rome until 1054, because it was in communion with Constantinople.
This logic was in fact asserted by Rev. Ivan Sergeevich Gagarin, S.J. However, Orthodox
ecclesiology does not accept this style of thinking. In many instances, two autocephalous
Orthodox Churches have excommunicated each other, but remain in communion with
Constantinople. A recent example would be the mutual excommunications of the Estonian and
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Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
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Russian Orthodox Churches, both of which remained in communion with Constantinople.
Ecumenical language describes the union between the Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches
as reunion of Churches, while the historical record shows a much more problematic relationship
between the Catholic and Orthodox churches.
However, the Union of Brzeœæ (1596) demonstrated that Greek Orthodox Churches in the
Polish Kresy could enter into communion with the Catholic Church, because they did. Yet, these
Byzantine Rite Catholic Churches existed as Catholic Churches with great difficulty. Their
Byzantine Rite made them less than Catholic to the Poles, and their communion with Rome
made them anathema to the Russians until their forced return to Orthodoxy in 1839. Their fate
was not only a barometer which measured the success or failure of Russian and Polish imperial
aims, but also gave the impression that an irreconcilable dichotomy existed– and exists– between
the Catholic and Orthodox worlds.3
Popularly, much has been made of the Schism of 1054. The sensational scene in which
the Papal Legate, Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida, acting with the full authority of Pope Leo
IX, laid the bull of excommunication on the altar of Hagia Sophia on 17 July 1054, prompting
Patriarch Michael Cerularius to respond in kind on 20 July, has been presented by historians and
theologians as a watershed between the Photian Schism4 (863-867) and the sack of

3
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Constantinople by the western Crusaders in 1204,5 in which political and theological differences
became irreconcilable.6 These dramatic events imply a definitive eccleisiologial break between
the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. Indeed the practice of using the labels “Catholic” and
“Orthodox to refer, respectively, to the Western and Eastern Churches, came in response to this
break.
In spite of the de jure mutual excommunication between the magisteria, inter-communion
among the laity remained a reality in the Levant. Serge Decsey began his study of The Melkite
Church by observing,7
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In the seventeenth century, we find a situation within the Turkish Empire so
unprecedented that, in fact, one has every right to wonder whether it is possible
to speak of a definitive schism between the Greek Churches and Rome during
this period, in spite the long-existing rupture. For despite an anti-Latin hostility,
more marked at Constantinople, Jerusalem, and Mount Athos, many Catholics
and Orthodox, both educated clergy and simple faithful, behaved as if there
were no schism at all between East and West. The innumerable cases of joint
celebrations and of communicatio in sacris are striking evidence of this attitude.8

Decsey asserted that this was possible because: (1) the Christians of both confessions lived in the
same areas and co-mingled, (2) the shared weight of the Ottoman yoke as non-believers gave
them a shared identity, (3) the Antiochene patriarch, Peter III, though unsuccessfully, assumed
the role of mediator between Michael Cerularius and Leo IX, (4) isolated acts of communion
were made by subsequent Antiochene patriarchs, and (5) the Latin missionaries sent by
Propadanda Fide successfully infiltrated the Levant (in what Decsey calls a “Trojan Horse” style
of settlement), and were well-regarded for their preaching and teaching. The relatively positive
relationship between Latins and Greeks did not last.
Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of
the Faith), commonly referred to as Propaganda Fide, was created by Pope Gregory XV in 1622,
and was charged with preserving the faith of Catholics in non-Catholic lands and with
proselytization of non-Christians. While initial missionary efforts did respect the Eastern
Christian liturgical and theological heritage, the post-Tridentine centralization tendencies began
to privilege Roman Catholicism. Latinization, i.e. the imposition of western liturgical practices
and doctrinal beliefs upon non-Roman Catholic Churches, became the standard practice,
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embittering Eastern Rite Catholics, and it remained in practice in spite of Papal exhortations to
the contrary found in Allatae sunt (1755).9 While relations between the Eastern Catholic rites
and the Roman rite remained problematic, the relations between Catholics and Orthodox took a
turn for the worse in the 1840s.
By this time, transport by rail and steamship allowed substantial numbers of Catholics
from Italy, France, and even the US to travel to the Holy Land. These pilgrims were relative
newcomers to the area, while devout Russian Orthodox believers had been making pilgrimages
for centuries. It was not merely the Russian presence that was important, it was the Orthodox
Russian presence. The majority of the earliest Russian writings concerning the Near East were
pilgrimage accounts.10
The connection between Russian-ness and Orthodoxy is virtually impossible to overstate.
Russians believed that one could not be Russian unless she or he was Orthodox, and believed
that the fullness of True Orthodoxy existed only in Russia. Even Orthodox Russian
commentaries condemn a “pagan” Russian attack of Byzantium found in the Russian Primary
Chronicle, because the Russians acted against Orthodoxy.11 Carrying that logic to its conclusion,
the mid-nineteenth century Russian theologian M.P Soloviev insisted,
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Russia’s name has been made known throughout every country by her statesmen
and politicians. It is quite different in Palestine which is our native land and in
which we do not recognize ourselves as foreigners. The participation of Russia
in the affairs of Palestine and the Christian East has not been the result of temporary
and transient political factors but from the beginning has been an affair of the people,
who instinctively and enthusiastically claimed the Holy Land as their own just as
much as Holy Russia.12 (Emphasis mine.)

The Russian connection to the Holy Land was not merely a matter of theological principle, but
also of practice. In 1842, the Russian Orthodox Church established an ecclesiastical mission
which lasted until 1917, the aim of which was to teach Russian and Greek, oversee the use of
Russian alms within the Orthodox millet in the Ottoman Empire, and support Russian pilgrims.13
Over the next few years, this mission developed into a rather complex undertaking in support of
these pilgrims, which included the construction and administration of a hospital, chapel, school,
and marketplace.14 In the wake of the Crimean War, Pan-Slavism contended with how to
understand Pan-Orthodoxy, as it included non-Slavs and included the Christian East.15 Indeed,
the Russian Orthodox presence in the Holy Land was well-established, enjoying a measure of
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both civic responsibility and religious authority. Contemporaneously, the Catholic Church
discovered a window into Russian Orthodoxy through Ivan Sergeevich Gagarin (1814-1882).
Gagarin, born into a traditional Russian Orthodox noble family, understood both Russia
and Orthdoxy quite well. He also understood the west very well; he was well educated, traveled
in Germany, France, and Italy as a youth, and spent years in Western Europe in the Russian
diplomatic service. His conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1842 and his entrance into the
Society of Jesus the following year provided the Catholic Church with a genuine expert. In
regard to his conversion, Beshoner, his biographer, observed,

We must remind ourselves that Gagarin’s conversion took several years: even
after the influence of Schelling in 1832, Chaadaev in 1835, and participation in
Svechina’s salon in 1838, Gagarin only converted in 1842. This decision did
not come easily for him: he began with a belief in the superiority of Western
civilization, then identified Western civilization with the Roman Catholic
Church, and accept Roman Catholic theology as the divine truth. Only then
could he accept conversion.16

As a Jesuit, Gagarin worked his entire life for the conversion of Russia, sometimes at odds with
his superiors and flirting with disobedience because his zealous desire to convert his homeland.
We find in Gagarin not only the seeds of thought which influenced Soloviev and
d’Herbigny (which will be identified in chapter 4), but ideas which the Vatican promoted during
his own lifetime. Gagarin eventually became involved with the Christian Near East after a coup
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within the editorial board of Études de théologie, de philosphie et d’histoire17 the journal he
founded to promote the conversion of the Orthodox, sidelined him. In addition to the many
theological and historical articles which addressed the possibilities and problems for reunion,
Gagarin also thought practically. Broadly, over many years, Gagarin developed many ideas for
the conversion of Russia in particular and Orthodox Christians in general, as well as for
safeguarding the Byzantine Catholic Churches. Gagarin warned against the Latinization of
Byzantine Churches, proposed the establishment of Byzantine-Rite scholasticates and seminaries
for men from, or who wanted to work within, the Byzantine Rite, and advocated the use of the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church as a doorway into Russia because it was a Byzantine-Slavonic Rite
Church. Gagarin finally got a chance to work with the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the early
1860s. The Levant, by that time, was a pitched spiritual battleground.
The first serious challenge came from a portion of the nearly 20,000 Catholic pilgrims in
the Spring of 1846. That year, Easter fell on the same day for both Churches,18 each of which
wanted to use the holy sites. When the Orthodox would not leave the Holy Sepulchre on Good
Friday, both Catholic and Orthodox pilgrims engaged in a deadly fight which left over forty
people dead and many more seriously wounded.19 Although subsequent antagonisms between
Catholics and Orthodox were not as spectacular, antagonisms did indeed grow.
In 1846, a local Franciscan printing press was founded for the publication of Catholic
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literature, allowing for local dissemination of Catholic ideas which, of course, challenged the
Orthodox position. In 1847, Pope Pius IX re-established the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem in
Jerusalem itself, which had not been the case since the fall of the crusader states 1291.20 The
Pope appointed Giuseppe Valerga, who had been a member of the Propaganda Fide, as the
Patriarch. The choice of a veteran of Propaganda Fide is important. It signaled that the primary
work of the Latin Patriarch was that of proselytization. Additionally, Pius IX promulgated an
impolitic general and generic encyclical letter in the following year (1848), urging the bishops
and clergy of the Orthodox Churches to re-enter communion with Rome.21 However, these
Patriarchs rebuffed his overtures in their public letter in May 1848 to “all bishops everywhere...
their most pious clergy... and to all... sons of the one, holy, apostolic church,”22 citing the filioque
as heresy and repudiating ultramontanism (examined below) as a legitimate exercise of Papal
authority. Valerga immediately began to oppose the efforts of Cyril II, the Greek Patriarch of
Jerusalem.
Cyril II moved the Patriarchal residence from Constantinople to Jerusalem itself. Ruling
until 1872, he attempted to solidify his authority over Orthodox Christians in the general region
of the eastern Mediterranean. He also sought to establish his authority over the Byzantine
Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. While these Byzantine Catholics had traditionally oscillated
between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, they recently found themselves more and more drawn to
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the Catholic Church.23
Correlatively, the Pope had directed that Propaganda Fide be divided into two sections:
one responsible for business pertaining to the Latin Rite, and the other responsible for business
pertaining to the Churches of Oriental rites which had a stable hierarchy, including the ItaloGreek Church. This new oriental section, the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide pro
Negotiis Ritus Orientalis24 was not to concern itself chiefly or only with liturgy as Propaganda
Fide had done previously, but with “doctrine, rite, discipline, direction, [and] the examination of
the affairs of the bishops and means to promote union.”25 Propaganda Fide was reorganized
officially on 6 January 1862. That same year, Pius IX promulgated Amantissimus,26 reaffirming
the respect of the Catholic Church for its diverse peoples and rites within it. Once again,
Latinization was condemned. Pius IX had cast himself as a patron of the Christian East. While
the Vatican sought to improve relations with its Byzantine Catholics, an opportunity arose to
bring a group of Orthodox Christians into communion with Rome.
In December 1860 in Constantinople, some officials of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church
approached Anthony Hassoun, the Armenian Catholic Primate, with the request to enter into
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communion with the Roman Catholic Church. In return, the Bulgarians asked that a Catholic
Bulgarian Patriarchate be created to preserve the Orthodox faith, and that their Byzantine
liturgical life be preserved. The Vatican responded favorably, and Pius IX ordained
Archimandrite Joseph Sokolski as archbishop for these new Bulgarian Catholics, who numbered
about 60,000.27
The conversion of this Byzantine-Slavonic Rite Church gave Gagarin hope and confirmed
for the Vatican that dissidents could return to the One, True Church. The hopes that Orthodox
Christians were ready to return to the Catholic Church were built on false premises. Beshoner
pointed out that both Gagarin and the Vatican mis-read the intentions of the Bulgarians. Their
conversion had more to do with seeking independence from Constantinople for reasons of
ecclesial prestige rather than accepting Catholic dogmatic and doctrinal formulations as the
truth.28 The Russian Orthodox Church, contrarily, would lose prestige– if not all of its
followers– if it traded the patronage of the Tsar for the Roman Pontiff.
Nonetheless, Russia itself would lose what prestige it had with its loss in the Crimean
War. At issue was the “Eastern Question,” i.e. how to handle militarily and diplomatically the
Ottoman Empire, the so-called “sick man of Europe.”29 Each of the European colonial powers
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attempted to address the Eastern Question in conjunction with its colonial interests, advancing its
own aims while hindering its rivals. The historiography of the Crimean War is complicated, but
without distortion we can say that Western imperial interests, France domestic politics, and
Russian religious attitudes brought Great Britain and France into open conflict with the Ottoman
Empire and Russia. Without dismissing the colonialist dimensions of the conflict, Russian
religious interest within the borders of the Ottoman Empire were germane to Vatican missionary
ambitions.
Since the reign of Catherine II, Russian Tsars claimed the role of protector of Orthodox
Christians within the Ottoman Empire, which, due to the structure of the millet system,
practically meant involvement over all Christians. However, after the creation of a Catholic
millet in 1831,30 the Tsars could no longer claim a de facto concern over Catholics. The French
Clerical Party took advantage of this situation to increase its influence within France and French
influence abroad.
Emperor Napoleon III, in an effort to preserve his government with pressure from this
French Clerical Party, posted one of its members, Charles de La Valleta, as the French
ambassador to the Sublime Porte. A zealous Catholic, La Valleta pressured the Ottoman Sultan
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Mahmud II to transfer the stewardship of some holy sites from the Orthodox Church to the
Roman Catholic Church. Tsar Nicholas was quickly losing his authority in the Ottoman Empire
over religious matters; this was finalized in the Russian defeat in the Crimean War.
The Treaty of Paris of March 1856 confirmed Russia as a European inferior. Politically,
Russia was required to recognize the neutrality of the Black Sea and to surrender territories near
the mouth of the Danube, effectively halting any territorial expansion it envisioned.
The subsequent Russo-Turkish War (1887-1888), while it dismantled the Ottoman
Empire in the Balkans, did not help Russia regain religious and geo-political influence in the
Eastern Mediterranean for which it had hoped. While the Treaty of San Stefano (March 1878)
displayed Russian power and prestige– including its role of protector of Armenian Christians, the
Treaty of Berlin (July 1878) which followed almost immediately clearly undid that. The new
treaty nationalized the Armenian issue, allowing the Great Powers to play the role of protector as
a weapon against the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian issue also signaled a shift in Great Power
politics, marginalizing Russia and forcing it to find an ally to replace Germany.31 Quintin Barry
noted, “Russia had been militarily exhausted by the war, and reality compelled her [sic!] to give
up some of the gains [it] had wrested from the Turks at San Stefano. In the end, the two empires
[the Ottoman Empire and Russia]... ended [the war] by sharing... a feeling of humiliation.”32
Although it had played a part in creating the map of nineteenth century Europe, Russia
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found itself on both the geographic and political fringe. Religiously, the Tsar was required to
renounce his claim of protective oversight over Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. In
the midst of these difficulties, the Vatican saw more clearly the possibility to increase its
influence in the Byzantine world. Success became all the more important for the Vatican with
the rise of Modernism and its unavoidable participation in the nationalist projects across Europe.
While the Catholic Church enjoyed the loyalty of many faithful Catholics across Europe,
it found itself in opposition to the major political and intellectual currents popular in the
nineteenth century, in which much of the old political and social order, with its corresponding
intellectual culture, was swept away. By the fin-de-siècle, the Catholic Church had accomplished
its own renewal of sorts by internal reform, strengthening its position in the Byzantine world, and
attempting to gain a spiritual foothold in Russia.
Broadly, Catholic reform in the nineteenth century was meant to resist the effects of
modernity. Politically, that meant surviving the effects of the nationalist projects in Western
Europe, which had as their aim transforming pre-modern conceptions of national identity to the
modern conception based on ethno-linguistic factors. Western European nationalists generally
cast the Catholic Church simultaneously as both an internal and external other, against which the
nation could, in part, find its identity. The success of this strategy across western Europe was
mixed and uneven.33 Two important exceptions existed in regard to employing the strategy of
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othering: Poland and Italy.
The Polish nationalist Dmowski, who only incorporated Roman Catholicism as part of his
nationalist program to woo Catholic peasants to his cause, created a program which proved, in
the long run to be more popular in Poland than that of Józef Pi³sudski. Rather than a Polish
identity based upon loyalty to the state which would be available to any ethnicity or nationality
but the Russian, adherence to Roman Catholicism and Polish as one’s mother tongue became
essential markers of Polish national identity.34 Rather than using Catholicism as the image of the
other, Judaism was the primary other through which modern Polish national identity was
constructed.35
The Italian nationalist projects of Cavour and Garibaldi functioned much like those in
western Europe: they sought to inculcate an Italian national identity within those people who
spoke Italian or Italian dialects while claiming territory which was argued to be Italian.36 The
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(New York: Longman, 1998), pp. 1-5, argues that three general schools of thought exist: (1) a
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opportunity for the benefit of the lower classes, hijacked by a small elite monopolizing power
and (3) a rightist school influenced by Catholic historians who argue that this same small elite
unjustly attacked the Church, thereby injuring Italian society. Antonio de Francesco agrees with
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Catholic Church and Catholicism, initially, was not immediately and automatically cast as an
other against which to construct modern Italy. Martin Clark noted that

[b]efore 1848, no one [i.e. no Italian nationalist intellectual] supposed religion
was incompatible with ‘national’ sentiment. Conceptually, it was and is
difficult to separate the Catholic Church from Italian history, as the Protestant
Reformation never made the gains in Italy as it had beyond the Alps. Many
Catholic intellectuals favored a ‘lay’ state, but one in which the Church would
retain a large social and cultural role.37

However, after 1848, sentiment changed for both Catholics and Italian nationalists.
The condemnation of the Austro-Piedmontese War (early 1848) over Austrian Lombardy
by Pius IX, even after the participation of the armies of the Papal States against Austria, turned
Italian Nationalist opinion against the Papacy. The Risorgimento became an anti-clerical
movement, forcing moderates to choose between church or state in the effort to create an Italian
nation.38 This dichotomy was not inevitable. Many scholars argue that before 1848, Pius IX had
been a liberal who both enacted reforms within the Papal states and accepted– at least to a
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degree– the political vision of Gioberti, the “neo-Guelph” vision in which Italy would be a
federation of states with the Pope as its president.39 However, with the loss of much of the
territory of the Papal states after 1860 (which coincided with renewed, intense difficulties with
the French government), Pius IX interpreted Italian nationalism as Italian secularization, and
became an “uncompromising foe of liberalism and of democracy, inside or outside the church.”40
Creating a link between nationalism, especially democratic nationalism, and
secularization was an important move. While secularism initially meant the transfer of church
lands to lay ownership during the Reformation and French Revolution, it came to have a wider
meaning, especially after 1865, to connote the expanding diminishment of religious or spiritual
outlook in the political, economic, artistic, and scientific spheres.41
While we see on the one hand that modern nationalism and secularization diminished the
prestige of the papacy, on the other, nationalism and secularization was the catalyst by which
nineteenth century Catholics re-imagined the papal office. Between 1820-1850, Ultramontanist
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movements emerged which advocated a strong, centralized papacy.42 The ultimate success of
Ultramontanism meant the defeat of Conciliarism– incidentally the governmental principle
operative in the Orthodox Churches– which had taken the shape in France, Germany, and Austria
as, respectively, Gallicanism, Febronianism, and Josephism.43
While Ultramontanists generally thought that they were restoring the prestige of the
papacy, Klaus Schatz argued that the Vatican reaction against modernity in fact altered the
papacy, reformulating its role.44 Modernity, which keenly brought to consciousness the role of
historical agency in human affairs, shifted the understanding of the magisterium from premodern shepherd-rulers “sustained by [the] stream of divine truth” to modern decision-makers
concerned about the “faith as transmitted.”45
This new understanding of the Papal Office prompted the magisterium to assert the
centralized ecclesial authority of the papacy at an unprecedented level through Pastor Aeternus,
the first Dogmatic Constitution of the Catholic Church (ratified during the fourth session of the
First Vatican Council on 18 July 1870). Indeed, as the Church lost territory and temporal
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authority, it asserted universal spiritual authority,46 i.e. across the globe and across time, when it
declared:

...the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church of God was immediately
and directly promised and given to Blessed Peter the Apostle, by Christ the
Lord. ...and it is known to all ages, that the holy and Blessed Peter, the Prince
and chief of the Apostles, the pillar of the faith and foundation of the Catholic
Church, received the keys of the kingdom from our Lord Jesus Christ, the
Saviour and Redeemer of mankind, and lives, presides, and judges to this day,
always in his successors, the Bishops of the Holy See of Rome, which was
founded by Him and consecrated by His Blood. ...[And we] must believe that
the Holy Apostolic See and the Roman pontiff possesses the primacy over the
whole world; and that the Roman pontiff is the successor of Blessed Peter,
Prince of the Apostles, and is true Vicar of Christ.47

Consequentially, the juridical primacy of the Pope extended toward Eastern Catholics, and
theoretically, to all Christians, including the Eastern and Russian Orthodox. This assertion was
unpalatable, even to Eastern Catholics. The Catholic Melkite Patriarch Gregory II, a participant
at the First Vatican Council, left Rome before the vote on the Constitution took place. In the
following year (1871), the Patriarch sent a letter of adhesion at the official demand of Rome, “but
with the same reservation as that solemnly enunciated by the Council of Florence in the formula
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‘salvis omnibus iuribus et privilegiis patriarcharum.’”48 Yet, three years later (1874), Pius IX
affirmed the respect of Rome for the Ruthenian (i.e. Ukrainian) Greek Catholic Church, citing
the value of diversity, and Vatican willingness to defend the Byzantine Rite when it had come
under attack, citing specifically the Russian conduct in the Kholm/Che³m region.49 While the
theme of this encyclical was similar to that of Amantissimus promulgated a decade earlier, the
post-Vatican I context gives this encyclical a different ecclesiological tone. The status of the
papacy had never been higher or grander. Overall, the Papacy became not only a means, but a
symbol, by which Catholics could reject modernity even as the temporal power of the church
waned.
Modernity is a complex phenomenon, with many cultural, social, political, philosophical,
and even religious roots and expressions which cannot be reconciled into a meta-system of belief.
Although we can speak of the concept of modernity, modernity as a single phenomenon or idea
does not exist. Nonetheless, modernity does take the individual autonomy of the human being
seriously, even if such autonomy and individuality is denied. As such, modernity is ultimately
rooted in the Cartesian “turn to the subject” which, in the attempt to create conditions for
certitude in knowing, divorced the knower (res cogitans) from what was known (res extensa).50
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Broadly speaking, this Cartesian “turn to the subject” shifted the chief philosophical category of
inquiry from metaphysics to epistemology. If knowledge were to be something other than
opinion, some reasonable reconnection between the knower and the known needed to be
established.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), in The Critique of Pure Reason,51 launched a “Copernican
Revolution” in European by providing a reasonable reconnection between the knower and the
known. Kant, in contradistinction to pre-modern thinkers, (1) rejected the mind as a passive
receiver of information from the world, instead emphasizing the active work of the mind in
creating knowledge from phenomenological experience, and (2) rejected– its champions would
say refuted– the pre-modern beliefs that metaphysics as a science was possible.
While Protestant thinkers embraced modern philosophy as a means to understand God,
the world, and the place of humanity in it,52 the Catholic Magisterium rejected two important
premises of modern philosophy: the autonomous, individual, human person as a means to
understand the person, and the rejection of metaphysics as a means to real knowledge. The
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Catholic Magisterium could cite the works of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831),53 Ludwig Feuerbach
(1804-1872),54 Karl Marx (1818-1883),55 and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834),56 as
examples of the problems of modernity. Hegel created a non-Christian theology, Feuerbach and
Marx turned theology into religious anthropology, and Schleiermacher created a fundamental
theology that was only meaningful and convincing for believers. Furthermore, the historical
method, which was a product of modernity and popular at Tübingen, made miracles and the
divine nature of Jesus problematic. The Life of Jesus57 by David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874)
challenged traditional Catholic biblical criticism and What is Christianity?58 by Adolf Von
Harnack rejected traditional Christianity of all kinds by calling for a return to the religion of
Jesus, rather than hold the religion about Jesus.
Some Catholic thinkers did engage and attempt to use modernism, especially the
historical method; most if not all felt the displeasure, of one degree or another, from the Vatican.
John Henry Newman (1801-1890), to whom d’Herbigny likened Vladimir Soloviev (examined in
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Chap. 4), was a notable exception because (1) he wrote his modernist works before his
conversion from Anglicanism to Catholicism on 9 October 1845, (2) his Essay on the
Development of Christian Doctrine maintains that through the incarnation of Jesus Christ,
Catholic sacramentality, Church hierarchy, and asceticism which are the essential doctrinal
elements of Christianity, were present in their fullness, and that only our understanding has
changed historically,59 and (3) after his conversion, his public apologiae for Catholicism were
generally well respected by the Catholic church, as he worked to build60 and to defend his
“imagined community” as congruent with Englishness,61 even as he was opposed by some within
the Catholic Church.62 While all of these Catholic modernists had precedent in the Church
Fathers (who sought to explain Christianity in accord with Greek philosophical concepts rather
than Jewish63), the Vatican did not think the use of Modernism was possible. Famously, Pius IX
(r. 1846-1878) rejected Modernism itself in the Syllabus of Errors.64 Subsequently, Leo XIII and
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Pius X officially rejected any use of modernist thought and reaffirmed the pre-modern premises
of Catholic Theology.
Aeterni Pastor65 promulgated in 1879 by Pope Leo XIII (r.1878-1903), advocated
scholasticism– more specifically Thomism– as the preferred intellectual framework for Catholic
philosophical and theological investigation, thereby preserving the pre-Kantian form and content
of Catholic theology. Secondly, the Oath Against Modernism promulgated in 1910 by Pius X (r.
1903-1914) was “to be sworn by all clergy, pastors, confessors, preachers, religious superiors,
and professors in philosophical-theological seminaries,”66 made the rejection of (Catholic)
Modernism, falsely held to be a single, comprehensive system,67 explicit. While the oath is
somewhat lengthy, the second paragraph gets to the heart of the matter:
Furthermore, with due reverence, I submit and adhere with my whole heart
to the condemnations, declarations, and all the prescripts contained in the
Encyclical Pascendi and in the decree Lamentabili, especially those concerning
what is known as the history of dogmas. I also reject the error of those who say
that the faith held by the Church can contradict history, and that Catholic dogmas,
in the sense in which they are now understood, are irreconcilable with a more
realistic view of the origins of the Christian religion....68
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Officially, the Catholic Church rejected the contemporary movements of philosophy, democracy,
and the dynamics of the modern nation state, while reaffirming the primacy of the Pope. On the
one hand, this put them out of step with most of Europe. On the other, embracing the struggle
against modernism provided– from a Catholic perspective– a dimension of philosophical
sophistication that Orthodox theology did not have, and which was later embraced by the
members of the PCpR. In the meanwhile, the Vatican set its sights once again on the Christian
East, under the leadership of Pope Leo XIII (r. 1878-1903), who understood himself as its
benefactor.
The most sensational Catholic effort in the Christian East was the Fourteenth Eucharistic
Congress, held in 1893 in Jerusalem, Syria, from the Ascension through Pentecost (11-21 May).69
Holding the congress in the Levant reinforced his attempt to have direct religious influence in the
Christian East, replacing that of the French,70 and instilled in many Catholic faithful a
consciousness of the Byzantine world.71
Additionally, he founded the Armenian College in Rome (1893), a Coptic College in
Cairo (1897), the Leonianum in Athens, and two Bulgarian colleges in Plovdiv and Edirne, as
well as the Seminary of St. Anne in Jerusalem for the formation of Melkite clergy. He also
restored the Athanasianum, a seminary for Greek Orthodox clergy, which was built by Gregory
XIII. In regard to policy, Leo XIII also promulgated the apostolic letter Praeclara
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gratulationis72 (20 June 1894) which called for the reunion of Christendom. In it, the Pope
praised the Christian East while defending papal juridical primacy, attacking the subjugation of
Orthodox Churches to state government, and evaluating the modern assertion of progress to be
false. Finally, Latinization remained a problem, and Leo XIII promulgated the encyclical
Orientalium Dignitas (1894) to attempt to renew a respect for Byzantine Church tradition.
Ironically, issuing such an encyclical was itself Latinizing, as it reminded everyone that the Pope
was more than first among equals; he claimed a juridical primacy even over the Christian east,
which had not been an aspect of their tradition.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church was solidly ensconced in the
Christian East. Insofar as the Holy Land was part of the Russian religious imagination, the Pope
had placed himself on Russian spiritual territory upon which it no longer had any real influence.
By the end of the nineteenth century, Catholic success in the Levant provided context to
rethinking its relationship to Russia. Ivan Gagarin (1814-1882), the Russian nobleman who
converted to Roman Catholicism in France, became a Jesuit, and worked his entire life for the
conversion of Russia to Catholicism. Later, Nicholas Alekseivich Tolstoi (1867-1938), Leonid
Feodorov (1879-1935), and a handful of others converted to Catholicism within Russia itself, in
spite of the dangers of doing so. The conversion of these men not only suggested the possibility
of more conversions in Russia itself, but illustrate soft-Orientalist dynamics at work.
Although aspects of the life and conversion of Gagarin have been treated earlier, it is
important to revisit his conversion, especially in regard to his self-understanding and his
72
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understanding of Europe. In his youth, Gagarin had substantial exposure to the culture of
Western Europe. He played with French children, was educated by a French tutor, read widely
(which included Catholic and western European texts), learned to speak French and Latin by the
age of ten, and went with his family on a three year journey to Germany, Italy, and France.
Beshoner asserted that Gagarin “received a favorable presentation of the West and of Western
intellectual scholarship.”73 Correlatively, Gagarin received the traditional Orthodox and patriotic
education. The interplay between these two strains defined Gagarin, which made him an enigma
in the west and eventually a pariah in his motherland. Neither his French Jesuit confreres nor
the his fellow Russian countrymen could imagine that he was both a Jesuit74 and a Russian.75
On the one hand, his Orthodox patriotism made him amenable to the ideas of Friedrich
Schelling (1775-1856), who advocated the notion that Russia had a great mission and was
therefore itself destined for greatness. Correlatively, he believed firmly that Russia, and only
Russia, could rightfully lead the Slavic nations.
On the other hand, the thought of Petr Chaadaev (1794-1856) was equally attractive.
Chaadaev claimed at once that Russia was neither European nor Asian and that only western
Europe possessed a common Christian heritage through the Roman Catholic Church. Russia was
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lesser because it did not share in that heritage.76 Gagarin framed his understanding of his
missionary work as a Jesuit through Chaadaev. The appropriation of these soft-Orientalist
dynamics by Gagarin represented, in a sense, the ideal conversion for the Vatican. The return of
dissidents to the fold meant admitting one’s imperfections and need of Rome, and the acceptance
of the Roman Catholic faith. Even as Gagarin warned against the dangers of Latinization and
promoted the union between a segment of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to the Catholic
Church, he did so as a Jesuit. Subsequent converts did not so readily accept the western style of
Catholicism.
The situation in which Rev. Nicholas Alekseivich Tolstoi (1867-1938)77 found himself
confirmed the legitimacy of the soft-Orientalist attitudes of Gagarin and the Vatican. Tolstoi, a
married man with children, had been ordained as an Orthodox priest in 1890, but his exposure
both to the Church Fathers and to Aquinas while in the Moscow Theological Academy attracted
him to the Catholic Church. After his graduation with honors from the Academy, he formally
joined the Catholic Church in November 1894, and after having been secretly ordained,78 was
incardinated within the Melkite Church with the understanding that he would continue to
function within Russia in the Byzantine Rite. This was necessary since the Russian expression of
the Byzantine Slavonic Rite did not come into existence until after 1907, when Orthodox convert
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Fr. Alexis Zerchaninov petitioned Metropolitan Sheptytskii for its establishment.79 Unlike
Gagarin, who by eschewing married life and the Byzantine Rite as a Jesuit, became “western,”
Tolstoi remained “Russian” as a married priest intent on remaining in the Byzantine Rite. Both
Tolstoi and Vatican officials assumed this would be problematic.
Tolstoi returned to Russia in April (O.C.)/May 1895 under a pseudonym,80 established a
Byzantine Rite house church in Moscow, and spent time in both Catholic and Orthodox
intellectual circles. However, the Holy Synod became aware of his activities, due mainly to
complaints by Orthodox priests who did not like the Catholicization of the Russian faith.81
Coincidentally, many local Latin priests did not like the Russification of Catholicism. Tolstoi
was short on local friends and allies, and the Vatican noted that this Russian Orthodox convert
was a victim, suffering at the hands of the Russians.
Tolstoi included the Pope in the canon during his celebration of the Divine Liturgy rather
than the Russian Patriarch or even the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, rendering his
worship an anti-Russian act. Like Gagarin, Tolstoi believed that true Orthodoxy consisted in
union with the Catholic church, the center of Christianity.82 Celebration of the Divine Liturgy in
this mode was therefore not an act of union, but reunion. The Orthodox church was considered
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by Latin and Greek Catholics– including Sheptyts’kyi83– to be schismatic, and the assumption
that Catholicism was the center of Christianity placed the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia
itself on the periphery.
Managing Tolstoi was an ad hoc venture which confirmed, for the Vatican, Russia to be
both a poor and a dangerous place for Catholics. Fearing the deportation of Tolstoi to Siberia,
the Vatican sent a letter to the Holy Synod on behalf of Tolstoi, and in conjunction with French
bishops, arranged for his probable exile in France which included, in part, financial support.84
Although Tolstoi did spend time in France, he returned to Russia in 1898, where he lived for the
rest of his life as a Catholic, partly dependent upon the continued financial support of the
Vatican, which was maintained through his French connections.85
Leonid Feodorov86 (1879-1935) was born in St. Petersburg into a poor Orthodox family,
and as a young man, attended the Orthodox Ecclesial Academy in St. Petersburg with the intent
of being ordained an Orthodox priest. However, during his studies he, like Tolstoi, became
convinced that true Orthodoxy demanded union with the Catholic Church. With the urging and
support of Fr. Stanislawski, the Polish pastor of St. Catherine’s in St. Petersburg, Feodorov left
the academy and traveled to Rome via Lemburg, where he met Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi who
encouraged him to remain steadfast in his Byzantine faith. Stanislawski, conversely, insisted that
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Feodorov be ordained as a Catholic priest in the Roman Rite, and Feodorov did not outwardly
express any resistance to this idea at the time.87 Feodorov was received into the Catholic Church
by Stanislawski on 31 July 1902 at the Gesu in Rome, which in and of itself symbolized the
precedence of the Roman church over the Russian: Feodorov was received into the Catholic
church in the mother Church of the Society of Jesus, the anti-modernist and Roman Catholic
religious order par excellence, on the Feast of St. Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit
order. He began his studies at the Jesuit Seminary in Anagni soon thereafter. Up to this point,
his outward conduct and disposition was reminiscent of Gagarin. He too, embraced “the Truth”
and having done so, placed himself in cultural and political opposition to Russia. This was not a
minor or theoretical problem; Feodorov assumed pseudonyms to escape the notice of the
Okhrana,88 and had to transfer out of the Jesuit seminary or face permanent exile outside of
Russia.89 Thus, his conversion and life was understood to be heroic, and Russian government
officials, once again, were villains. Russia remained not only dangerous, but poor. Like Tolstoi,
Feodorov was financially dependent upon the Catholic Church for his livelihood.
However, Feodorov had no intention of abandoning his Byzantine Catholic identity, even
if he participated in Roman Catholic religious and cultural expressions, such as being a member
of the Marian sodality while at the seminary. Although he had the authority of Orientalium
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Dignitas (1894) behind him, as well as the support of Popes Leo XIII and Pius X,90 Feodorov
experienced Othering dynamics.
Stanislawski expressed his disappointment to Feodorov in a letter for reverting to “‘this
Eastern rite which is associated with everything disgusting and retrograde in Russia,’”91 a rite
which Feodorov loved and felt was a part of his soul. While this statement is due more to Polish
national sentiment than ecclesiology, Feodorov found life in Rome difficult. The style of life
and studies at the seminary were completely foreign to him, and Russia was not at all a part of
the ecclesial intellectual landscape of his colleagues or professors.92 When Russia did emerge as
part of the intellectual landscape, westerners attempted to reshape it to fit a Catholic perspective;
the best example of this, in which Feodorov was involved, was the contest over the celibacy of
Byzantine priests in America (examined in Chap. 5). Additionally, Feodorov had appropriated
the western view that the West was the locus of rationality, while the East was the locus of
inscrutable mysticism, framed as the difference in emphasis on dogma and liturgy.
‘The Eastern Christian... only knows extremes; he is not conscious of the
Western distinguo; he understands only affirmo and nego. Hence his
inability to distinguish between faith and rite. If one tries to explain to
him the distinction between rite and faith... he will exclude the rite
completely from his religious practices and confine himself strictly to
prayer and sermons. This is how the Russian sects acted, and also the
Muslims or the Buddhists of Burma, Siam, and Ceylon.’93 (Emphases
mine.)
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In spite of appropriating these soft-Orientalist dynamics and in spite of his discomfort in Rome,
Feodorov persevered, and was ordained on 26 March 191194 by the Bulgarian Byzantine Catholic
archbishop Mikhail Mirov to serve as a priest in the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite. He spent time as a
Studite hieromonk before returning to Russia on the eve of the First World War.
The Vatican had success in its ventures into the Christian East and had made a few
Russian Orthodox converts to Catholicism. Perhaps it was time to venture into Russia itself.
The re-imagining of the Papacy as a decision-making office rather than a conveyer of the faith
had as a consequence the general overhaul of the Vatican bureaucratic machinery.
Pius X issued a major reform of the Roman Curia in 1908 in the Apostolic Constitution
Sapienti Consilio. While many congregations lost their authority and responsibility in many
areas, especially in regard to matrimonial issues, the Congregation for the Eastern Churches
within Propaganda Fide did not. It not only retained its power, but was given authority to
handle matters of the Latin Rite in territories traditionally understood to be Byzantine, as well as
handle issues with dissident Orthodox Churches.95 On 1 May 1917, Benedict XV issued the
Motu Proprio Dei Providentis which both established the Congregatio pro Ecclesiis
Orientalibus (the Congregation for the Oriental Churches) separate from Propaganda Fide, and
proclaimed the suppression of the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide pro Negotiis Ritus
Orientalis.96 Canon 257 of the new (1917) Code of Canon Law bolstered the authority of the
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Congregation for the Oriental Churches by making the Roman pontiff its prefect.97 Its decisions
automatically held the full authority of the pontiff without having to seek it through regular
bureaucratic channels. A group of Russophiles, most notably Michel d’Herbigny, worked within
this Congregation on the sub-commission, the Pontifical Commission for Russia.
The experience of the nineteenth century for the Catholic Church was tumultuous,
changing the way the Vatican thought about the Church and about its missionary possibilities.
The Vatican took a strong stance against modernity, both within and outside its walls. The
nationalist project both eroded the temporal power of the papacy and bolstered its spiritual
power. The ultramontane reaction across Europe transformed the Papal Office into a decisionmaking position. The Roman Catholic Church also found itself active in the Levant, through
which it found itself in a position to take advantage of a weakened Russia. The conversion of
some Russian Orthodox believers to Catholicism both confirmed soft-orientalist dynamics in
operation and the possibility of the conversion of Russia itself.
The Byzantine world had the attention of the Pope, and Russia came into sharp focus with
the end of the First World War. While the war might have shown Modernity to have failed,98 the
western European nation states themselves endured. The Vatican did not foresee any major
political shift in the west. Contrarily, the Vatican, like many other governments, expected the
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new Bolshevik government to fall quickly. In the midst of great poverty, starvation, and
suffering, the Catholic Church saw an opportunity to sow its seeds of faith on Russian soil. The
members of the Russian Commission within the Congregation for the Oriental Churches found
themselves busy in the years after the First World War.
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Chapter 3
Structural Expressions of Soft-Orientalism

In chapter 2, we saw that the Vatican, due to the changing circumstances of the nineteenth
century, bolstered its connection to the Byzantine Christian world as a means of strengthening
the Roman Catholic Church. Particular expressions included: (1) the creation of the
Congregation for the Eastern Churches (CEO)1 to assist in communication with Byzantine
Catholic Churches in order to prevent them from entering communion with the so-called
“dissident churches” (i.e. Orthodox churches), (2) an effort to increase a Catholic presence in the
Christian east, especially in the Levant both through the activity of CEO and through the 1893
Eucharistic Congress in Jerusalem, and (3) encouraging individual conversions of Russian
Orthodox after the historical failure of reunion with the entire communion of Orthodox Churches
through the Ecumenical Patriarch– last attempted in the Council of Florence– and the
limitations and problems inherent in the conversion of local (i.e. diocesan) Orthodox Churches–
as was done in the Union of Brzeœæ. The evolution of existing Catholic ecclesial structures and
creation of new ones strengthened the missionary ability of the Catholic Church in Russia, which
not only conveyed soft-Orientalist attitudes, but were themselves symbols of soft-Orientalism.
In the wake of the First World War, the Vatican attempted to strengthen the moral
position and institutional power of the Roman Catholic Church by working to alleviate the
effects of the Great War. With about twenty million combatant and non-combatant deaths, thirty
four million wounded, wrecked national economies, fallen governments, newly founded states,
and the birth of serious anti-colonial movements, World War I acted as a catalyst for many
1

Congregatio pro Ecclesiis Orientalibus
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profound political and cultural shifts both within and outside of Europe.2 In Russia, World War I
acted as a catalyst for the Russian Revolution, the Civil War among the so-called reds, whites,
and greens, the intervention of foreign powers in Russian domestic affairs, and wars with Poland,
Ukraine, and other nationalists. The Catholic Church therefore had plenty of opportunities
become socially and politically significant, and Vatican officials believed that Russia was
vulnerable to conversion to the Catholic faith, thereby enacting a “return” to the Catholic Church.
Throughout the 1920s, the Vatican refined its institutional structures to manage its Russian
mission, ultimately creating an independent Pontifical Commission for Russia (PCpR) to
address political, social, and ideological challenges, meet the material needs of the Russian
people, and most importantly, to manage the conversion of Russia to Catholicism. The
development of the PCpR occurred in three stages as it met these challenges: (1) the shift of
practical control of the Russian mission from Lwów to Rome between World War I and 1925, (2)
the creation of the PCpR as a formal congregation within CEO in 1925, and (3) its existence as
an independent and autonomous commission between 1930 and 1933. The PCpR and the
structures it managed were themselves expressions and conveyors of soft-orientalist values.
For the Pope, Michel d’Herbigny (recognized within the Catholic Church as a leading, if
not the leading, Russian expert), and others interested in the conversion of Russia were brought
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together to direct that conversion. During the course of their work, they would contend not only
with theological issues, but with political and socio-economic ones as well. While the Catholic
Church understood these issues to be theoretically related (ultimately due to the Doctrine of the
Incarnation), the efforts between 1917 and 1925 to convert Russia and to provide material aid
were unsystematic and generally lacked coordination. Even before the end of the war, Benedict
XV inquired among various religious orders concerning the prospects for making personnel
available for assignment to the Christian east, which stretched from the Levant into Russia.3 No
concrete plans were implemented at this point, and post-war missionary efforts were dictated
more by circumstance than planning. Additionally, various plans were contradictory and worked
at cross-purposes. For example, conversions of religious leaders like Feodorov could mean the
de facto conversion of many, but the “sheep-steeling” strategy would anger the religious leaders
of the flocks from whence these individual converts came. These tensions would be
compounded by whether or not the Byzantine Rite would be respected, and whether or not
Roman Rite Catholicism would be the dominant Catholic structural support for conversions. In
spite of these issues, the erection and operation of the Pontifical Oriental Institute (PIO)4 took the
initial lead in both the concrete articulation of the Russian mission and preparation for it.
The mission of PIO was simple, and was articulated rather succinctly in February 1919, in
a plenary session of the SCEO by its secretary,5 Nicola Cardinal Marini.
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The institute... is above all a center of apostolic formation and not a simple
academic institution... it has as its essential scope the formation of learned
apostles and not merely scholars.... It is a school of higher, practical studies
to fulfill the apostolic vision [i.e, the reunification of the Christian east with
the Roman Catholic Church] as schools of social and political science in
Paris and Florence fulfill their vision in the formation of career diplomats,
[and] as colonial institutes prepare agents, destined for the colonies, in the
bosom of the modern state.6
The PIO would accomplish this mission by teaching its students the theology, canon law, history,
and archeology of the various Eastern Christian Churches, as well as liturgical competency in the
Eastern rites and the ability to preach in the local languages.7 Marini was able to frame his
understanding of the mission of PIO in colonialist terms because of the Catholic understanding of
Orthodox Christianity and as the western European understanding of the Great War and its
legacy.
By the interwar period, the Catholic and Orthodox Churches had produced historical,
theological narratives which asserted their “self-sufficiency”8 and refuted the “self-sufficiency”
of all other churches. With regard to doctrine, the filioque and azymite/prozymite crises both
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This is the theological principle that a church– recognizable because of its structure– has
all the necessary means for the salvation of its members and that all other churches– recognizable
because of their structures– are lacking some or all of those necessary means.
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illustrated and created difference.9 With regard to church structure, the differing modes of
governance of the church by its authorities and the relationship between ecclesiastical and secular
authorities also illustrated and created difference between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches.
The historical complexity of these issues– and many others– were over-simplified in order to
create theological dichotomies to argue for “self-sufficiency” in the most advantageous manner.
In regard to church structure and modes of governance, the core issue was reconciling the
local with the universal church. The local church could mean the parish, the diocese, and in very
early ecclesiology, even the family. If counted this way, many local churches existed. The
universal church, contrarily, was the amalgam of all local churches and all individuals within all
of these local churches. Complicating this was the notion that the churches on every level were
mystically joined to heaven. Through catechesis, preaching, and the participation in sacred rites
(especially baptism and Eucharistic liturgies) the imagined community of the universal church
was created, and it stretched across the earth and into the heavens. By the interwar period, the
Orthodox Church asserted that the Church, properly understood, was the communion of local
churches in a sort of confederatorial arrangement, wherein each bishop had full, unimpeded
authority within his diocese, and a bishop leading a council was simply the “first among equals.”
Contrarily, the Catholic Church asserted that the Church, properly understood, was the Catholic
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These will be addressed in the following chapter. Suffice it to say now that the filioque
controversy concerns the addition of the phase “and the Son” in regard to the procession of the
Holy Spirit within the Trinity. The addition highlights theological differences between the
Catholic and Orthodox Churches, and the manner in which it was added highlights
ecclesiological differences. The differences in azymite (unleavened) and prozymite (leavened)
bread highlight both theological and cultural differences.
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Church, with the Pope of Rome10 imbued with juridical authority over the universal church on
earth as the Vicar of Christ in heaven. It would be awkward to speak of local Catholic churches.
These ecclesiological articulations created part of a common dichotomy which recognized
the existence of both the local and universal church but respectively privileged one over the
other. Liturgical differences in rite, language, dress, and calendar,11 and even church
architecture– broadly understood12– reinforced this dichotomy. Because this dichotomy was
bridged in Byzantine Catholic Churches not only in Eastern Europe but in the Americas, they
experienced Latinization.13 The efforts at Latinization rightly suggest that the dichotomy created
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by the Catholic and Orthodox Churches distorted not only their present, but their past as well.
Practically, Metropolitan Archbishop Andrei Sheptyts’kyi thought that Orthodox Christians were
convinced that the Catholic church thought the “Oriental Rite” inferior, and that they preferred
converts to become Roman Rite Catholics, in order to be “truly Catholic.”14 This dynamic will be
examined below, in regard to the creation of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite itself.
The relationship between secular and church authorities within the narratives of “selfsufficiency” correlatively helped create the dichotomies which distorted church history. Before
the Establishment of the Christian Church (i.e. the church which professed the Nicene, and not
the Arian, version of the faith), the non-cooperative, mutually-othering relationship between
Church and State was rather starkly defined. After the Edict of Milan (313) of Constantine and
the Edict of Thessalonika (380) by Theodosius, the relationship between the orthodox church(es)
and the Empire and their spheres of authority– sacerdotium and regnum/imperium– were much
more muddled and problematic.
Brian Tierney implies that the earliest example of this distinction is evident in 494, in a
letter from Pope Gelasius I (r. 492-496) to the Eastern Roman Emperor Anastasius I (r. 491-518),
in which Gelasius argues that each has its own sphere of authority.15 Yet, Pope Leo the Great (r.
440-461) told “the orthodox Greek emperor that he is invested not only with imperium but with a
priestly office (sacerdotium) and that by the Holy Spirit he is preserved from all doctrinal
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error.”16 In the west, similar confusions existed between the papacy and the Carolingian kings.17
However, by the interwar period, Orthodox and Catholic narratives glossed over these
problematic issues, and in order to assert that their own church had maintained a proper
relationship with secular authorities, but that the other Church had not.18 The Orthodox
Churches asserted the Pope had improperly gained secular power,19 while citing that it had
deposed Patriarchs of Constantinople for “aspiring to the purple.” The Roman Catholic Church,
contrarily, accused the Byzantine Emperors and Tsars with Caesero-Papism, the unjust
interference of the secular rulers in church matters. With regard specifically to the Russian
Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church cited the creation and operation of the Holy Synod by
Peter I20 as the logical consequence of such interference, ignoring the Russian Orthodox theology
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which sought to come to terms with this situation which they did not like.
On religious grounds, both the Catholic and Orthodox churches glossed over historical
events which would have implied theological and structural similarity, and chose to create
narratives which not only distinguished between, but helped to create the Catholic and Orthodox
Churches in accord with the principle of “self-sufficiency.” The dichotomy between east and
west and the Orthodox and Catholic worlds was firmly in place, and Catholic rhetoric had
established both its superiority and the need of the Orthodox to return to the “True Faith.”
Therefore, in 1919, after the colonial project had already reached its zenith, it was natural for
Cardinal Marini to frame the religious mission of the Catholic Church in colonialist terms.
For the Catholic Church, the alien character of Russia, marked by its profession of what
they believed was a deficient faith (examined in Chap. 4) guarded by a corrupted church structure
was compounded by the experience and effects of the First World War. While the war inflicted
unprecedented damage in combatant and non-combatant suffering and death, as well as massive
economic losses across Europe, it had particularly devastating effects on the fringes of Europe.
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire came a general re-organization of the so-called Middle
East, and in the former eastern German and western Russian lands, not only the effects but the
violence of war continued. While recent scholarship has brought the violence and political
instability in western Europe into greater focus,21 western politicians of the time attempted to
preserve the exceptional place and status of Western Europe. Perhaps the most obvious example
is the remark by Winston Churchill to David Lloyd George on the eve of the armistice, when he
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declared, “The war of the giants is over. The quarrels of the pygmies have begun.”22 In the
comparison, the western European powers are not only giants in comparison to the smaller
powers, but these smaller powers are represented as the obvious Other, as pygmies: small rather
than large, primitive and tribal rather than civilized, and therefore in the need of colonial-like
guidance. Margaret Macmillan notes that for the diplomats at the Paris Peace Conference,

[t]he war they had just survived [i.e. the Great War] made sense only if it produced
a better world and an end to war. That was what their own governments had
promised in the dark days, and that was what kept them going.... Harold Nicolson
spoke for many of his generation when he said: “We were journeying to Paris,
not merely to liquidate the war, but to found a new order in Europe. We were
preparing not Peace only, but Eternal Peace. There was about us the halo of some
divine mission. We must be alert, stern, righteous, and ascetic. For we were bent
on doing great, permanent, and noble things.”23

The continuation of war in Eastern Europe and the accompanying mass-scale suffering, even as
the western powers intervened in Russia, distanced it culturally and politically from the west.
Matthew Rendle noted in his examination of amnesties granted by the Bolsheviks, that “[h]orrific
tales of acts of terror [by the Bolsheviks] dominate contemporary accounts...”24 Bolshevik
Russia therefore had to be lesser and more primitive. Consequently, its white inhabitants would
have to resemble pygmies, even if they were physiologically European. Russia, beset by strife,
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was a wild land inhabited by wild people and filled with danger. Catholic missionary activity in
these lands was reminiscent, therefore, of nineteenth century missionary activity in Africa and
Asia, and earlier missionary activity in the New World. The Walsh mission operated in
conformity with these notions.
Although the whole of Europe experienced both post-war famine and epidemics,25 the
population of Russia was particularly hard hit. Russia experienced food shortages almost from
the very beginning of the First World War. The famine was the result not only of the legacy and
continuation of war which impeded economic and social recovery in both urban and rural
contexts, but a trade embargo by the allies which lasted until 1920, a financial blockade which
lasted until mid-1921, and two years (1920-1921) of successive drought. Bolshevik Russia had
been a diplomatic pariah for the west since the October Revolution and the Treaty of BrestLitovsk, and its inability to provide basic food and medical care for its citizens further
marginalized it in the western mind, especially after purported instances of cannibalism and
scenes of piles of corpses in the streets. Wild Russia had become even more barbaric.
While churches and western governments sincerely wanted to alleviate the suffering of
the Russian people, they did not want to support the Bolshevik regime. The project of relief
therefore became a medium of political struggle between the Soviets on the one hand, and the
25
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Russian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, and various governments (especially the United
States through its American Relief Administration or ARA) on the other.26 Historiographically,
the contentiousness inherent in the relief project has been preserved within the scholarship.27 For
the Catholic Church, both at the time and in subsequent scholarship this contentiousness was
articulated ideologically. Atheistic communism created wholesale suffering and death, while the
Orthodox Church was unable to rectify this, the Catholic Church would, in conjunction with likeminded western governments, come to the material and spiritual aid of the Russian people.
Initial Catholic response was uncoordinated. The Vatican sent American Jesuit Edmund
Walsh into Russia on a fact-finding mission (March 23rd - May 3rd 1921), who confirmed the
seriousness of the famine and the general suffering of the population. Other sources confirmed
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the Walsh report,28 prompting the Pope to describe the conditions of the Russian people as a
“catastrophe of history,”29 suggesting that the historically-conscious Communist program to
realize utopia was primarily at fault.
Benedict XV hoped that both Jan Cieplak, the apostolic administrator of the Archdiocese
of Mogilev and Eduard Van Der Ropp, its exiled archbishop, would be able to direct Catholic
relief efforts inside of Russia. However, this idea was soon abandoned, since it became clear that
Ropp would not be allowed back into Russia (he had been arrested for anti-revolutionary
activities, sentenced to death, and only allowed to leave Russia because of the intercession of the
Pope), and the Soviets had begun a campaign of arrests which included Cieplak and the
confiscation of church wealth and property in a simultaneous effort to fund its own famine relief,
de-legitimize both Russian Orthodoxy, and, to an extent, de-legitimize Catholicism, the foreign–
and predominantly Polish– faith. The Soviets, while claiming not to be “persecuting religion of
any sort,” defended their policy by claiming to arrest only clergy whose “political activity [was]
directed against the internal or external safety of the Soviet Republic.”30
Initial Catholic efforts were ad hoc. The Vatican sent fifty train cars of relief supplies
into Russia, gave one million Italian Lire to the International Relief Commission in Switzerland,
made an appeal to the League of Nations, and made general appeals to its own Catholic bishops
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and faithful.31 Simultaneously, a long term plan was being worked out. Cooperation with the
Soviets was absolutely out of the question. Working in conjunction with the Orthodox church,
though a theoretical possibility, was eschewed in clear favor of working with the ARA; Edmund
Walsh was assigned to direct Catholic relief within the ARA, and Louis Gallagher (another
American Jesuit) was assigned as his chief assistant. The Catholic association with the ARA
rather than the relief efforts of the Orthodox Church highlighted both the general effectiveness of
the west and ineffectiveness of the Orthodox Church.
In part, association with the ARA was a good practical choice. The ARA was wealthy,
relatively speaking, and most importantly, its mission was protected by the Riga Agreement
which it had concluded with the Soviets. It was also well-administrated, alleviating the church of
that responsibility. The ability of the west to give concrete aid to the Russian people stood in
sharp contrast to the inability of the Soviet government, which was forced to confiscate church
wealth.
This had a dual benefit for the Bolsheviks: economic gain and the de-legitimization of
religious moral authority. The initial appeal for aid by Patriarch Tikhon and the solace offered by
his church in the midst of suffering was eroded as he, along with Orthodox clergy, spoke out
against the confiscation of church wealth (its land, icons, and most especially, its sacred liturgical
vessels).
In spite of the fact that the Catholic Church also suffered similar trials, these problems
confirmed the Catholic opinion toward the Russian Orthodox Church. Gallagher reflected on
this state of affairs as they manifested themselves in December 1922, when Pontifical relief was
31

Zatko, “The Vatican and Famine Relief in Russia,” pp. 56-57.
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in full operation:

The great drive on the Russian State Church was coming to an end. The
Orthodox churches had already lost over a hundred million dollars worth
of sacred vessels, icons, and gold and silver ornaments. The Catholic
churches, less ornate in decoration, had lost some hundreds of thousands
of dollars worth in similar objects. The Bolshevik Government had the
Orthodox Church well in hand and under control. With the Catholic Church
there was no question of control because with that Church there was no room
for compromise on fundamental principles.32

We will see below that this also included rare and important books.
After the conclusion of the Papal relief mission and the show trial of Cieplak et al. (the
mid- 1920s), Gallagher went on a lecture tour in Ireland and the United States to discuss Papal
relief efforts. While he promised that he would include “nothing political”33 in the lectures and
would practically aim to ensure that Catholics would be willing to make donations for future
charitable undertakings, the entire context of the lectures was political. The simple fact that the
Russian people were starving to death in the most horrible conditions while the Soviets were,
from the Catholic perspective, looting churches and passing laws to forbid the public religious
worship, reinforced the Catholic world view in the minds of those attending these lectures. The
Vatican secretary of State, Pizzardo, confirmed this in a letter to Gallagher when he wrote [in
English], “the conferences which you propose to give on the Pontifical Relief Work in Russia
will be most opportune, and will, I venture to hope, be effective in re-awakening political
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sympathy with the grand mission of charity there in which you have taken so notable and devoted
a share.”34 While it was possible to create feelings of sympathy for Russia in many western
nations, this was not possible in Poland. The recent rebirth of the Polish “feniks” from the ashes
of the empires which had partitioned it inspired the Polish population to renewed patriotism,
which included a suspicion of any remnant of a legacy of those partitioning powers.
Perhaps the most obvious symbol of that legacy was Orthodoxy which was generally
associated with Russia. The forced incorporation of the Greek Catholic Church into the
Orthodox Church demonstrated to the Poles both the political ties of Orthodoxy to Russia and the
non-Polish quality of Byzantine Catholicism. The decision by many former Greek Catholics to
remain Orthodox rather than re-enter the Catholic Church after 1918 confirmed this non-Polish
quality of Byzantine Catholicism.35 Therefore, to be Orthodox was minimally not to be Polish.36
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Consequently, after a lively debate between the “Cathedralites” and “Anti-Cathedralites”
the Poles tore down the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Warsaw, “the largest and most
conspicuous Orthodox Church in all of Poland,”37 to demonstrate that Warsaw, as well as all of
Poland, was free from Russian rule. Additionally, the existence of non-Polish speakers and nonRoman Catholics in Poland, as well as Polish-speaking Roman Catholics beyond the borders of
Poland, necessarily politicized religion for both the Polish as well as the Soviet government.
This process of reconstruction of the Polish State in the years just after the “Great War”
was mostly concluded by 1921 (the year in which the Constitution was ratified and the Treaty of
Riga was signed), though minor conflicts (in several areas in the Carpathians, most notably
Spisz/Spiš) persisted until 1925.38 The borders of the II RP contained 388,000 square
kilometers,39 and according to the 1921 census, Poland counted 27,092,025 million people.40 The
census, which used language as the marker of nationality, showed that the II RP consisted of
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about: 70% Poles, 14.3% Ukrainians, 7.8% Jews, 3.9% Belarussians, and 3.9% Germans.41
The 1931 census which also used language as the national indicator, showed only minor
changes: of the 31.9 million citizens, 22.01 million were Poles (69% of the total population), 4.8
million Ukrainians (15%), 2.7 million Jews (8.5%), 1.5 million Byelorussians (4.7%), 700,000
Germans (2.2%) 80,000 Russians (0.25%), 80,000 Lithuanians (0.25%), and 30,000 Czechs
(0.09%).42 Of this total number, the census identified that roughly 64.8% of the population was
Roman Catholic, 10.5% was Greek Catholic, 11.8% was Orthodox, 9.8% was Jewish, 2.6% was
Evangelical (Protestant), and 0.05% practiced other religions.43
These numbers and percentages meant that roughly one-third of the citizens of the II RP
were not ethnically Polish and were not Roman Catholic. In other words, the minority was small
enough that they had virtually no hope of having any real effect in the Sejm, but large enough that
they could not be ignored by the ethnically Polish majority.44 Within the Greek Catholic
population, the Ukrainians vastly outnumbered the Belarusians, and many of the discriminatory
policies toward minorities were aimed at them.45 Their champion was Andrei Sheptyts’kyi
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(1865-1944), the Greek Catholic Metropolitan of Halicz-Lwów and ardent Ukrainian nationalist.
The Sheptyts’kyi (or Szeptycki) family could trace its roots to Rus’ as a boyar family that
had long been culturally and linguistically Polonized. Sheptyts’kyi was christened “Roman” in
the Roman Catholic Rite, but returned to the Byzantine Rite of his ancestors to champion
Ukrainian nationalism.46
Although committed to Ukrainian nationalism, Sheptyts’kyi eschewed violence as a
means of obtaining Ukrainian independence.47 John-Paul Himka noted that Sheptyts’kyi
“roundly condemned the murder [of a Polish count by a zealous Ukrainian nationalist in 1908] as
a terrible sin, as ‘politics without God.’”48 Andrii Krawchuk argued that Metropolitan
Sheptyts’kyi was first a man of the church whose social and political policies were not
formulated to serve Ukrainian nationalist ambitions, but for a type of social justice which would
serve all nations involved, Poles and Ukrainians alike.49 For the government of the Second
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Polish Republic, such a distinction was meaningless, especially after the Polish-Ukrainian War of
1918-1919. The support of Ukrainian nationalism by any means– religious or secular, violent or
non-violent– was a threat, and Sheptyts’kyi was a Ukrainian nationalist.
The tensions between the Polish government and Sheptyts’kyi created practical
ecclesiastical difficulties for Rome in the summer of 1921, when the Polish government began
strong protests of the earlier consecration of Josyf Bocian (the rector of the Greek Catholic
Seminary of Lwów) in 1914 by Sheptyts’kyi as the Greek Rite bishop of £uck. Although £uck
fell within culturally Polish lands in 1914, it was, legally and politically speaking, in Russia.
However, after the Treaty of Riga in 1921, £uck was again part of Poland. Sheptyts’kyi
maintained that he had the right to consecrate Bocian by a private verbal agreement with Pope
Pius X in 1907 claiming, “all faculties necessary for the restoration of Slavic [Rite] Catholicism
in Russia and the acknowledgment of the rights which are maintained and prescribed to the
Uniate Metropolitan of Halicz who has succeeded as the Metropolitan of Kiev.”50 He therefore
claimed legitimate authority to have appointed Bocian, although no record existed within the
archives of CEO or of those held directly by the Holy Father.51 By July 1921, the Vatican
decided that the extraordinary faculties granted to Sheptyts’kyi by Pius X– if they had indeed
existed– had expired.52
Furthermore, Sheptyts’kyi had been in St. Petersburg during the special synod in late
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March 1917, convened to deal with the revolutionary atmosphere in Russia. Appealing to the
authority he claimed had been given him verbally by Pius X, he led the synod to install Leonid
Feodorov as the Exarch of the Russian Catholic Church.53 The Polish government was
uncomfortable at best with a connection between one of its citizens and Russia. Suspicion
concerning the affinity between Byzantine-Rite Christians and Moscow was confirmed– or
perhaps created– in the October 1921 discovery and arrest of supposed communists (described by
the Polish government as a “Bolshevik-Communist Congress”) which met in the Greek Catholic
church of St. John in Lwów.54 In the following December Grabowski, then the voivode of
Lwów, accused 200 “Uniate” priests in Galicia as having sympathies with Russian Orthodoxy.55
The Vatican began to doubt the ability of Sheptyts’kyi, the outspoken Ukrainian nationalist, to be
effective in leading a Russian mission.
This became clear to the Vatican in the summer of 1923. Sheptyts’kyi had returned to
Rome after a pastoral visit to Ukrainian communities and their Greek Catholic Parishes in the
United States and Canada. Sheptyts’kyi intended to return rather quickly to Poland, but was
impeded by the Polish government, which claimed that he had espoused anti-Polish
propaganda.56 This displeasure was heightened by a pastoral letter that Sheptyts’kyi wrote during
his stay in Rome, which he promulgated on June 29th, the Feast of Sts. Peter and Paul.57
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Sheptyts’kyi did not explicitly mention the anti-Ukrainian disposition of the Polish
government or the chauvinism of Roman Catholic Poles in general, and citing Romans 13:1-2, he
exhorted all Christians to be obedient to the government. However, his appeal to true Christians
to render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, and unto God what is God’s, was at once a clear
condemnation of Polish governmental policies and a charge of hypocrisy against Poland. The
response in Poland was outrage.
Almost immediately, the Polish press protested the return of Sheptyts’kyi to his diocese,58
and by August, the Ministry of Religion forbade the publication of the letter in Poland even
though Sheptyts’kyi had earlier gotten approval to write it.59 Rev. Buczko, the secretary for the
Ruthenian Rite consistory in Lwów, condemned the conduct of the Polish government when he
wrote to Rome, “we are not in Bolshevik Russia, but in Poland.”60 Concurrently, the Polish
government resisted the return Sheptyts’kyi to his diocese. They stalled on issuing (or renewing)
his passport, and insisted that he remain in Vienna rather than try to return to his diocese.61
When Sheptyts’kyi did cross the Austrian-Polish border on August 22, he was arrested, detained
on the train (in his sleeping car), and then due to reasons of health, moved to a hospital run by
religious sisters.62 With the exception of Przegl¹d Katolicki which condemned the arrest, the
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Polish press generally supported the government action.63 Subsequently, Sheptyts’kyi was forced
to make a public profession in which he not only affirmed his loyalty to the Second Polish
Republic, but also recognized that his diocesan territory was an intrinsic or integral part of
Poland.64
The Vatican did not like the intransigence of either the Polish government or
Sheptyts’kyi.65 The mutual antagonisms between them made it clear that neither would be
helpful in realizing the Russian mission. Additionally, the general patriotic behavior of Roman
Catholic bishops in Poland66 (e.g. their general support of the Endecja, the recall of Nuncio
Achille Ratti to Rome,67 the unfolding of the Matulewicz Affair68) and the general difficulty in
concluding a Concordat with the Polish government made a Polish-led mission to Russia
unattractive. If the Russian mission was to succeed, it would have to be led by someone other
than Sheptytsk’yi and outside of Poland.
The shift of the leadership of the Russian mission from Lwów to Rome was in many ways
spearheaded by the Jesuit Michel d’Herbigny, who developed the PIO (which had been entrusted
to the Society of Jesus in September 1922) as the institutional tool to manage the Russian
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mission. Korolovsky noted that d’Herbigny “found professors, recruited students, began and
indefatigably pursued the gathering of a unique library, such as did not exist in Rome...”,69 all of
which helped to erode the considerations of Pius XI to close the PIO, beset by nationality-based
discord and rivalries among members of various religious communities. The acquisition of the
library is an important element not only in raising the value and prestige of the PIO, but it also
demonstrates the underlying soft-Orientalist attitude of the CEO.
While the Vatican refused to work with the Bolshevik government in the project of
famine relief, it paid the Soviets six thousand Italian lira to acquire important and rare Russian
books,70 which the government in turn used for famine relief. While d’Herbigny could argue that
the purchase of these books both preserved an important aspect of Russian culture (since they
could have been destroyed, for example, as part of the anti-religious campaign) and concretely
aided the Russian mission, the Vatican took advantage of the weak position of the Soviet
government to increase its own wealth.
Yet, the rhetoric of the PIO insisted that the Christian East– including Russia– was in
need of Rome. Orientalia Christiana (currently Orientalia Christiana Analectica), a journal
founded by d’Herbigny, published by the PIO, and dedicated to the exploration of issues
concerning the Christian East, argued this point. While the articles in Orientalia Christiana were
scholarly, their underlying logic was congruent with the “colonial” mission articulated by
Cardinal Marini. Although d’Herbigny wrote many articles in the early 1920s concerning
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ecumenism, “L’unité dans le Christ”71 (“Unity in Christ,” 1923), “La Vraie Notion
d’Orthodoxie”72 (“The True Notion of Orthodoxy,” 1923), and “L’Aiuto Pontificio ai Bambini
Affamati della Russia,”73 (“Pontifical Aid to the Starving Children of Russia,” 1925) collectively
argued the for the necessity of the Russian mission.
In “L’unité dans le Christ,” d’Herbigny recognized that schism among the various
Christian Churches was a collective sin, from which the Catholic Church was not excluded, and
asserted that all Christians are obligated to work for unity. However, that unity is found in
communion with the Pope, who has universal jurisdiction, rather than bishops of other places– he
cited as examples the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Archbishop of Canterbury– who have
local jurisdiction. He concluded his argument by quoting Soloviev, “Now, children, it is the time
to fulfill the supreme prayer of Christ for his disciples: Ut sint Unum! [That they might be one!]74
That our brother Peter [The Pope] might gather us the lost sheep of the Lord.”75 Unity therefore
demanded conversion to Catholicism.
In “La Vraie Notion d’Orthodoxie,” d’Herbigny, argued this point specifically with

71

Michel d’Herbigny, S.J., “L’unité dans le Christ,” Orientalia Christiana 1 (1923): 1-29.

72

Michel d’Herbigny, S.J., “La Vraie Notion d’Orthodoxie,” Orientalia Christiana. Vol.
II, no. 7 (December 1923): 1-33.
73

Michel d’Herbigny, S.J., “L’Aiuto Pontificio ai Bambini Affamati della Russia,”
Orientalia Christiana Vol. IV, no. 1 (Apr 1925): 1-75.
74

The thought of Soloviev was the ideological and intellectual basis for much of the work
of the PCpR. He will therefore be analyzed in depth in chapter 3.
75

D’Herbigny, “L’unité dans le Christ,” p. 29. “Maintenant, enfants, il est temps
d’accomplire la suprême prière du Christ pour ses disciples: Ut sint unum! Que notre frère Pierre
puisse paître les dernières brebis du Seigneur.”
110

respect to the Russian Orthodox Church through a type of straw-man argument against a wellrespected contemporary Orthodox theologian, Nicolas N. Gloubokovsky. Gloubokovsky argued
that in spite of the historical co-development of Orthodox Churches and nations, such as in
Greece and Russia, the Orthodox faith was universal. D’Herbigny claimed that Gloubokovsky,
by making this claim, rendered the Christian faith as a transcendental abstraction, which in turn
rendered the doctrine of the incarnation and the very existence of a church meaningless. In
refutation, d’Herbigny proposed that the Catholic Church, as a truly universal church, has
faithfully maintained the Christian faith. True Orthodoxy, therefore, is possible only in
communion with Rome, and consequently, Russia stood in great theological need of Catholicism.
It also stood in great material need, which the Church could provide.
In “L’Aiuto Pontificio ai Bambini Affamati della Russia,” d’Herbigny described the
response of the Catholic Church to the horrific conditions due to the famine, primarily utilizing
descriptive text and graphic pictures. Minor consideration was also given to the show trials of
Cieplak and Constantine Budkiewicz,76 to demonstrate the barbaric, despotic behavior of the
Bolsheviks.77

While d’Herbigny portrayed the efforts of other western organizations positively,

describing the overall effort as “a grand example of universal fraternity,”78 the Bolsheviks– who
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were outside of this fraternity– were condemned as enemies of the church and the Russian
people. This notion was supplemented with concrete images of refugees, on whom the Catholic
Church spent thousands of lira since 1918, in an attempt to alleviate their suffering.79 It rendered
refugees powerless, pathetic, and in need of the west.
Additionally, the Ivanitzky case of the early 1920s reinforced the Vatican view of the
Bolsheviks. Raphael Ivanitzky-Ingilo, a Georgian with a wife and ten small children, had fled
into exile in Germany, leaving his family in Tiflis. Because he was an Orthodox ecclesiastic of
some importance, he appealed to the Pope for aid through Eugenio Pacelli, the nuncio in Berlin.
After careful deliberation, he was awarded 500 lira in October 1924, and in February 1925, the
Vatican awarded him an annual pension of 3,600 lira.80
For d’Herbigny, who had the ear of the Pope, the spiritual and material needs of Russia
which was suffering Bolshevik rule were great, and the Catholic Church had the obligation to
meet those needs. The field of acceptable candidates to lead this venture was small. The
nationalist disposition of the Polish bishops and the politically problematic Ukrainian
nationalism of Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi made them unacceptable. Catholic prelates either in or
exiled from Russia were out of the question. Correlatively, the protracted and difficult
negotiations with the Polish government concerning the Concordat, the unjust mistreatment of
Greek Catholics in eastern Poland, and the Bolshevik view that Catholicism meant Polish
interference, demonstrated to the Vatican that Poland would not be the ideal location from which
to stage the Russian mission. Rome, however, offered a safe location easily managed by the
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Pope, and contained the experts needed to pioneer this mission to Russia, most notably Michel
d’Herbigny.
The Pontifical Commission for Russia (PCpR) was officially established on Palm Sunday
(5 April) 1925 “in the bosom”81 of CEO, and announced in Osservatore Romano immediately
after Easter Sunday.82 Its creation was somewhat of a departure of the general character of the
working committees within CEO, which were organized by rite83 rather than by specific
missionary objective. D’Herbigny, in a series of private audiences beginning on the first of
February, established the positions on the commission, the appointments to those positions, and
the general areas of responsibility and authority.84
Because the Pope was the Prefect of CEO (which was the case until 1967), the PCpR
was, juridically, directly answerable to him. However, the cardinal secretaries of CEO, Giovanni
Tacci Porcelli (1925-27) and Luigi Sincero (1927-1930, and again 1933 ff.), oversaw the PCpR.
Michel d’Herbigny, as relatore (supervisor) and the chief Russian expert, managed the practical
daily business of the PCpR with Carlo Margotti as the secretary. Although members of the
commission shifted, Bishop Isaiah Papadopoulos was a constant member until his death in
January 1932. His personal history, which resembled that of Leonid Feodorov, made him a
valuable but always junior member of the PCpR.
Papadopoulos, a Greek Orthodox priest, converted to Catholicism and eventually became
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the titular bishop of Gratianopolis and the head of the Greek Byzantine Catholic Church85 which,
like the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite Church, was very small in number, existed in a sea of
Orthodoxy, had an uneasy relationship with the local Latin Rite Catholics, and defied the
popularly held assumption that to be Catholic was to be a national Other. As such, he understood
the difficulties of establishing Catholicism within geographic and conceptual territory which was
constructed, in large part, by Orthodoxy. Additionally, he exemplified the ideal Orthodox
convert in the imagination of d’Herbigny: not only did he “return to the true faith,” but worked
for the similar conversion of others.
Papadopoulos, by no means a Russian expert, was a native Orthodox Christian who
entered communion with Rome, while the Roman Catholic d’Herbigny, who was merely granted
faculties in the Byzantine Rite, was a Russian expert. The Vatican imagination concerning the
Russian mission, greatly influenced by d’Herbigny, conceived of the Russian mission primarily
as a mission to the Russians who were Orthodox, rather than as a mission to the Orthodox
Christians in Russia. Since Russian identity was cast primarily as cultural and political and not
religious, d’Herbigny was therefore the obvious choice as the relatore. However, the personal
history of Papadopoulos provided him with the ability to speak authentically to Orthodox
Christians who suffered war and were aware of the cultural difficulties of conversion. Even
without expertise in Russia, Papadopoulos might very well have been a fine relatore of the
PCpR. However, he would always be a convert and in Roman bureaucratic circles, an outsider
drawn into the fold. On the contrary, d’Herbigny was a native Catholic whose political acumen
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allowed him to negotiate Vatican bureaucracy with ease.
The PCpR was given authority over (1) all territory in Soviet Russia, Siberia (including
Transcaucasia and Vlodivostok), and Georgia, (2) all rites within that territory, which included
not only the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite, but also the Latin, Armenian, Georgian, and Calcedonian
Rites, (3) the production and promulgation of propaganda for the conversion of non-Catholics,
i.e. “dissident” Orthodox, Muslims, Jews, and pagans, (4) care of Russian refugees in various
countries throughout the world, in whatever form was deemed necessary, and (5) any work
connected to these responsibilities. The PCpR would also aid the SCEO in resolving canonical
questions– such as matrimonial and baptismal difficulties and the appointment of bishops– and
providing solutions for Russians who desired to study in the West.86
The PCpR worked vigorously to carry out this mission. Their work, in regard to points
three through five, will be examined in subsequent chapters. However, none of that work would
have been possible without the ecclesial structural apparatus to support and sustain that work.
The most fundamental was the diocese.
The ratification of the Vatican-Polish concordat by the Sejm on 27 March 1927 allowed
Pius XI to promulgate the bull Vixdum Poloniae Unitas, which reorganized the diocesan
structure in Poland so that diocesan boundaries matched political frontiers. Lasting until the
Second World War,

[t]he decree divided the country into five Latin-rite metropolitanates..., the sees
of Warsaw, Gniezno-Poznañ, and Lwów joined by new archdioceses of Kraków
and Vilna [recovered from Austria-Hungary and Russia, respectively]. In addition,
Lwów retained its status as the archiepiscopal seat of the country’s two Eastern86
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rite congregations, the Armenians and Greek Catholics.87

The Polish dioceses had two practical effects for the PCpR: (1) Because the Byzantine-Slavonic
Rite within Poland would not have its own parallel diocesan structure alongside the Latin and
other Greek Catholic Rites, the Latin– and not Greek Catholic– Rite bishops became the
ordinaries of Byzantine-Slavonic Rite parishes. (2) Unlike in Soviet Russia and in spite of the
ethno-religious tensions, the Catholics of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite had administrative and
material support of the Latin Rite bishops. (3) The eastern borders of the eastern-most
metropolitanates of Lwów and Wilno88 defined the western borders of the western-most dioceses
of Russia.
The traditional Roman Catholic dioceses of Russia were considered missionary dioceses
because they had existed in an Orthodox country; they included the archdiocese of Mohilev and
the bishoprics of Wilno, Somogitia, Lutsk-Zytomir, and Tiraspol. Originally, Mohilev included
all of Great Russia, the pre-war territories of Belarussia, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, and parts
of Ukraine, Siberia, and Central Asia. The Diocese of Samogitia had covered most of the
Lithuanian territory, and the Diocese of Vilna included the rest of Lithuania. Lutsk-Zytomir
included Volhynia, Podolia, and parts of the territory which had been part of the ancient
principality of Kiev. Tiraspol covered Bessarabia, Odessa, the Crimea, the Caucasuses, and a
section of territory between the Volga and Don Rivers. However, by 1926, because of the
changes in boundaries and the difficulties with the Soviet Government, these ancient bishoprics
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were replaced by ten apostolic administrative regions,89 technically overseen by Exarch Feodorov
who was responsible for Byzantine Rite Catholicism throughout Russia. However, because he
was an Exarch and not a bishop overseeing administrative regions rather than a diocese, he held a
lesser ecclesial status, even below titular bishops who were often nothing more than
administrative personnel. The necessity of administrative reorganization reinforced the Vatican
view that Russian territory was wild, while the persecution of Catholics reinforced the view that
Russia was barbaric.
Correlatively, the Orthodox Church also faced serious challenges to its institutional
structure after the success of the October Revolution. Beginning in 1918, the Bolsheviks
published general anti-religious decrees restricting religion and outlawing certain practices, such
as catechetical instruction in schools or church ownership of property. These laws did, however,
permit the performance of religious rites by adults, so long as they were deemed by the
government not to interfere with the public order.
While Catholic historiography has generally portrayed Bolshevik anti-religious policy as
a unified, systematic plan which unfolded over time– increasing in intensity as the Bolsheviks
solidified power– their policies were in fact both flexible and shifting, depending upon the timeframe and the religion in question.90 The manner of survival of the Orthodox Church depended
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primarily on the particulars of accommodation with respect to the Soviet government.
Accommodation is the willingness of a church to cooperate with a society and
government which does not operate strictly according to “gospel values,” implying that it
understands itself to be somehow separated from the larger society. Accommodation functions
on a spectrum, ranging from complete accord between church and state (as in a theocracy) to a
relationship just short of complete discord and hostility, whereby the church is outlawed and
persecuted, and the church judges the government unworthy of support. While this played out in
Russia with many different Christian and non-Christian faith communities, the Vatican was
chiefly interested in the mode of accommodation between the Bolshevik government and the
Catholic and Orthodox Churches.
In regard to the Catholic Church, the Soviets viewed Catholicism as a means of
Polonization and the Vatican viewed Soviet behavior toward the Catholic Church in Russia as a
form of martyrdom. With Vatican-Soviet diplomatic stalled in the early to mid-1920s over these
questions, Pius XI seized the opportunity for some improvement when Metropolitan
Vvendensky, a leader of the Renovationist movement, invited Michel d’Herbigny to visit the
Soviet Union. D’Herbigny entered the Soviet Russia with the claim that he was there for
vacation and study. During this first in a series of often-portrayed “clandestine visits,”
d’Herbigny focused on Soviet political action.
While famine and violence were the chief mechanisms which had– from the point of the
view of the west– rendered Russia wild and barbaric, the failure of Orthodox Christianity would,
in a sense, demonstrate the pervasiveness of that barbarity. The Orthodox Church, led by
Patriarch Tikhon, rejected any accommodation with the Soviet government on the theoretical
118

grounds of its atheism and the practical grounds that it had confiscated (or “looted,” according to
the Orthodox) a great deal of church wealth.91 Edward Rosloff convincingly argued that the
notion of “heresy” within the Orthodox Church prevented any real ability to reach an
accommodation.92
While the majority of the Russian Orthodox population supported the Tikhonites, the
public confession of guilt and oath of loyalty to the new regime by the Patriarch in June 1923
indicated to d’Herbigny and the Vatican that the Orthodox hierarchy was ineffectual. Hansjacob
Stehle noted that overall, d’Herbigny found the Tikhonites “theologically rigid, religiously and
politically implacable, and absolutely passive,”93 but was more impressed with the Renovationist
program.
In May 1922, a group of priests– with tacit support from the government– deposed
Patriarch Tikhon and established the “Living Church,” intent on extensive reforms. Most of
these reforms were liturgical, and many had been previously and seriously debated by the
traditional Orthodox hierarchy; e.g., the use of Russian rather than Church Slavonic in the Divine
Liturgy, shortening the Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom celebrated universally in its
monastic form, and opening the royal doors of the iconostasis at the beginning of the liturgy so
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the faithful might see the sacred Eucharistic rites. Some reforms reflected an effort to come to a
practical, working relationship with the Soviet government, which by the mid-1920s was stable
and would clearly endure. Many of these reforms centered around social justice considerations,
which justified the aims but not the means of the new government to remove oppressive social
structures from Russia.
The Living Church– popularly termed “Renovationist”– had neither a unified program of
reform nor a systematic means of implementing its reforms, relying instead on particular gains
made on the local level. Many of the Russian Orthodox faithful were suspicious of the
Renovationist program, as the fractured nature of reform indicated to them the lack of the Holy
Spirit at the Renovationist councils. D’Herbigny, therefore, maintained that it “had ‘no hopes of
establishing permanent roots among the population.’”94
A major reason for disunity within the Living Church was disagreement on the degree to
which it ought to have accommodated the Bolshevik regime. D’Herbigny identified a two-fold
division by describing the “Church of the Revival,” led by Metropolitan Antony, as “red,” since
it cooperated more fully with the Soviets than the Church of the Renovation, led by Metropolitan
Vvedensky (with whom d’Herbigny was greatly impressed95), as “concordatory.” Mgr.
d’Herbigny was the first to frame the conflict between the churches as a political matter, missing
the deep cultural problems of the Renovationist program, especially in regard to the liturgical
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calendar.96
The Soviets had adopted the Gregorian calendar in 1918, as it was scientifically more
accurate than the Julian, and used by the rest of the world. They demanded the Orthodox Church
do the same. The willingness by the Renovationists and the brief consideration by the
Tikhonists provoked a strong negative reaction among the general Russian population,
principally because changing the calendar would undo the traditional way of life. Somehow,
d’Herbigny missed this.

He returned to Rome with favorable political impressions of the

Renovationists, having in mind (1) their seeming willingness to work toward union with Rome–
in contrast to the Tikhonites, and (2) the structural integrity of the Living Church, noting both an
intact hierarchy and the existence of seminaries. He published some of his opinions in the
December 1925 edition of Etudes97 (a French Jesuit scholarly journal), in the form of a travel log.
Both Tretjakewitsch and Zugger take care to explain how d’Herbigny was too naive to realize
that the outreach by Metropolitan Vvedensky and the entire council was staged to give exactly
this impression,98 which worked toward the advantage of both the Renovationists and the Soviet
government.
D’Herbigny subsequently convinced Pius XI that the time was opportune to plant
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clandestinely the seeds of the Catholic Church. From the political perspective, the Tikhonites
were marginalized, and although the Living Church enjoyed structural integrity, the support from
the Bolsheviks– such as it was– was not enough to overcome popular dislike. Furthermore, the
hostility of the Soviet government toward the Catholic Church– often exemplified by the show
trials of 1923 in which Feodorov, Cieplak, Budkiewicz, and fourteen other Catholic priests and
one layman were convicted– demonstrated the importance of the clandestine character of the
undertaking. Pius XI agreed. On 29 March 1926, Pacelli secretly consecrated d’Herbigny as the
Bishop of Ilien (Troy in the classical world), and d’Herbigny clandestinely entered Russia twice
more to take stock of the situation and, in turn, secretly consecrate bishops to provide a
foundation for an underground Catholic Church.
Writing once more in the form of a travel log,99 d’Herbigny shared remembrances of his
April-May trip through Russia. Because Paques 1926 en Russie was meant for widespread
public consumption, with the aim of edifying the faithful, d’Herbigny did not discuss his secret
consecrations of bishops, most notably the Assumptionist priest Pie Eugene Neveu, whom he
appointed as the Apostolic Administrator of the Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Mogilev
(replacing Jan Cieplak and supplanting Leonid Feodorov).100 He did share his impressions of
Russia in a way familiar to those in the metropole, overlaying a Catholic sense of sacred time on
his travels in a non-Catholic space.
The title itself, Paques 1926 en Russie, framed the entire journey within the holiest of
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liturgical seasons. The journey began on Holy Thursday and ended on the Feast of the
Ascension. D’Herbigny employed images of healing a sick Russia and a sick Russian people to
render the journey, and the work done therein, as holy. From a theological sense, the journey
could be said to have occurred during a kairos, rather than ordinary chronos, because of the
liturgical framework which connects his sojourn in Russia to that of Christ in the world. By
overlaying a Catholic imaginative landscape upon the damaged physical landscape of Russia,
d’Herbigny created a dichotomy between what Russia was and what Russia should be. It also
helped to construct a sense of alienation from the space he was in, furthering the portrayal of his
work as Christ-like. Russia was spiritually and physically Other.
The physical landscape itself was punishing; d’Herbigny noted that in the early part of
April, temperatures reached well below zero during mass. He also expectedly related the
condition of the Christian faith as deplorable. The anti-religious policies, the lack of priests, the
arrests, and the suffering of the people (in the aftermath of the famine) rendered Russia as a place
of hardship and danger. Although he noted that he could easily bring sacraments to people in
their homes and in Soviet hospitals, he had to do it without the requisite solemnity due the
sacrament, implying that even the seemingly easy things were still marred by Soviet policy. In
spite of the difficulties, d’Herbigny gave his readers reason to hope in the success of his mission:
there are even incidents in which Orthodox dissidents pray with Byzantine Catholics.101
Although d’Herbigny portrayed this prayerful union as charitable, it was not a union of equality.
Mgr. d’Herbigny did understand the Russian people to be lesser. In “L’âme religieuse
des russes d’après leurs plu récents publications,” published a year before his missionary travels
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into Russia as a bishop, d’Herbigny portrayed the Russian people to be psychologically beset
with a folkloric religion, which was a blend of Orthodoxy, spiritualism, and occultism, which in
turn made them vulnerable to Bolshevik anti-religious propaganda.102 Though not part of the
article, the folkloric description of general Russian society in general would implicitly place
them, culturally and sociologically, behind western Europe on the time line of progress– a mark
of soft-Orientalism. In this context, the Orthodox liturgical calendar was part of a corrupted
Christianity which needed to be replaced by Rome. This viewpoint was confirmed by Feodorov,
who noted that Orthodoxy had become such a part of Russian culture that one could claim, “I do
not believe in God, but I am Orthodox.”103 This would, for d’Herbigny, justify his use of the
Gregorian Calendar in his travels through Russia, on sociological as well as theological grounds.
The creation of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) also
demonstrated the lesser status of Russia to the PCpR. In 1920, Patriarch Tikhon had issued
decree no. 362 in which he stated, “In the event a diocese...finds itself completely out of contact
with the Higher Church Administration...the diocesan bishop immediately enters into relations
with the bishops of neighboring dioceses for the purpose of organizing a higher instance of
ecclesiastical authority.”104 That same year, without knowledge of this decree, thirty-four émigré
Russian bishops (from Russia, Europe, Asia, and North America), with the blessing of the
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Patriarch of Constantinople, convened a council and created the magisterial structure of ROCOR.
They elected Metropolitan Antony of Kiev and Volyn– who had been a rival of Tikhon for the
Moscow Patriarchate– as their hierarch and in 1921, and moved their headquarters to
Yugoslavia. In 1927, ROCOR formally separated from the Moscow Patriarchate when its
imprisoned Patriarch, Sergius, issued a declaration on the recognition of the Soviet state, in
which he required that his clergy sign an oath of loyalty to the government. In response, a synod
of the Moscow Patriarchate convened on 9 May 1928, and issued an ukase which declared the
ROCOR and its activities invalid.
This schism between ROCOR and the Russian Orthodox Church reconfirmed the Roman
view that the Russian Orthodox Church had been corrupted by Russian politics. Not only was it
in schism, the schism within ROCOR (i.e. the Platon Affair) demonstrated to the Vatican the
thoroughness of the structural corruption within Russian Orthodoxy. The institutional implosion
of the Russian Orthodox Church confirmed the need for a Catholic, Byzantine-Slavonic Rite.
This Byzantine-Slavonic Rite, like the Chinese Rites of the Jesuits, was a conscious
construction, but one which drew upon both historical elements and existent communities in its
construction, unlike the Chinese rites. While the Chinese rites had incorporated “pagan” and
Chinese cultural elements which ultimately brought about their prohibition,105 the ByzantineSlavonic Rite was an already existent Christian liturgy. Furthermore, the rite its roots in the
conversion not only of Orthodox clerics, but also of lay women and men. Perhaps the most
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notable lay converts were Anna and Vladimir Abrikosov,106 who wished to be Catholic but
continue worshiping in the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite. However, the Catholic expression of this
rite was not officially established until after Fr. Alexis Zerchaninov, who after his conversion,
formally petitioned Mgr. Sheptyts’kyi for the creation of such a rite. Sheptyts’kyi, whose
authority rested in the claim of the verbal mandate by Pius X, responded by appointing
Zerchaninov as the vicar general of the rite.107 Unlike the Orthodox bishops who brought their
entire dioceses into union with Rome at Brzeœæ in 1596, Sheptyts’kyi– as well as other Catholic
prelates– did not expect mass conversions, but hoped to gain individual converts to fill up this
new rite.
Although this Russian Catholic Church of the Byzantine Slavonic Rite was new (hence
“neounion”), it was constructed from historical elements. Its Divine Liturgy remained practically
indistinguishable from that of the Russian Orthodox Church, including its tones, tropars,
kondaks, and liturgical language– Old Church Slavonic– which was (and is) also used by the
Bulgarian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches.108 Although the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite Church
was not a product of the Union of Brzeœæ, it became an indirect inheritor of its legacy.
The Greek Catholic Churches formed by the Union of Brzeœæ were geographically and
culturally situated between Russia and Poland. Timothy Snyder noted that this Union created a
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de facto state church, since both Catholic and Orthodox dioceses within Poland would henceforth
be oriented solely toward Rome.109 Barbara Skinner noted that even before the modern
nationalist project of the nineteenth century, the Greek Catholic Churches helped to galvanize the
politics of Poland and Russia. The so-called “Uniate” Churches were one means of Catholic
expansion to the East, thereby becoming a target of Russian counter-expansion to the West.110
Tsarina Catherine II, although regarded contemporaneously as politically tolerant, was
nonetheless firmly anti-Greek Catholic in temperament. Insofar as Greek Catholics were
Catholic– which included a Latinized Byzantine liturgy and western-style training of its clergy–
they became Polish.
The political ramifications of Latinization first played out in their support of the
November Uprising of 1830-31 within the Polish or Congress Kingdom. The Congress Kingdom
was a semi-autonomous entity with a constitution which recognized the Tsar as the King of
Poland with strong executive power. Yet, it had its own government (the Polish Sejm remained
in existence and Polish was the official legal language), judiciary, civil service, many civil rights,
and even its own army. The near taste of freedom, juxtaposed with the involvement– or perhaps
interference– of the autocratic Tsar Nicholas I and his ministers– inspired the Poles to attempt to
regain it wholly.
Although the uprising had an almost comical start, some initial successes made this a
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serious military action. The eventual Russian victory had equally serious consequences. The
Congress Kingdom ceased being a semi-autonomous political body and insofar as it existed, it
was solely a legal one. The Russian government suspended its constitution and many civil rights,
abolished the Polish army and Sejm, implemented punitive taxes and a program of Russification,
and closed universities and other institutions of higher learning.111 Additionally, in the wake of
the uprising, the Russian government “took note of the pro-Polish activities of the Uniate clergy
and especially the Basilian order.”112
As a consequence, in 1839, the Greek Catholic Churches outside of the former Congress
Kingdom were reincorporated into the Orthodox Church, and it became illegal to be Greek
Catholic or convert to Catholicism of any rite. Additionally, all of the Basilian monasteries in
the area, with the sole exception of one in Warsaw, were closed. Astonishingly, the Greek
Catholic Churches in Podlasie and Che³m/Kholm regions, which fell within the territories of the
Congress Kingdom, were left untouched until the mid-1870s, in the wake of the January Uprising
of 1864.
Unlike the uprising in 1830-31, the January Uprising was managed by a vast, wellorganized underground state which had been formed and organized under the comparatively
lenient rule of Tsar Alexander II. After several months of guerilla fighting, the Russians
vanquished the Polish bid for independence, and discovered, perhaps unsurprisingly, that many
of the key figures in the underground movement were Catholics. Norman Davies provided a list
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of twenty prominent figures who were tried, found guilty, and punished. Of the twenty,
seventeen men and three women were listed. While the religion of all three women was not
identified, sixteen of the men were identified as “Catholic,” and one was identified as a “Jew.”113
Fifteen of the men, including the Jewish conspirator, were condemned to hang until dead. The
rest of the conspirators, which included all of the women, were sentenced to other punishments.
Additionally, the województwa of Congress Poland were dissolved and replaced by Russian
gubernia, transforming the region into “Vistulaland.” In a familiar move, universities and other
institutions of higher education were closed, and a program of Russification was once again
implemented.
The link between Catholicism and Polish nationalism was again established, but this
time, the Greek Catholic Churches were not overlooked. Russian administrators voiced concern
about them. Although the conduct of the Russian government outwardly suggests that it set out
from the beginning to eradicate the Greek Catholics in the former Congress Kingdom, Theodore
Weeks maintained that archival evidence does not support this.114 The Russian government
insisted in 1864 that Russian, and not Latin, be the language of seminary instruction. Although
the Greek Catholic congregants had over time come to identify closely with and like their
Latinized liturgy, the Russian government demanded in 1874 that all Greek Catholic priests
celebrate the Divine Liturgy in Orthodox fashion. Additionally some peasants reported
intimidation and violence to force them to sign petitions to join the Orthodox Church, and in the
following year, about 50,000 Greek Catholic parishioners in Bia³a (in Siedlce) joined the
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Orthodox Church. Subsequently, the Greek Catholic Bishop Popiel soon thereafter petitioned St.
Petersburg for a complete reunion of his diocese to the Orthodox Church, in the hopes of
preventing dissension among his parishioners. The union became official on 11 May 1875,115
and the Russian government could now count these new Orthodox Christians as Russians.
In spite of the official ‘return” of the Greek Catholics to the Orthodox Church, many of
the former Greek Catholics would not go to the Orthodox Divine Liturgy or allow Orthodox
clergy to baptize their children, conduct marriages, or bury their dead. About 20,000 of the
136,215 “Russians” in Siedlce province continued to consider themselves Catholic, and
continued to go illegally to the Catholic Church. Their obstinance persisted well into the
twentieth century, which earned them both the label as the “stubborn ones” or “persisters,” and
an almost constant inclusion in official documents from or about the region, even after the Edict
of Toleration promulgated on 17 April 1905.116 Unfortunately, the Greek Catholic loyalty to the
cause of Poland and their fidelity to the Catholic faith and Church was not highly regarded by the
Poles, even after the First World War.
As previously mentioned, the Belarusian ethnic identity and the confession of Byzantine
Rite Christianity– in both Catholic and Orthodox forms– was problematic for the Polish
government, which preferred its citizenry to be Roman Catholic and speak Polish. The long-time
Russian insistence that Latinization meant Polonization held true within the II RP. From the
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perspective of the II RP, the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite was a means of Russification,117 and
because it was not included in the 1925 Concordat with Poland,118 it did not enjoy the same
protection as did other Catholic churches.
Insofar as it was problematic for the Polish government, it was problematic for the
Vatican, which was also concerned about creating a pure Russian rite, unsullied with Latinized
practices and forms, which would in turn be attractive to prospective Russian Orthodox converts.
The solution acceptable to both the Polish government and the Vatican was to place ByzantineRite parishes under the authority of local Roman Catholic bishops, rather than under the
authority of Greek Catholic bishops (such as Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi) or create a parallel
diocesan system for the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite. Even after centuries of loyalty to Poland,
Belarusians of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite did not have the right to their church in its fullest
expression, i.e. with its own bishops. And the flagship Jesuit mission of Albertyn included both
Byzantine and Roman Rite churches; the Byzantine Rite Catholic Church could not stand
alone.119
It is unclear whether d’Herbigny or Henryk PrzeŸdziecki, the (Roman Catholic) bishop of
Siedlce, thought of placing Byzantine-Slavonic Rite parishes under the jurisdiction of the Roman
bishops. Sadkowski provided a brief historiographical review, noting which historians favor
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d’Herbigny, which ones favor PrzeŸdziecki, and which ones take no position at all.120
Rzemieniuk claimed that PrzeŸdziecki acted in concert with W³odzimierz Ledóchowski, who
handled the Roman Curial aspects, in the creation of the rite within Poland,121 and Neal Pease
agreed, citing the pastoral needs of his parish as inspiration.122
Although these Russian Catholic Churches were placed within the Roman (Latin)
diocesan structure, their relationship with their fellow Roman Catholics was problematic at best.
Archbishop Edouard de Ropp proposed that Roman Catholic priests with bi-ritual faculties staff
the rite,123 in contrast to the original conception of Sheptyts’kyi, who thought Byzantine rite
priests ought to do the work. De Ropp believed that the Latin Rite was the essence of
Catholicism, and argued that the Russia should fall within the sole jurisdiction of only one
ecclesiastical authority.124 He was not alone. Sadkowski demonstrated that the “Catholic clergy
strenuously opposed the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite because of their intense opposition to the
Orthodox Church, and convinced local Catholics to do the same.”125 The attitudes exhibited
toward the Russian Catholics were remarkably similar to attitudes exhibited toward the Russian
Orthodox.126 These tensions emerged in the narrative of Koœcio³ Katolicki Obrz¹dku
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Bizantyjsko-S³owiañska, which can be characterized as mechanical. The book explains the
creation, administration, and sacramental ministry of Byzantine-Slavonic Rite churches. For
example, both the local Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic clergy claimed legal ownership
of the former Greek Catholic Church, in which the Russian Catholics worshiped in the small
village of Bubel Stary in Podlasie (within the Siedlce diocese of PrzeŸdziecki).127
If the measure of success of the Russian mission is quantitative, as the members of the
PCpR assumed, then its accomplishments are difficult to assess without concrete numbers.
Nevertheless, within a quantitative framework, the Russian mission was relatively unsuccessful.
Within the Catholic Church, the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite was and remains small, almost
negligible, even though it developed into a global phenomenon. Correlatively, its existence in
Russia (as the Russian Orthodox Church in Communion with Rome) was and remains small,
almost negligible.
If the measure of success is qualitative, a category which the members of the PCpR did
not consider, its accomplishments remained unsuccessful.128 Alongside the familiar nationalist
themes which associated the Roman rite with Poland and the Byzantine rite with non-Poles, we
can see soft-Orientalism at play.
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This assessment changes with a post-Vatican II perspective, which is tangential to the
historical dynamics at play in the interwar period. With a shift in ecumenical theory in Vatican
II, non-Roman rite churches are recognized as churches as well as rites, and ecumenism came to
mean inter-communion rather than conversion to Catholicism. More generally, the existence of a
Russian Catholic Church demonstrates that cultural and national boundaries, often considered to
be firm, have been transcended. The possibilities exist for a greater Russian-Catholic
communion because a Russian-Catholic communion already exist, though in a minimal way.
133

The zealous Polish nationalism of many Roman Catholic clergymen degraded people
proven to be loyal to “Poland” over decades or even centuries. While the placement of these
churches within the Roman Catholic diocesan structure practically preserved Byzantine-Slavonic
Rite churches, it did so at the cost of their ecclesial dignity. Theologically, it is questionable
whether or not an apostolic church without its own bishop is a church in its own right. The local
Byzantine-Slavonic Rite churches, having been placed under the authority of the local Roman
Rite bishop was a reflection of the ecclesiology which placed Byzantine Metropolitans and their
churches under the juridical authority of the Roman pontiff. At the same time, the Roman
Catholic magisterium knew that Roman Catholics in the region felt a “profound loathing” of the
Byzantine Rite, and regarded only Latin Rite Catholics as “true Catholics.”129 At every level, the
exercise of Roman Catholic ecclesiology reinforced the sense of Roman Catholic superiority over
the Byzantine world.
Because both Roman and Byzantine Rite bishops wanted the neo-union to be attractive to
prospective Russian converts, maintaining its liturgical purity was paramount. Although men like
Feodorov and Sheptyts’kyi laid the foundation for the rite, its placement under Roman episcopal
authority ironically implied that they could not or should not be trusted with it. Furthermore,
placing this rite under Roman episcopal control suggested that Rome could better be trusted to
maintain the purity of the rite, ensuring that the rite would not become corrupted with the
Latinization that had generally seeped into Greek Catholic worship to varying degrees. The
concern of maintaining a purity of space extended beyond the parish and into the flagship
seminary for the Russian mission: the Russicum.
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The Pontificium Collegium Russicum Sanctæ Theresiæ a Iesu Infante,130 informally
known as the Russicum, was founded on 25 August 1929 to train candidates to be ordained in the
Byzantine-Slavonic Rite for the so-called Russian mission overseen by the PCpR.131 While the
Russicum was not the first national college in Rome, it was the first founded by Pius XI.
Generally, all of the Catholic national colleges were established in Rome to provide a place to
train seminarians when Catholic priestly formation was all but impossible in their native
countries.
The first Roman college was founded by Cardinal Capranica in 1417, the Almo Collegio
Capranica (1417), simply for the benefit of young clerics.132 Constantine Simon provided a brief
historical outline of the Roman national colleges,133 and noted the first Roman colleges were
established in response to the Protestant Reformation. These include: the Pontificio Collegio
Germanico-Ungarico (German-Hungarian: 1552/1580), Collegio Inglese (English: 1579),

130

The Pontifical Russian College of Saint Thérèse of the Child Jesus.

131

A collegio (or college) in the Catholic seminary system does not have the same
connotation usually associated with the English word “college.” A Catholic collegio was not an
institution of higher learning or a seminary, but a dormitory overseen by a religious superior
(rector) and supplemented with a formation program which often contained spiritual, cultural,
and sociological elements. Seminarians, scholastics, and other formal theology students are
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Pontificio Collegio Scozzese (Scottish: 1600), and the Pontificio Collegio Irlandese (Irish: 1628).
During this time frame, the Collegio Greco (1576) and the Collegio Marionita (1581) were
founded for Greek-speaking students from the Hellenic Christian east and the Arabic-speaking
Maronites, respectively. Additionally, the Collegio Urbano di Propaganda Fide (1627) was
founded to train missionaries.
Apart from the outline created by Fr. Simon, it should be noted that a Chinese college
had been founded by Fr. Matteo Ripa as part of an Oriental Institute in Naples in 1727 and
reorganized in 1888, in which Chinese language and culture was taught.134 Since it was not a
Pontifical college and existed outside of Rome, it is entirely reasonable that this– along with
other types of colleges– was not included in Russicum: Pioneers and Witnesses. Yet, its
inception, sustained existence, and reorganization has an affinity with the Russicum. While
many Roman colleges were places of refuge and study for Catholics from anti-Catholic countries,
both of these colleges were founded to prepare missionaries to inculturate into the exotic.
Simon contended that the second wave of the establishment of Roman colleges began
about two centuries later. These include: the Pontificio Collegio Belga (Belgian: 1846),
Collegio Pio Latino Americano Pontificio (Latin American: 1858), Collegio Americano del Nord
(North American College: 1859),135 Pontificio Collegio Polacco (Polish: 1868), Pontificio
Collegio Armeno (Armenian: 1883), Pontificio Collegio Canadese (Canadian 1888), Pontificio
Collegio Nepomuceno (Czechs: 1890), Pontificio Collegio Ruteno (Greek Catholics from Galicia
Slavs: 1897), Pontificio Collegio San Girolamo degli Illirici (1901: Croats), Pontificio Collegio
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Spagnuolo (Spanish: 1892), and the Pontificio Collegio Portoghese (Portugese: 1901).
Pius XI founded the Russicum in 1929, followed by the Ethiopian, Romanian, and Dutch
Pontifical Colleges in 1930. Finally, Pius XII founded the College of St. Peter the Apostle
(1947) for African missionaries and the College of St. Casimir (1948) for Lithuanians. In many
ways, the Russicum was not unique. It was simply one of the many national Roman colleges
which created an idealized space of prayer and study, and like the Greek College, it was meant to
hasten the return of “schismatics” to the One True Faith. However, unlike many of the colleges,
its idealized space included a cultural component constructed without sustained, authentic
experience of the national region it purported to represent. While the bulk (if not the totality) of
the students in the Polish College were Polish, the NAC American, and the Ruthenian College
Ukrainian, the bulk of the students in the Russian college were almost anything but Russian.136
Of the list of alumni of the Russicum assembled ca. 1951,137 only thirteen138 of its eighty-one
graduates, i.e. 16%, were Russian. Tretjakewitsch noted that by 1938, only thirty-four of sixtythree, i.e. 53%, who began their course of studies persevered and were ordained.139 In the 1930s,
four Russians began studies but left for a variety of reasons within their first year.140 These could
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not have made a strong impact in the cultural mission to create Russians ordained in the
Byzantine-Slavonic Rite.
Although these numbers are only very general, they nonetheless demonstrate the
absurdity of the cultural mission, expressed in equal absurdity by Cyrille Korolevskij, “an
Eastern Rite Frenchman whose real name was [Jean François] Charon.”141

...I think that whoever was not born in Russia or of Russian parents, must make
a real effort in every way to become Russian... this transformation should by no
means stop at the superficial level but be tangible and palpable. The subject should
try his best to become used to Russian cuisine, to the Russian way of life- but most
of all should try to arrogate Russian psychology. Love for Russia should replace
love for one’s own country- to such an extent that the assimilated Russian is moved
no longer by the joys and sorrows of his own fatherland but by the joys and sorrows
of Russia... In other words, Russian– down to the marrow of his bones– without
becoming a fanatic but in all sincerity.142
Simon took exception to this quote by focusing on the improbability of creating a non-fanatic
missionary and the “Gallic” rather than “Slavic” concern with food. Yet, the main point was the
desire to create a Russian psychology. With so few Russians in the Russicum itself and no
Russians in charge of the program, the Russian psychology was that imagined by westerners:
“the way of Solov’ev and his disciples who never flinched before sacrificing themselves for a
cause,”143 which might be better applied to nineteenth century Romantic Polish nationalists than
many Russians.
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The common belief that Russian religious sensibilities were inclined toward mysticism144
rather than the disciplined logic rooted in Thomistic training provided a context in which such an
assertion appeared reasonable. Perhaps the Russians who attended the Russicum were zealous,
but thirteen Russian Catholic men cannot be taken as representative of Russian society.
Furthermore, sixteen percent of the student body simply cannot interact with the rest to create
cultural experiences of real depth for the other eighty-four percent, especially since they were
seminarians undergoing priestly formation. Ironically, while Mgr. De Ropp proposed that Roman
Catholic priests be given bi-ritual faculties in the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite, the Russicum– due to
a lack of Russian candidates– generally ordained Roman Catholic seminarians as priests of the
Byzantine-Slavonic Rite with bi-ritual faculties in the Tridentine Roman Rite.
Those charged with the Russian mission differed with respect to who could be
transformed into their ideal type of Russian. Simon noted that Korolevskij, because of his
antipathy toward Poles, preferred non-Polish Slavs to non-Slavs, and non-Slavs to Poles.
Philippe de Régis (the second rector of the Russicum), who had lived in the kresy, preferred
Slavs to non-Slavs.145 Mgr. D’Herbigny– who tended to agree with his fellow Frenchman
Korolevskij– was involved not only in building the Russicum, but had a strong hand in guiding
the formation of its resident seminarians and scholastics. He believed that rather than instill a
Russian soul into the young seminarian or scholastic, he demanded that a candidate for the
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Russicum already possess a “Russian soul”146 which could– and would– be further refined at both
the Russicum and the PIO. At the PIO, for example, the final exams for the 1922-1923 academic
year included competence “On the Current Religious Mentality among Dissidents” (i.e. the
Orthodox).147 With this type of logic, the exposure to idealized– rather than genuine– Russian
culture in the Russicum was justified.
Simon noted that the idea of a Russian seminary emerged in 1917, the same year that the
PIO was established, a correction of the assertion by Tretjakewitsch that the Russicum was first
proposed in 1921.148 Some proposed that it be joined to an existing institution, while others
proposed that an institution be moved to Rome. It would also not be an isolated structure for the
conversion of Russia; it would dovetail with other school and retreat houses tailored to wooing
Russians out of Orthodoxy and into Catholicism.149
In 1923, d’Herbigny added his own thoughts, proposing the idea of a Russian college in
“Rome itself” as a college for Serbian and Bulgarian converts studying theology in Rome.150 In
the basics of its conception by d’Herbigny, the Russicum resembled other national colleges.
However, throughout the 1920s, the conception of the role of the Russicum shifted, due to the
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understanding that diabolical work in Russia had been undertaken by the Bolsheviks, causing
people to be infected by false doctrine and subjected to much suffering (addressed in Chap 4).
Pius XI described the situation in Russia as desperate, and “hoping against hope,” (Rome 4:18),
the Russicum would prepare priests of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite for work in Russia and with
Russian refugees.151
From 1923-1929, the Carmelite Sisters of St. Therese of the Infant Jesus donated over
1,030,00 French francs for the construction and establishment of the Russicum152 as a means of
supporting the missionary efforts of the Church.153 Because of their substantial support, in
accord with Catholic tradition,154 “Lisieux” was inscribed on the front of the building, near the
roof. Rather than referencing the financial contribution, the choice was justified by citing the
similarity of Carmelite mysticism to Eastern Orthodox spirituality. Indeed, many Russians in
diaspora found Carmelite spirituality attractive, and the Russicum was placed under the
patronage of Saint Therese of Lisieux.155 Accordingly, May 17th (the date of her canonization)
became the feast day of the college.156
Once again, the incongruity of the western Gregorian calendar and the Julian calendar
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presented itself. The sense of spiritual time was western, and not Russian. Similarly, the
physical space was at its root western. Although the interior “incorporated many Russian and
Eastern Christian ornamentals,”157 it was designed by a non-Russian architect, Muñoz, employed
by an Italian engineering firm, Figli di Pietro Castelli (Sons of Peter Castelli).158 Similar
observations may be made concerning the Byzantine Rite Chapel. The Church of St. Anthony,
shoe-horned between the PIO and the Russicum, was not razed and replaced by a Byzantine style
church. Rather, the edifice remained and its interior was remodeled, which included side chapels
with iconostases, an architectural feature notably lacking in Byzantine Rite churches but common
in Roman churches for private masses. Of course, liturgy within the space followed the
Gregorian calendar.
In spite of the aim of forming Byzantine-Slavonic Rite priests with Russian souls, the
physical, temporal, and intellectual spaces of the Russicum and its principal chapel were
governed by western sensibilities which viewed Russia as mission territory upon which Catholic
missionaries would suffer. In spite of the sense of religious superiority borne out of theological
self-sufficiency coupled with need, Russicum graduates sincerely desired the good of those
whom they served. Walter Ciszek, for example, wrote a rather judgmental letter to a friend– a
Russicum drop-out of the now defunct New England Province of the Society of Jesus– in which
he lamented the extreme poverty of the Albertyn region which attacked both body and soul.159
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By 1930, d’Herbigny and his collaborators had accomplished a great deal. To that end,
the politicking of d’Herbigny was as effective as it was well known, as it exploited the successes
of the Russian mission. They had succeeded in shifting the leadership and locus of the Russian
mission from Sheptyts’kyi in Lwów to the PCpR in Rome. Additionally, the administration of
the Byzantine-Slavonic rite by the PCpR practically discounted Exarch Feodorov, in part placing
most of the functioning parishes of the rite under Latin bishops and smearing the character of Fr.
Abrikosov,160 who had come to Rome to advocate for Feodorov. Polish ecclesiastical intrigues
and the Polish governmental stance against Russian Catholics helped to isolate those who had the
greatest stake in the success of the Russian mission: Feodorov and his Russian Catholic
congregation. The Russicum also shifted the locus of proper Russian-ness from Russia to Rome.
Correlatively, we will see in later chapters how the PCpR oversaw the spiritual and material care
of Russian refugees across the globe, which bolstered the view that the PCpR was the right
ecclesiastical organ for the job, and d’Herbigny was the right man to oversee it.
Such opinion did not come from his formal role within the PCpR, as he was officially
only a consultant, but through his informal avenue of power: his access to Pius XI. Mgr.
d’Herbigny formalized this relationship in September 1927 when he was named a reporter,
responsible for making at least two private reports per month to the Holy Father. By late
1930/early 1931, d’Herbigny was upgraded to relator perpetuus, which gave him the right of
access to the Pope without prior appointment or notice. D’Herbigny reached the apex of his
power with the promulgation by Pius XI of the Moto proprio Inde ab inito on 6 April 1930,
which separated the PCpR from CEO. D’Herbigny was named its president, and remained so
160
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until his scandalous dismissal late in 1933.161 On 21 December 1934, the PCpR was reintegrated into CEO via the Moto proprio “Quam sollicita,”162 and remained there until 15
January 1993, when it was suppressed and merged into the Interdicasterial Commission for the
Church in Eastern Europe within the Secretariat of State.
Consideration of the structures of the Russian mission, especially the PCpR are important
for two reasons. First, they are the means by which values are conveyed in order to realize a
goal.163 Secondly, structures themselves are often symbols of the goals they attempt to realize.164
In regard to the former, the value of the Russian Mission was clearly important. The
aforementioned ecclesiastical structures were both created and reorganized to meet those goals.
Even in the midst of the depression, funds remained plentiful for the PCpR, unlike the situation
with other Catholic works and commissions.165 The ecumenical goal for which these structures
existed was not the reunion of two apostolic churches (which had been attempted with the
Orthodox world in the Council of Florence and partially realized in the Union of Brzeœæ), but
proselytization which would re-form individual Russian Orthodox believers into Roman
Catholics.
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In regard to the latter, these structures themselves conveyed the value of the superiority of
the west over the east. Fundamentally, they maintained the dichotomy of east vs. west, even if
the dichotomy was not geographically clear. Catholic dioceses constructed in Poland delineated
the Roman Catholic from the Russian Orthodox world, yet the locus of the Catholic mission was
not shifted from Lwów to Warsaw, but from Lwów to Rome. From the point of view of
Byzantine-Slavonic Rite Russians and Belarussians, both the Poles and Rome behaved
disrespectfully toward them. From the point of view of d’Herbigny and many of his
collaborators, such as Korolovskij, both the Poles and the Russians were problematic. They
could even blame the Poles of colonialistic behavior,166 but they did not or could not see it in
themselves. Although the fault line of the dichotomy was not clear, the dichotomy itself was:
Orthodox Christians, living or having fled from wild, barbaric Russia needed to be saved by the
Roman Catholic Church, gifted with the Truth and populated by those of non-barbaric, and
therefore superior, western cultures.
The structures themselves created this dichotomy by conveying superiority of the west.
Slavic ecclesiastical officials, such as Sheptytsk’yi and Feodorov, could not be trusted to manage
the Russian mission; non-slavs in Rome were. No one from the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite could
be trusted to be consecrated as bishop to manage the rite and maintain its Byzantine purity;
Polish Latin Rite bishops were. Because it would be impossible to run seminaries in wild,
barbaric Russia, Russian space was created in Rome. Structurally, the PCpR and the institutions
it administered both created and conveyed at atmosphere of soft-Orientalism.
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Chapter 4
Doctrinal and Intellectual Expressions of Soft-Orientalism

In chapter 3, we saw how Vatican officials were able to use interwar nationalist and
religious tensions in Eastern and East Central Europe to re-locate the center of the Byzantine
Slavonic Rite from Lwów to Rome, and in turn, adjust old structures and create new ones which
both symbolized and conveyed an atmosphere of soft-Orientalism. Broadly, interpretation of the
schism between the Catholic and Orthodox churches created a dichotomy between East and
West, from which each church demonstrated its superiority over the other church, which in its
deficiency, stood in need. From the Vatican point of view, the PCpR itself, the marginalization
of Exarch Feodorov and Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi, the Latin management of the ByzantineSlavonic Rite, and the creation of the Russicum were necessary to respond to the need of the
Russian people. The fundamental need, of course, was their conversion to Catholicism,
specifically Byzantine-Rite Catholicism, in accord with the principles in the encyclical
Orientalium Dignitas. While this encyclical (along with a few others) was meant to preserve the
dignity of the Christian East and in spite of the professed respect of the Christian East by the
Vatican, long-standing doctrinal differences between the Catholic and Orthodox Church meant
that conversion required a reformulation of belief. The PCpR professed and taught a Catholicism
which demonstrated to Orthodox converts the superiority of Catholicism, the inadequacy of
Orthodoxy, and the evils of Communism.
This Catholic system of belief was comprehensive, and asserted a dichotomy between
East and West in an attempt to demonstrate Catholic self-sufficiency. Succinctly, the Catholic
Church taught that it was the One, True Church founded by Jesus Christ, whose locus of unity
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was the Roman Pontiff, and that all other Christians churches were deficient in varying degrees
due to their schism from the Catholic Church.1 Professing the superiority of Catholicism begged
the demonstration that non-Catholic churches were deficient, and subsequently, the deficiency of
non-Catholic churches begged the remedy for such deficiencies: the Catholic Church. While the
PCpR had no need to justify this position in its missionary outreach, it found intellectual assent,
not validation, in the writings of Vladimir Sergeyevich Soloviev (1853-1900).2
Soloviev, whose intellectual biography began in unbelief and ended in Catholicism via
Orthodoxy, was a dynamic literary critic, philosopher, and theologian with mystical aspects,3
driven by a Slavophile assumption that the

problem of all problems was whether humanity ultimately is to become an
organism guided by spiritual forces from within, or a mere organization ruled
(with a totalitarian iron rod, if necessary) from without. This is what the
antithesis of Christ and anti-Christ meant to him symbolically.4
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His interests were wide and varied. He wrote, for example, on history,5 interfaith issues,6
classical philosophy,7 political theory,8 and art & literature.9 However, the work most relevant to
the PCpR were his social, political, and ecclesial considerations which were, in turn, based upon
an orthodox understanding of the hypostatic union, i.e. the union of the fully human and fully
divine natures in the one person of Jesus Christ. While Soloviev did propose a Trinitarian
principle10 which teased out more metaphysical and mystical elements in order to understand
society, the application of the notion of the hypostatic union to society yielded more concrete and
pragmatic principles to understand the relationship between the church and civil society. This
was an important fundamental theological premise, as both the Catholic and Orthodox Churches
based their Christological thinking upon it. To do otherwise was to delve into heresy.
Very broadly, the early Church wrestled with the nature of Jesus Christ. Generally, the
rejections of both the Docetist and Arian positions, which argued that Christ was respectively
only divine or only a creature, brought the magisterium to the conclusion that Jesus Christ was

5

Vladimir Soloviev, War, Progress, and the End of History, including a Short Story of the
Anti-Christ: Three Discussions (London: n.c., 1915).
6

Vladimir Soloviev, Freedom, Faith, and Dogma: Essays by V.S. Soloviev on Christianity
and Judaism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008).
7

Vladimir Soloviev, The Drama of Plato’s Life (Germany: Verlag Freies Geistesleben,

1980).
8

Vladimir Soloviev, Politics, Law, and Morality: Essays (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2000).
9

Vladimir Soloviev, The Heart of Reality: Essays on Beauty, Love, and Ethics (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003).
10

Vladimir Solovyev, Russia and the Universal Church, trans. Herbert Rees (London: The
Centenary Press,1948), p. 148.
148

both human and divine. However, the next logical step in Christian doctrinal development was
how that could be. A complicated formula of the nature of Christ was created through
deliberations at Ephesus in 431 and concluded at Chalcedon in 451.11 What was relevant for
Soloviev was that a full human nature co-existed with a full divine nature (of the Second Person
of the Trinity) within Jesus of Nazareth, constituting not one but two persons.12 This union,
described as the hypostatic union by theologians, was beyond the ability of human logic and
therefore a theological mystery, a mystical truth.
By analogy, Soloviev understood the ideal relationship between church and state in
similar terms. As the hypostatic union is the expression of the perfect human being, so too the
human and divine must be properly unified in society, to create the perfect– and universal–
society. Soloviev thought that a socially-expressed hypostatic union was the only means to
create a just society. In his analysis of Medieval Western Europe, he noted, “The close alliance
and organic union of the two powers [secular and ecclesial] without confusion and without
division is the indispensable condition of true social progress.” [emphasis by the author]
Soloviev accounted for the fall of the Byzantine Empire, i.e. the Second Rome, because
of its rejection of this socially-expressed hypostatic union. Succinctly, he accused the Orthodox
church of the heresy of improperly granting church authority to the Byzantine emperor, which
properly belonged to the papacy.13 Because the emperor did not in fact have legitimate ecclesial
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authority, Soloviev argued, Byzantium fell into disarray. Its ecclesiastical component was false
and corrupt. Furthermore, Soloviev asserted that the imperial court maintained its pre-Christian,
i.e. “pagan,” disposition, rendering its secular component corrupt as well. The two corrupt
elements could never find a proper unity, so he therefore concluded that, “...the dualism of
Nestorius, condemned in theology, became the very foundation of Byzantine life.”14 The fall of
the Second Rome was logical to Soloviev, and he argued, “Indeed, it deserved to fall and still
more it deserved to fall before Islam. For Islam is simply sincere and logical Byzantinism, free
from all its inner contradiction.”15
Soloviev therefore affirmed the assumptions of the Catholic Church in general16 and of
the PCpR in particular, toward both Byzantine and Roman ecclesiology. Soloviev recognized in
the West the genuine commitment to the socially-expressed hypostatic union, even if it were not
realized, in contradistinction to the east, which he accused of falling into a social Nestorianism.
For Soloviev– and for the members of the PCpR– the Byzantine Churches needed the Papacy,
and the Papacy, because of its continued and consistent orthodoxy, was in a position to reform
the Byzantine Churches. And this included the Russian Orthodox Church.
Although the Orthodox and Catholic Churches share the same number and basic
understanding of the sacraments, the same scripture, and share the same history until the Middle
Ages, which include the foundational ecumenical councils and canon law, Soloviev believed that
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the all of the Orthodox Churches– including the Russian– had inherited a “pseudo-Orthodoxy”17
from Byzantium. Therefore, it suffered the same problems as Byzantium which Rome did not
have: illegitimate government control of the church (through the Holy Synod18) and a false
understanding of True Christianity. It should be noted that this interpretation and evaluation of
Russian Orthodox neither began with or was unique to him.19 Soloviev, like many other
Russians, believed that the Russian version of Orthodoxy defined Russia so thoroughly that they
could not be separated.
Correlatively, Soloviev accepted the idea that Russia had a special mission and was
destined for greatness. However, he differed from many of his fellow Russians on exactly how
that special mission– and the corresponding Russian greatness– would appear. Soloviev
proposed that the first step to Russian greatness occurred with the unification of Kievan Russia
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of St. Vladimir and Muscovite Russia of Ivan Kalista under Tsar Alexis.20 This unification,
when combined with the subsequent polices of Tsar Peter to learn from the “civilized peoples of
the west,”21 made Russia great for itself. Consequentially, he called to mind a fundamental
question of the Slavophiles: in light of this westernization, what must Russia do now?
Soloviev proposed that true greatness was not living for oneself, but for others. He noted
that unlike the Ashanti or Eskimos, Russia had an historic mission.22 In making these assertions,
Soloviev placed Russia on the historical time line of progress ahead of many primitive peoples,
but still behind the west. Yet, he did not want to fall into “nationalism, [or] a perverted
patriotism,” as he believed it to be against the ultimate good of humanity.23 Ecclesiologically,
Soloviev believed that the schism between Rome and Moscow was due to “national
particularism,”24 which, correlatively, also insisted upon Russian superiority over the Orthodox
Christians under Ottoman control. His attitudes were perfectly congruent with the attitude of
western Europe in the wake of the Crimean War, engaged in the colonial project: Russia, both
technologically and spiritually, was inferior. Soloviev asserted that if Russia were to make
authentic progress, it would first have to abandon illegitimate government control of the Church
and convert to “True Christianity,” i.e. Roman Catholicism.
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Because Russian Orthodoxy and the idea of Russia itself were so intertwined, Soloviev
believed that Russia defined itself chiefly against Catholicism, and in doing so, perpetuated the
pseudo-Orthodoxy inherited from Byzantium. Soloviev asserted,
This pseudo-Orthodoxy of our theological schools, which has nothing in
common with the faith of the universal Church or the piety of the Russian
people, contains no positive element; it consists merely of arbitrary negations
produced and maintained by controversial prejudice:
‘God the Son does not contribute in the divine order to the procession
of the Holy Spirit.’ [the filioque controversy]
“The Blessed Virgin was not immaculate from the first moment of her
existence.’
“Primacy of jurisdiction does not belong to the see of Rome and the
Pope has not the dogmatic authority of a Pastor and Doctor of the Universal
Church.’25

In qualification of these assertions, Soloviev maintained that for the Russian Orthodox Church,
the first two points are “pretexts,” and the “real bugbear” is the juridical primacy of the Roman
Pontiff.26 Overall, Soloviev has asserted that “Russia,” however vaguely he used the term, has
Othered the Catholic Church in an effort to define itself. Because he was primarily engaged
with a religious analysis and not a political one, he did not include the traditional Roman
Catholic enemy of Russia in his analysis: Poland. In this way, he was very much in the tradition
of Ivan Gagarin, the nineteenth century Russian Jesuit who, along with many Orthodox critics,
cited those three points as the essential obstacles to union.27 Soloviev, like Gagarin, also
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maintained that union was about religious and not political matters. These main points
articulated by Gagarin and Soloviev eventually became the main points of the Russian policy of
the PCpR.
Soloviev summed up his critique of religion with a seafaring analogy, likening the
different Churches to boats and describing the manner of their voyage. He likened the Catholic
Church to the barque of Peter, “a large and seaworthy vessel built by a famous master [Jesus],
navigated by a skillful pilot [Peter and his successors], and equipped with all that is necessary for
the voyage.”28 He claimed that the Protestant Churches exhorted their followers to build instead
individual vessels, which were ultimately unprepared for the voyage. Finally, with regard to the
Orthodox, Soloviev asserted that they believe that “the best way of reaching [the] harbour [of
heaven] is to pretend that you are there already, and... think that... they have the advantage of
their Western brethren.”29 The analogy served to emphasize the inadequacy of Russian pseudoOrthodoxy and the necessity of Catholicism for Russia. To supplement this religious analysis,
Soloviev included a critique of the Raskol30 to demonstrate, as it were, that the Russian Orthodox
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ship was a wreck.
Succinctly, Soloviev blamed the schism on the “inadequacies and pretensions”31 of the
Russian Orthodox Church itself, going so far as to say, “there exists no truly spiritual
government in the Greco-Russian Church.”32 [Emphasis by the author.] As evidence, Soloviev
referred to the many Old Believers– put to death for their heresy– as martyrs, at once
condemning the Russian Orthodox Church and praising it, going so far as to call the Russian
Orthodox Church the work of the anti-Christ while praising the simple, heartfelt Christian piety
of the average Russian who has been left spiritually adrift.
Soloviev lamented both the lack of religious freedom (that of the individual believer to
make a religious choice) and ecclesiastical freedom (emancipation of the church from
government control) in Russia. To that end, he utilized the work of Ivan Aksakov, a Slavophile
opposed to both the Old Believers and to Rome. However, while Aksakov maintained Orthodox
Russia was the means to provide unity: “Russia=the nation=orthodoxy=unity,”33 Soloviev, for
reasons cited above, denied that such unity through Russia was possible. Unity would come
when the Tsar, who headed all of Russian and the Russian Orthodox Church, placed it under the
Roman Church. Soloviev maintained that this would bring about the Trinitarian restoration of
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the ecumenical unity of state, church, and society,”34 which in turn would purify state and society.
This was the great mission of Russia.
Aksakov had compared the use of the Holy Synod by the Tsar to German bureaucracy
“with all its inherent official insincerity.”35 Aksakov/Soloviev pointed out that the members were
civil or military men nominated by the Tsar, and that the reports of the High Procurator of the
Holy Synod were no different in form and style from other government reports. Because the
government managed the church, especially through finances, and required it to behave in some
respects as an arm of the government, Aksakov/Soloviev claimed that the Church was “robbed of
her soul. The idea of a truly spiritual administration was replaced by that of a purely formal and
external discipline.”36 Aksakov/Soloviev noted the bishops were only nominally in control of
their dioceses.37 Furthermore, the various offices in the clerical hierarchy were recorded in the
List of Ranks, and
were made to correspond exactly with the various military grades. A metropolitan
is equivalent to a marshal (“full general”) according to the Russian expression, an
archbishop to a divisional general (or “lieutenant general”), and a bishop to a
brigade general (or “major general’). Priests may wish with a little keenness
reach the rank of colonel.38
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Ignoring the historical record of medieval warrior-Popes and crusader warrior-priests who
literally fought for their faith, the Roman church bureaucracy which managed Rome, and the
wars in which the Papal States were involved, Soloviev claimed that the Catholic Church had the
ideal situation: it did not depend upon but rather used western European states. In the end,
Christian kings can serve the church, but they cannot be its head and act as its point of unity.
Soloviev, expanding on the thought of Aksakov, maintained that for the church to be truly free,
its “point d’appui” must be “outside the confines of the State and nation.”39 Soloviev maintained
that only the papacy provides this through the assertions that (1) Christ builds the church, not
churches, meaning that there is an inherent unity in the church, (2) the universality and unity of
the church cannot be theoretical but concrete, given the nature of the incarnation and
subsequently, the hypostatic union, and (3) such concreteness is found only in the Catholic
Church, a visible universal church, because its unity is based in the succession of Popes, the
successors of Peter, who was made the “rock” of the Church by Jesus Christ. The true Church
of Christ was, therefore, the Roman Catholic Church.
Contrarily, Nikoley Onufriyevich Lossky (1870-1965)40 maintained that although
Soloviev received the sacraments from Rev. Nicholas Tolstoy, he never ceased thinking of
himself as an Orthodox Christian. Lossky asserted that Soloviev believed that although the
outward unity of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches was sundered, the mystical unity between
them remained. He continued, “this is why, before receiving communion [from Tolstoy],
Soloviev, having read the decision of the Council of Trent, could add his declaration that the
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Eastern Church is the true Orthodox and Catholic Church.”41 D’Herbigny noted that Soloviev,
while making that claim, professed his obedience to the Apostle Peter and his successors, which
made him Catholic.42
Whether Soloviev considered himself a Catholic, Orthodox, or a sui generis OrthodoxCatholic Christian, Michel d’Herbigny found in Soloviev a well-developed apologia of
Catholicism which was intertwined with an argument for the inadequacy of Orthodoxy and
layered with strains of soft-Orientalism. In spite of the ambiguity which Soloviev had
concerning his relationship to the Catholic Church, both d’Herbigny and the PCpR could utilize
his thought to demand that Orthodox converts submit to Roman Catholic doctrine. The
biography of Soloviev by d’Herbigny, Vladimir Soloviev, a Russian Newman, portrayed Soloviev
as a Russian Catholic. Indeed, d’Herbigny opens his biography with the claim,

He [Soloviev] was a convert from Orthodoxy to Catholicism, and the one
ruling passion of his life was to familiarize Russia with the idea of a Universal
Church, monarchical in its constitution. This is the chief reason for calling him
the Russian Newman. There were other striking similarities between the two
men, although their divergences were even more striking and more numerous.43

For d’Herbigny, the portrayal of Soloviev– who was never ordained– as one who could renounce
the Russian Orthodox faith so strongly associated with his nationality and become Catholic, was
an iconic example to the rest of Russia. However, an Irish Jesuit writing officially in the name of
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his province thought this analogy to Newman was spurious, asserting,
His [Soloviev’s] life-struggle was one between a country with a violent desire
to stagnate, and a patriot who insisted that she should advance. He found his
vocation in the effort to reconcile the Russian Church with the Church of Rome
...Yet, there was something immature and undeveloped in his doctrine. Unlike
his English prototype, Newman, Soloviev was a patriot before he was a Christian.44

Again, to be both Russian and Catholic was an imaginative impossibility, at least officially for
the Irish Province of the Society of Jesus. Perhaps to the credit of d’Herbigny, he thought that it
was possible to be both Russian and Catholic, and to bridge East and West. Yet, his
understanding of the divide between East and West was expressed in a dichotomy which ignored
the historical complexities reviewed in chapter 2. D’Herbigny asserted, with strong softOrientalist tones,
The great debate is the antagonism between East and West, that has lasted for
centuries, and dates back almost to the beginning of Christianity. From the
earliest time and for various reasons, many being utterly futile, a conflict of
tendencies has separated the two halves of Europe. In the East man [sic!] is
more contemplative, and willingly gives way to indolence and passivity; being
selfish and lazy, he is apt to excuse his indifference towards his neighbours by
pleading his devotion to God alone. In the West, on the contrary, man [sic!]
thinks only of action, and would readily be satisfied with a purely human great-ness. He would be contented with a deified man, or even with the deification
of humanity in the abstract, or of strength and genius. His innate tendency is to
make human life, with its progress and activity, the object of his cultus.45

The dichotomy between East and West was unquestioned. Liam Brophy, writing in the midtwentieth century, noted the aptness of the comparison, as Newman and Soloviev– both talented
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men– aimed to convert their respective countries to Catholicism. However, Brophy contrasted
“Byzantine frigidity” to “creative western thought” in his effort to describe the missionary efforts
of Soloviev.46
D’Herbigny then argued that the principles of Christianity restrain the Westerner from
deifying human beings or humanity. While he did not reference the official Catholic evaluation
of Modernism, this statement was congruent with the Vatican critique of modernism examined in
chapter 2. D’Herbigny did assert that these Western virtues, when tempered, “commend
themselves to the Eastern mind.”47 Soloviev, d’Herbigny claimed, had accepted them, having
been inspired by (1) the conversion of Ivan Gagarin, (2) the thought of Tchadaïev (Chaadaev),
and (3) the friendship of Princess Elizabeth Volkonsky, who converted from Orthodoxy to
Catholicism.48 D’Herbigny utilized Russia and the Universal Church, treating it as the mature
expression of a Russian Catholic theology. The qualities of the perfect Christian society, the
deficiencies of Byzantine Christianity accepted by Russia, the filioque, the Immaculate
Conception, and Petrine Primacy as an essential requirement for true Christian universality, the
last of which garnered the bulk of his attention.
Through the editorship of Orientalia Christiana and his course on ecclesiology at the
PIO, d’Herbigny promulgated the importance and necessity of the Papal office. Although the
following articles which appeared in Orientalia Christiana were examined in chapter 3, a brief
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review is in order. “L’unité dans le Christ,”49 echoing the consideration of Soloviev on Papal
primacy and universality, asserted that unity is found in communion with the Pope, who is the
only bishop with universal jurisdiction. Correlatively “La Vraie Notion d’Orthodoxie,”50 argued
that the Orthodox claim to universality was false and reaffirmed the assertions made in “L’unité
dans le Christ.” Furthermore, d’Herbigny, once again echoing the consideration of Soloviev on
the theologically impoverished situation of the Russian Orthodox Church, argued that Russia
stood in great theological and material need of Catholicism, both of which the church could
meet. These works were intended for a general educated audience interested in the Catholic
mission to the east. However, the ecclesiology course which he offered at the PIO was meant for
the future Catholic religious professionals, echoed these sentiments in a more intellectually
sophisticated way.
The curriculum at the PIO was meant, as Nicola Cardinal Marini had articulated, to create
missionaries trained in a matter akin to the colonial officers of the Great Powers.51 The
curriculum of the PIO52 was clearly organized around this principle. Its courses in dogmatic
theology were not wholly Byzantine in character, but comparative in their examination of the
Trinity, the Incarnation, the Eucharist, and of Mary the Mother of God. This logic was further
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teased out with courses, both “on the formation of religious mentality among dissidents”53 and
“on contemporary religious mentality among dissidents.”54 Categorizing the Orthodox as
“dissident” automatically put them in error, relegating them as lesser, and of course, in need of
Catholic missionary effort eager to take on the burden of their conversion. The professors could
assume the need argued in Orientalia Christiana, placing the Roman Catholic Church in the role
of savior.
With the theoretical categories of theology established, the church history of the East was
read in conjunction with the West. Photius, Cerularius, the Council of Florence, the “Synod” of
Brest, were given special attention, as well as the opinions of the (medieval) scholastics and
Greek Catholics. Courses on church history, the Eastern Fathers (i.e. those who were not quoted
within Scholastic considerations of the early Church), the archeology of the near East, and the
philology of the languages of the Eastern churches– Arabic, Greek, Russian, Old Church
Slavonic, and Syriac– were meant to round out knowledge of the Byzantine world for these
future missionaries.
It is important to remember that the discipline of philology, which in turn had its roots in
religious textual criticism, especially that of the Bible, helped produce Orientalism.55 The use of
philology by the religious professionals at the PIO would be in the Orientalist tradition.
Recalling from Chapter 3 that liturgy is not merely a cultic action which arises from a people but
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also helps to form them, the PIO liturgists understood Eastern liturgical languages as helping to
form Eastern peoples. Furthermore, the inclusion of Russian as an Oriental liturgical language
once again made Russians at least non-Western, if not Eastern, rendering Latin-speaking Rome
as the metropole and the non-Latin speaking Christian east as its peripheral, missionary land.
Studies of Eastern (i.e. Byzantine) liturgy, sacramental theology, Eastern canon law, and
languages– Latin and Greek in addition to Russian– ensured that the future missionary would
have the practical skills to interact with the people of the Byzantine world. Nonetheless, the
future missionary was cognizant of his role as an agent, albiet a spiritual agent, of the Catholic
Church, most especially of the Pope. The course which d’Herbigny offered on ecclesiology
bridged these two realities. On the one hand, it taught the dignity of churches not of the Roman
rite. On the other hand, it preserved the superiority of both the Pope and of the Roman Rite.
The course conformed to the principles laid out in Studiorum Ducem (1923),56 which
reaffirmed Aeterni Pastor (1879),57 which in turn advocated the use of Scholasticism in the
formation of Catholic priests. The format of the course, preserved in published notes58 ad usam
stricte privatum, were organized and presented in the scholastic disputation format.59
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The format, briefly, is as follows: a thesis statement is made, followed, in turn, by (1) a
few strong introductory statements either supporting or refuting the thesis, each accompanied by
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D’Herbigny affirmed the Byzantine (and Catholic) Church structure in his defense of the
formation of the Apostolic College, or the College of Bishops. Briefly, d’Herbigny argued that
Christ established the twelve apostles as the original College of Bishops to which even St. Paul
submitted.60 However, d’Herbigny also argued that Christ preserved the full integrity and
infallible teaching only of those who remained a part of the True (i.e. Catholic) Church.
Therefore, only Catholic bishops could be rightly called the “Magisterium.” This was no
different from the systematic doctrine of papal and magisterial authority taught in western
seminaries, novitiates, and scholasticates, as well as in schools of secondary and higher
education.61
However, d’Herbigny also asserted that, insofar as elements of the Truth exist outside the
Catholic Church (e.g. scripture) and that the Holy Spirit works throughout the entire world, the
Church exists passively there. The only active Church was the Catholic Church, in which the
church was present in its fullness62 because of Peter63 and the Petrine Office, i.e. the Papacy.
Consequently, (1) the Catholic Church claimed the power of jurisdiction throughout the world,

general supporting statements, which contradict (2) a statement supporting or refuting the thesis,
with several points of justification, and (3) point-by-point refutations of the introductory
statements. The thesis statements themselves follow a logical format and are intended to support
one another to make a general argument about a general subject, in this case the nature of the
Church.
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and (2) the schismatic Orthodox Church, in order to be a church in the fullest sense, had to return
to the Catholic fold. No matter the Byzantine trappings of the curriculum or worship, the future
missionaries understood the core of the Church was Petrine, a thoroughly Roman concept.
Correlatively, the creed which Russian Orthodox converts were to profess to enter the
Catholic Church was the same creed required for heretics; it was entitled, “Short Form of the
Profession of Faith for Heretics or Eastern Schismatics.”64

In order to situate this creed within

soft-Orientalist dynamics these terms must be placed within the context of several others which
denote states of belief and relationship to the Catholic Church.
It is important to note the importance of performativity for the Catholic Church in the
examination of heresy and schism. Private matters were considered “occult” or hidden as part of
the “internal forum,” and were not considered legitimate matters to be judged officially in the
“external forum.” However, once a private matter was brought into the external forum, both
official and unofficial public judgments could be made. Generally, the more serious and farreaching the public performance of either virtue or vice, the more keen would be the interest of
the Magisterium. It was important not only to acknowledge and praise those whose social
performance reinforced the Catholic narrative, but to criticize, rebuke or even punish antiCatholic narratives, both within and outside the Church. Treatment of heretics and schismatics,
those whose group identity was in part a rejection and repudiation of a Catholic identity that they
once held, was particularly neuralgic.
Pagans, in the broadest sense, believed in religions other than the true one revealed by
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“Formula Brevior Professionis Fidei pro Haereticis seu Schismaticis Orientalibus.”
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Jesus Christ, and in a narrower sense, all religions other than Christianity, Judaism, and Islam
(Mohammedanism in the Catholic Encyclopedia), the historically interconnected monotheistic
religions born in the Near East. However, in practice, paganism was used in the narrower sense,
emphasizing, a la Comte, the primitiveness of the peoples in question.
Apostasy was understood to have three modes: (1) a Fide or perfide, the abandonment of
the faith, (2) ab ordine, the abandonment of the clerical state by a cleric, and (3) a religione or
monachatus, the abandonment of the religious state by vowed religious person.65 For the issue at
hand, Apostasy a Fide is relevant, implying the denial of Christianity itself, in toto. A person
could apostasy, becoming a pagan, Jew, Muslim, atheist, or agnostic.
A heretic differed from an apostate in that s/he denied only a part but not all of the
revealed religion. Heresy in its fullest sense was “pertinacious adhesion to a doctrine
contradictory to a point of faith clearly defined by the Church.”66 Any opinion opposed to an
article of faith which had not been clearly defined or proposed was an opinion approached
heresy, or sententia haeresi proxima. Doctrinal propositions which were not heretical in
themselves but led to logical consequences which varied from revealed truth were classified as
erroneous theological propositions, or propositio theologice erronea. Lastly, theological
opinions which had only a probability of heresy which could not be demonstrably proven were
labeled de haeresi suspecta or haeresim sapiens.
A schismatic differed from a heretic in that ecclesiastical union and unity is ruptured
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either by personal or communal choice.67 The schismatic may or may not hold heretical
theological opinions. This category is concerned about church order. The constant reference to
the Orthodox as schismatics placed them in the gentlest category of the Other, but an Other
nonetheless.
The formula intended for the official reception of heretical and schismatic converts was
intended to highlight the corrective nature of the conversion to Catholicism. Unlike “pagans,”
the intended convert had been baptized, but into a church with deficiencies in truth and/or church
order.
The introductory statement to the formula required the convert first to state explicitly, “I,
[full name] hold the firm faith and profess wholly and particularly, that which is contained in the
symbol (profession) of faith, which the Holy Roman Catholic Church uses, namely, ‘I believe in
one God, the Father almighty...’”.68 Overall, the formula which followed contained all of the
elements which Soloviev identified as problematic for Russian Orthodox converts: the filioque,
the Immaculate Conception, and the juridical primacy of the Pope.69 It contained eight
paragraphs, each of which demonstrated the deficiencies of Russian Orthodoxy, in
contradistinction to the fullness of the Truth taught by the Catholic Church. It also contained
other elements.
The first paragraph was simply the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed of 381 (commonly
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called simply the “Nicene Creed”). It not only included the filioque, but the word catholicam to
indicate the universality of the Church. Although this was (and remains) the standard word in the
creed in the west, it would have stood out to the Russian Orthodox convert used to hearing the
word “sobornoye”70 to indicate the mark of church universality. Catholic, after all, was the
descriptor of the papally-governed church of foreigners, especially the Poles.
The second paragraph was a summary of the essential elements of Christology formulated
at Chalcedon and quoted above, with the addition of the belief in the Immaculate Conception of
Mary. The inclusion of this notion, as well as the filioque above, rubbed against the Cappadocian
and Alexandrian theological tradition familiar to Byzantine Christians and insisted on the
Augustinian and Antiochene traditions favored by the Roman Catholic Church.71 Furthermore,
the production of this formula outside of a council and approved by the Pope demonstrated Papal
juridical primacy, the assertion of which came in the sixth paragraph. By implication,
conciliarism was dismissed.
The third paragraph dealt with the existence and legitimacy of the seven sacraments,
which both the Catholic and Orthodox Churches held.72 While familiar to an Orthodox convert,
many– but not all– Protestant converts would be reminded of the deficiencies of their previous
faith in this aspect of the formula. If an Orthodox convert were to convert to a Byzantine Rite
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Catholic Church, the administration of the sacraments would feel familiar; however, in the
Roman rite, differences in rite would feel alien. For example, while the Byzantine parish priest
would confer all at once and usually at birth: baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist73– under both
species of bread and wine, the Catholic priest would confer baptism at birth,74 and the Eucharist
only in the species of bread after the age of reason.75 The local bishop would by custom confer
confirmation at any time after the age of reason, ideally during Pentecost, and after sufficient
instruction.76
The fourth paragraph dealt with the differences in understanding a practice between
Roman and Byzantine Christians in the reception of the Eucharist. Both churches have held that
both bread and wine must be consecrated at the Eucharistic celebration, but have differed in two
practices. The first and less serious difference concerned the reception of communion by the
laity. Both Byzantine Orthodox and Catholic Churches allowed the reception of communion
under both species. Roman Catholic practice allowed the normal reception of communion only
in the form of the bread.77 The formula implied the importance of this practice as it included an
expression of the theory of concomitance, i.e. that the “fullness” of the Eucharist is present under
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both species. Thus, in a theological reductionist move, only one or the other of the species is
truly necessary for full communion. The second difference, the use of unleavened bread, was a
more serious difference between the two churches, as it evoked historical memory of the
theological battles between Catholic azymites and Orthodox prozymites beginning in the middle
of the eleventh century.
While many liturgical and ritual differences existed between the Latin and Greek
Churches, their respective use of azyme (unleavened) or prozyme (leavened) bread was symbolic
of serious theological differences. Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev noted,
the Byzantines saw in this seemingly trifling detail a reflection of serious
theological differences in the understanding of the essence of Christ’s body,
which is given to the faithful in the Eucharist: if leavened bread symbolizes
the consubstantiality of Christ’s body with ours, then unleavened bread is a
symbol for the difference between Christ’s body and ours. The Greeks viewed
the use of unleavened bread as an attack on the very heart of eastern Christian
theology: the teaching on deification [apotheosis], which was little known in
the west.78

The fourth paragraph required the convert to admit the legitimacy of the azyme bread, and by
extension, Catholic Christology. While this is a reasonable expectation of a convert, the lack of
acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the prozymite position is significant; it subtly dismisses the
Catholicity of Byzantine Rite Churches. For both Orthodox and Protestant converts, the Catholic
Church is ultimately synonymous with the Roman Rite.
The following paragraph dealt with the consequential soteriological issue of purgatory,
which developed in the Roman Catholic but not the Byzantine Church. Behind the doctrine was
the assertion that purgatory had its root in the thinking of John Chrysostom, which Augustine in
78
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turn began to develop.79 Unless the convert was exceptionally well-read in theology, s/he– even
if remaining in a Byzantine rite church– was experiencing a subtle type of Latinization.
Although the merit-based theology of grace rooted in the Roman church80 would not be a
necessary logical consequence, it could follow logically, further Latinizing the convert.
The final two paragraphs dealt with Church governance. The convert explicitly stated
that s/he believed in the universal, juridical primacy of the Pope as the Apostolic successor to St.
Peter, and that the magisterium, in union with the Pope, taught infallibly. As such, the convert
professed belief in the “true faith,” outside of which no salvation was possible.81 Correlatively,
the legitimate authority of the Catholic Councils beyond the first seven recognized by the
Orthodox Church were recognized. Florence, Trent, and the Vatican Synod (Vatican I) were
mentioned particularly; the Orthodox convert thereby professed an indirect belief and adherence
to the Catholic interpretation of the neuralgic points of contention with the Orthodox Church: the
theological justification for and formulation of the filioque (Florence), Catholic Church order
(Trent), and papal primacy and infallibility (Vatican I). The convert, with his/her right hand
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upon the bible, concluded the formula with the statement, “So, I (name) promise and believe. So
may God and this Holy Word of God judge me.”82
Taken in isolation, the formula is reasonable. It is rational to require a Catholic convert to
recognize the authority the Pope and the magisterium, to submit to Church order, and to believe
what the Catholic Church teaches, honestly and sincerely. Even the consideration to add a line or
two concerning the impossibility of divorce83– possible in Orthodox theology but impossible for
Catholics– is reasonable. However, taken within the context of the Catholic attitude toward
Russia formulated chiefly by Soloviev, conversion was not a simple matter of recognizing the
fullness of truth held and taught by the Catholic Church. Catholic priests and religious who
guided conversions did so with a sense that the Russian Orthodox Church was corrupted by the
tyrannical Tsarist government with which it collaborated, much like the Byzantine Church was
corrupted by the Byzantine Emperor. Both Churches fell to powers portrayed as hostile to
Christianity: Byzantium to the Ottomans and Russia to the Bolsheviks.
This is not an idle comparison; in 1929, d’Herbigny wrote an article in Orientalia
Christiana on the psychology of Islam. While he focused on the birth and growth of Islam,
d’Herbigny made infrequent references to the Bolshevik regime. The parallels to the Bolshevik
Revolution and growth of Communism are clear in the article. D’Herbigny had presided over the
PCpR, both as part of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches and as an independent
commission, almost as long as the Bolsheviks had been in power. He understood the conflict
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with the Bolsheviks in ideological terms, i.e. the true Catholic faith in opposition to atheistic
dialectical materialism or communism. For him, conflict with Muslims would be understood in
similar ideological terms, i.e. the true Catholic faith in opposition to Islam, a monotheism which
rejected the incarnation. While it is likely that his experience and understanding of Russia
shaped his scholarly approach to Islam, his analysis of Islam helped harden the soft-Orientalist
view of Russia.
D’Herbigny cribbed Soloviev in his explanation for the fall of Christianity in the region;
it was “besotted by degrading paganism or even more abject materialism...”84 Islam spread
rapidly, and blended religious, social, and political power under a theocratic despotism.
D’Herbigny asserted that while Muslims claimed to be dedicated to peace, by the end of the life
of Mohammed, Muslim preaching was often bellicose, hateful, and fiercely vindictive and
contemptuous.85 The parallel to the Bolshevik situation is rather clear. Bolshevism also spread
rapidly, and subsumed all social and political power under a despot. While the Bolsheviks
claimed to be dedicated to a better and just world, their vindictiveness moved beyond rhetoric
and into show trials. Islam had not been a genuine threat to European security at least since Tsar
Nicholas I had supposedly called the Ottoman Empire “the Sick Man of Europe.” But in the
interwar period, Pius XI agreed with d’Herbigny that atheistic communism was a serious threat
to civilization.
Although the historical actors of the 1920s and 1930s– including the members of the

84

“...abrutie par un paganisme dégradant ou par un matérialisme encore plus abject...” in
Michel d’Herbigny, SI, vesc. “L’Islam naissant. Notes psychologiques,” Orientalia Christiana
14 (1929): 198. (179-325)
85

D’Herbigny, “L’Islam,” p. 273.
173

PCpR– and current post-modern thinkers have conceived of Communism in varied ways, they do
agree that it has played out in global space, on socio-economic, cultural, and geopolitical planes.
Communists existed across Europe, and attempts or accusations of attempts of Marxist
revolution were made throughout the interwar period. Although the portrayal of the threat was
serious, the importance of the Bolshevik Revolution was equally if not more serious, since the
revolution was a success and the regime, after some time, was expected to endure.
The Vatican received reports of communist activity across Europe. A consideration in
October 1920 (a mere two months after the “Miracle on the Vistula”) by Louis de Maier, a
former Imperial Russian Colonel,86 confirmed for the Vatican the seriousness of the Communist
threat first across western Europe, then specifically in Russia.87 Piotr Isvolsky corroborated this
assessment by claiming the communist threat was not only in Russia, but was universal.88 The
tactical eye of Maier provided a means of hope for the Vatican; he maintained that the
Bolsheviks only had power in the important centers and the villages, and that approximately one
hundred million Russian persons had remained faithful (Orthodox) Christians. In accord with the
thinking of Soloviev, and citing the maxim that “unity is strength,” Maier called for the “Roman
Church, the mother of all Christian religions, to reach out to the Greek Church of Russia for a
union under the supreme leadership of the Sovereign Pontiff.”89 Not only would this be one part
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of the raison d’être for the eventual existence of the PCpR, the logic helped to define its mission.
Anti-communism would be a necessary part of the evangelization of Russia, which would
include both spiritual and worldly elements. (This mission will be examined in Chapter 5.) The
next few years demonstrated the difficulty of accomplishing a reunion of the Churches within
Bolshevik Russia.
In spite of whatever distaste a Russian Orthodox believer would have for the Bolshevik
regime, Catholic clergy learned over the next few years that the historical enmity between
Russian Orthodoxy and western/Polish/foreign Catholicism was not easily overcome,90 especially
since Polish priests– many of them bi-ritual– were hostile to Byzantine Christianity even among
Byzantine Catholics.91 Succinctly, religious rites were understood to be expressions of
nationalism, making any kind of Catholic-Orthodox rapproachement nearly impossible, in spite
of the common Bolshevik enemy. However, for the Vatican, religious confession was
understood to be the prior identity, and nationalist appropriation of religious identity
demonstrated the internal European otherness of these Slavic nations threatened by Marxism.
H.M. Waddams summed up the interwar assumptions made by scholars of Marxist theory
and practice that carried over into the post-war period and which have been challenged by recent
historiography:
(1) Religion is the opiate of the people.
(2) Religion is a conglomeration of outworn superstitions which will disappear in a fully
developed communist state as the result of a scientific and materialist education.
(3) The actual attitude of the Communist Party towards religion at any particular moment
is a matter of expediency or tactics (though these principles have an absolute value
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for Communists which we do not associate with them.92

The final point (3) has been an historiographical premise used both by members of the PCpR and
many historians of the interwar period, from those who participated in events to those born after
these events. For example, both Louis Gallagher,93 who participated in these events, and Dennis
Dunn,94 born after them, both assume that Marxist Revolutionary strategy at its core works to
root out religion thoroughly from society, as much as is expedient or possible. The notion that
the Bolsheviks were as much reacting to circumstances as trying to implement a revolution,
accepted by some notable current scholars,95 was not within the historical imagination of the
Vatican in the interwar period.
Given the attitude in the interwar period that Communists were ultimately looking to
eradicate religion, Harold Laski, a noted political scientist at the University of London, found a
parallel between Jesuits working to spread Catholicism and Bolsheviks working to spread
Communism. Concerning the Bolsheviks, he noted
They are, as a party, comparable to nothing so much as the Society of Jesus.
There is, in both, the same rigorous and unyielding set of dogmas, the same
iron rigour of discipline, the same passionate loyalty capable of unlimited
self-confidence. The Jesuit who set out to preach his faith in China or the
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unknown Arctic north-West is not dissimilar to the Communist who
volunteers to bury the infected corpses in the cholera epidemic. Like the
Jesuit, the Communist has no personal end to secure; he feels himself
essentially the servant of a great idea. Like the Jesuit, also, the Russian
Communist has the assurance that he works for a cause that is bound to
end in triumph.96

This layered parallel between Catholicism and Communism was not lost on Catholic
intellectuals97 or the members of the PCpR; the common practice of referring to Communism as
“atheistic Communism” reinforced the notion that it was an ideology, and a diabolical one at
that.98 Although shifts in the Bolshevik treatment of religion and specifically Catholicism are
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detectable, the members of the PCpR understood Bolshevik religious policy to be a
comprehensive ideological struggle within the context of turmoil and suffering of the post-war.
Ledóchowski, in a note to Secretary of State Gaspari in 1922, expressed this attitude when he
emphasized the “flagrant systematic violations of conscience” (emphasis by the author).99
By 1922, officials in the Catholic Church accepted the fact that the power of the
Bolsheviks was not only “not diminishing, but was growing,”100 with the correlative claim that
the “barbarities of the Bolsheviks were known everywhere.”101 Additionally, they feared that
Communism would spread successfully into Hungary, Italy, and then to all of Europe,102 given
the unstated, temporary successes of Béla Kuhn in Hungary and the notable presence of socialism
in Italy. Catholic strategy shifted from hoping for a widespread promulgation of the Catholic
faith in Russia simply to working to maintain its survival. A report of 14 September 1922 noted
that St. Catherine’s Church in Petrograd had been reduced from 30,000 members to 5,000, and
that similar massive declines in church participation was true in other parishes, some of which
were reduced to only 50 members.103 The show trial in the spring of 1923 of Jan Cieplak,
Konstantin Budkkiewicz, Leonid Feodorov, as well as fourteen other priests and a layman,
confirmed the desperate situation of the Catholic Church in Russia. Within the Catholic world,
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the view of Soviet Russia as a dangerous place hostile to Catholicism remained constant. By
1927, Adam Zielizinski, a Polish Catholic layman, volunteered to smuggle rosaries, (Latin)
crosses, and books into Russia to help keep Catholicism alive.104 Cardinals Dalbor and
Kakowski, in the name of all Polish bishops, took the opportunity to condemn the action against
these Catholics by the Soviets on humanitarian grounds.105
Although the Poles were vocal in their opposition and condemnation of Soviet behavior,
the PCpR, even before its separation from SCEO in 1925, also had problems with Poles. The
Poles were interested in missionary work in Russia, but while the language of mission was that of
reunification with the schismatics (i.e. the Orthodox Churches), the Vatican interpreted Polish
interest as imperial expansion into the far eastern kresy.106 Tensions between the PCpR and the
Poles reached a climax in the early 1930s, and remained a source of conflict for the PCpR for the
near future.
Because both Greek Catholic dioceses and Russian Catholic Churches were found in the
II RP, the PCpR administratively included Poland in its consideration of the mission to Russia.107
The general Polish distaste for things Russian in turn made the work of the PCpR in Poland
distasteful. The Poles wanted to take the lead in the missionary apostolic work in Russia, and
were irritated that the Vatican had created the PCpR. The Polish bishops voiced concerns about
“religious Russification” of non-Polish minorities in their dioceses, i.e. the Ukrainians and
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Belarusians, through the “oriental rites.”108 This charge was serious enough that d’Herbigny
discussed it in an audience with Pius XI on 7 August 1930.
The Pope and d’Herbigny judged that such charges were rooted in Polish nationalist
concerns and not proper religious sensibilities. If any “religious Russification” took place, it was
because of Tsarist policy, and furthermore, Latin Catholics were not Russified. They affirmed
that the choices the PCpR made to manage the churches were canonical, legal decisions.109 In
spite of the insistence by the Vatican that they were working for spiritual and not national ends,
problems with the Poles persisted. Whatever ecclesio-political machinations occurred between
the Polish bishops and d’Herbigny for control of the Russian mission, the PCpR found itself on
the defense from the Poles as well as the Bolsheviks. We will turn first to the Poles.
In 1932, Polish newspapers, citing concerns of the Russification of minorities, charged
the PCpR of being under the influence of the Russians and of having an anti-Polish character.110
To soften public opinion, in early 1932 the Vatican seriously considered changing the name of
the Pontifical Commission for Russia to one of the following: Pontificia Commissio pro Russia,
etc. (meaning concerns of Russia and beyond its borders), Pontificia Commissio URSS, Russi,
Estoni Christiani Orientalis in Pol. Maiore, Pontificia Commissio pro Russia, Estonia, ecc
christianis orientalibus in Polonia Maiore,111 Pontificia Commission Pastoralis pro Populis
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Russiae et Finitimis,112 and the very non-descript Commissio Reunionis dissidentum113 Through
all of these considerations, which were never adopted, the Vatican officials continued to insist on
the religious, and not the political nature, of their efforts.
The Kuryer Codzienny Ilustrowany in Kraków insisted on the hypocrisy of the PCpR
asking why, if it is a commission for Russia, is it in Poland? Gustaw Lawina, the author, led his
article with the header/quote which featured both the condescending attitude of d’Herbigny and
an example of d”Herbigny’s Polish: “‘Naszem [sic!]114 zadaniem jest zbawienie dusz, a nie
polityka!’ -d’H.”115 If the interview between Lawina and d’Herbigny were verbal, the spelling
of “naszem” might suggest that d’Herbigny displayed– if not simply a poor accent– an eastern
one.116 If d’Herbigny answered questions via telegraph or letter, his spelling choice might also
have diminished his stature in the eyes of Polish readers, even though the written Polish
language was not yet standardized.
In some sense, the Poles correctly understood the condescending attitude of the PCpR
toward Poland, in spite of the nationalist-driven politics which fueled concerns over a Russian
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commission in Poland. When D’Herbigny had the opportunity to alleviate the concerns of Poles
about their former oppressor, he demonstrated a lack of his concern for the effects of historical
memory. His answers were dismissive. When asked about non-Polish Byzantine Catholic
priests not speaking Polish but Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian he simply answered that they
speak the languages of the places they are assigned, including Polish. When asked about the
preponderance of Byzantine Rite priests in Poland, d’Herbigny explained that Byzantine Rite
priests were in France and Belgium as well, but that many Russians came first to Poland before
moving farther west. When asked about calling the Byzantine rite “Eastern” rather than “Greek
Catholic,” he responded by saying the earlier term was a scholarly blunder, and that “Eastern” fit
better than “Greek” due to the liturgical language used (Slavonic) versus the one that was not
used (Greek).117 Lastly, his insistence that the PCpR had a spiritual and not a political mission
betrayed an ignorance concerning the importance of the relationship between religion and
politics in the region. He simply repeated the assertions that Ivan Gagarin– a Russian noble and
patriot– had made in the nineteenth century.118 Tangentially Lorenzo Lauri and Bishop Van Der
Ropp also held and repeated these assertions.119
D’Herbigny believed that political and cultural factors distorted their view of the Russian
mission. While the PCpR wanted to preserve the native culture of converts, he believed that the
Poles wanted to Latinize, and therefore Polonize, them.120 This conflict with the Poles both
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reinforced and helped to construct soft-Orientalist attitudes of the PCpR. While the Poles,
politicians and bishops alike, were driven by a nationalism cloaked in religiosity, the PCpR
worked faithfully and truthfully for the conversion of Russia, supposedly keeping aloof of Polish
politics. Concurrently the PCpR was engaged with the Soviet government concerning the antireligious campaign, which the church insisted was primarily religious, and not political, in
nature.
There was very little the Catholic Church could do, except express moral outrage at the
behavior of the Soviets toward religion. The Pope had condemned Communism in a special
elocution after the conclusion of the Papal relief mission to Russia in 1924, and again in the
encyclical Miserentissimus Redemptor of 8 May 1928. He also called for prayers for those
persecuted in Russia, and on March 19, 1930, the feast of St. Joseph, a special mass was held in
Rome. Just preceding the event, on March 15, the Soviets “applauded the horrendous destruction
of churches and [the] mass arrests of 1929.121 To explain the rationale to both Catholics and
non-Catholics alike, Edmund Walsh published a short book entitled, Pope Pius XI Asked Prayers
for Russia on March 19th.122 In it, he reviewed the Bolshevik anti-religious campaign, which he
portrayed as both systematic and as an essential part of atheistic communism.
But in the following June, in the wake of the March 19th mass (attended by 50,000 people,
including non-Catholic Christians and Jews123), the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party
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officially renewed the anti-religious campaign. In the following July, the newspaper Bezbozhnik
(published by the League of Militant Atheists between 1922-1941) promulgated this June
resolution. Even if the relationship is not causal, the coincidental timing is provoking.
Over the next few years, priests were arrested and exiled,124 and sacred vessels were
confiscated and– by the very nature of the confiscation– desecrated.125 Again, Pius XI
condemned Communism. He granted an indulgence for praying for the salvation of Russia with
a holy card, in which red-shirted men with torches have set fire to an onion-domed church,126 and
he promulgated Quadragesimo Anno on 15 May 1931. The events were reminiscent of the
confiscations and arrests in the early 1920s, and the church took advantage of the historical
parallels.
By 1932, Socialist and Communist newspapers outside the Soviet Union supported the
anti-religious campaign along with Bezbozhnik,127 and Walsh reworked his apologia into an
historical argument, in which contemporary events could be explained not because of immediate
historical actors and exigencies, but because of the nature of Communism itself.
He created a periodization which could support the notion that the conflict between
atheistic communists and believers was not about protagonists, but principles.128 Walsh argued
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that the Bolshevik attack began as a military one (1918-1924) which was transformed into a legal
attack (1924-1928) when it was no longer expedient to use brute force. He explained away the
relative lack of religious persecution between 1928-1932 as the closing phase of the legal attack.
Walsh, either ignorant or dismissive of “institutional tension [between the Komsomol and the
League of the Godless] and genuinely differing understandings of religion and its role in Soviet
society,”129 asserted that the communists were uniformly and militantly anti-religious, and were
intent on communizing the world or destroying it. The unstated implication was that this
renewed persecution, in which police rather than military force was used, was simply a renewal
of the historical cycle.
Through it all, Pius XI attacked Communism. He published his displeasure with the
Bolsheviks in Osservatore Romano,130 complained to the Italian ambassador about the USSR,131
and officially condemned communism in his encyclicals Caritate Christi (3 May 1932), Acerba
Animi (29 September 1932), and Dilectissima Nobis (3 June 1933).
By the time d’Herbigny was dismissed in late 1933, anti-Communism had become an
essential aspect to the Catholic missionary narrative, reflecting a Vatican “realpolitik” with the
contemporary situation in the USSR. This, in turn, lent itself to the creation of the
historiographical schools of thought which emphasized the necessity of clandestine activity,
congruent with western Cold War narratives concerning the USSR. Interestingly, the PCpR was
suppressed in January 1993, not too long after the Soviet Union gave way to the Russian
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Federation.
While the Soviet experiment cemented itself in Russia in the 1920s and 1930s, it took
great hope to believe that eventually, the ideal society proposed by Soloviev, based upon the
socially expressed hypostatic union, would exist. From the point of view of the PCpR and the
Vatican, the corrupted and deficient Orthodox faith was supplanted by atheistic Communism, a
faith more damaging to Christianity than even Islam. In the meantime, the PCpR worked to
preserve the Catholic Church on Russian soil as best it could, and to make Catholic converts
adhere with their western notion of the true faith. The final aspect of the work of the PCpR was
to manage those converts, in accord with both spiritual and temporal concerns of the faith.
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Chapter 5
Behavioral Codes and the Construction of Soft-Orientalism

In chapter 4, we saw how soft-Orientalism was intertwined with Catholic creedal belief.
While anti-Communism became the means of dealing with a flawed and problematic USSR, the
ideals of Soloviev were used to manage Catholics within that society– whether they remained in
or escaped from it. The code of behavior which Russian Catholics were expected to observe
reflected the soft-Orientalist laden Catholic creedal belief constructed for them.
The ideal society which Soloviev envisioned (examined in Chap. 4), based on the western
medieval historical experience of the distinct but inseparable aspects of regnum and sacerdotium,
which he understood to be a reflection of the distinct but inseparable human and divine natures of
Christ expressed in the Chalcedonian formula (also examined in Chap. 4), would have to concern
itself with both the physical and spiritual natures of each single human person. The Catholic
magisterium had formulated the corporal1 and spiritual2 works of mercy as a general but practical
code of service for Catholics to care for both aspects of human nature, and also expected that
Catholics make use of the sacraments, especially Eucharist and Penance, to improve their
spiritual lives. While this code of conduct was sufficient in normal circumstances, the PCpR
believed that the situation in Russia called for more heroic behavior.

1

They are: to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to harbor
the harborless (or shelter the homeless), to visit the sick, to ransom the captive (or visit the
imprisoned), and to bury the dead; cf. www.newadvent.org, “Corporal and Spiritual Works of
Mercy.”
2

They are: to instruct the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to admonish sinners, to bear
wrongs patiently, to forgive offences willingly, to comfort the afflicted, and to pray for the living
and the dead; cf. www.newadvent.org, “Corporal and Spiritual Works of Mercy.”
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D’Herbigny (as discussed earlier) had used the famine to portray Russia as a barbaric
place in need of spiritual and material succor which the Catholic Church could provide, and this
portrayal had helped to demonstrate the need for the PCpR itself and the subsequent importance
of its work. However, apart from that agenda, the Vatican and the members of the PCpR were
sincerely interested in helping the Russian people materially, both those in Russia and refugees.
The Vatican spent a great deal of money on relief for refugees, even through the depression.
Although its ledgers are not available for consultation,3 some financial information is available
from routine correspondence and memos.
In October 1925, in its first year of independence from SCEO, the PCpR received
325,000 Italian Lira to finance the commission and all of its works, drawing its funds from the
Pope himself, the Secretary of State, the fund for seminaries and seminarians, the Commission
for Religious Works, and from Propaganda Fide.4 Available records imply that the Pope had a
special interest in helping the multitudes of the poor, giving 15,000 Italian lira to the PCpR in
1925, and designating that it be used for their relief.5 In April 1926, he ensured that the Secretary
of State specifically earmarked 20,000 Italian lira for the same purpose.6 Even in the depths of
the depression, the Pope did not allow the financial resources of the PCpR to diminish, even
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though the budgets of many other dicastaries had been reduced.7 While many historians note the
importance of Russia for Pius XI, his concern specifically for the Russian poor– including
refugees– appears equally important.
The type of outreach which the PCpR performed toward the Russian poor was not unique
to them. They were aware of other philanthropic organizations, and did many of the same things.
The French organization “Les Amities Franco-Russes,”8 for example, worked to foster friendship
between the French public and Russian refugees, as well as engender into the former a sympathy
for the plight of the latter. The organization held public lectures, supported education for
Russian immigrants, and provided monetary relief for them. The PCpR functioned similarly, but
understood these things from a religious perspective. Insofar as both organizations were
providing out of their cultural and material largesse for a people in need due to their historical
circumstances, soft-Orientalist dynamics were at play. For the PCpR, class dynamics were
clearly in operation as well, as it aided the upper class Russians differently from those who were
poor. The PCpR handled the former personally and directly, while it handled the latter
impersonally and indirectly.
The PCpR helped the lower classes who presented themselves in need in various modes.
In 1923, the PCpR (still within SCEO) sent 90 lira over two years to help Russian refugees in the
Levant and Constantinople.9 Clearly, the grand hold that the Russian Orthodox Church had in
the Levant discussed in chapter 2 was gone; the Soviet government, with the consent of the
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general Russian population, had to resort to the confiscation of Church wealth for famine relief at
home. The PCpR also sent aid to a Russian girls’ gymnasium in Harbin, China in 1929, partly to
relieve them from the afflictions of poverty, and partly to preserve their virtue within the context
of poverty in which such virtue–the church claimed– could be easy to lose.10 That same year, the
PCpR sent aid to mutilated and invalid Russian expatriate Great War veterans in Paris.11
Similarly, in 1932, the PCpR sent 13,000 Italian lira– roughly the equivalent of 5,000 z³oty– to
Wilno, to be doled out over two years to war invalids there.12 While the aid was sincere, it also
reinforced soft-Orientalist attitudes: the PCpR aided Russian refugees when the Soviet
government and the Russian Orthodox Church would not or could not. Furthermore, the aid
spanned geographical boundaries from the western European Metropole to the periphery, both in
Eastern Europe and in the traditional colonial areas of the Levant. It also found its way to Africa.
In 1930, d’Herbigny sent aid to a medical mission in Nigeria, and personally conveyed
encouragement to its head: Maria Lenganeur (neé Lubov), a doctor.13 Lenganeur was a member
of the Congregation of the Holy Child Jesus and oversaw a rather international group of sisters in
Nigeria. While the financial aid which the PCpR doled out often reinforced an Orientalist
attitude toward Russia, the work of Dr. Lenganeur demonstrated the softness of this softOrientalism. Although Russia was in need, those Russians who had established themselves in
the west– especially as Catholics– had ceased being the subjects of care– especially because they
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were integrated into the very structure of the Catholic church– and instead became the
instruments of care.
While the PCpR aided poor Russian refugees through intermediate structures, it aided
upper class Russians personally and directly. One of the first was the former (and final) Russian
ambassador to the Holy See, Lyssakovsky, who at age 46, petitioned the Vatican for help getting
settled in Paris. Lyssakovsky asked his contacts in the Vatican to help him make connections in
industrial, commercial, and banking interests in France. The PCpR, while still under CEO, took
great care to note his many accomplishments in the Russian diplomatic service.14 He had been
the attache and secretary in Tokyo, Beijing, Brussels, Berne, and Washington, and had been
responsible for business in Bucharest and Bangkok. He had also been the deputy head of the
Department of the Near East, and later head of the Department of Information for Foreign
Affairs. Finally, he was made the Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Holy
See in 1917. The PCpR left unstated that Lyssakovsky would have been vetted by the Holy
Synod for his Vatican posting, and that the revolution had destroyed the Orthodox Russian
government. They did note, however, that Lyssakovsky did not represent the current (Bolshevik)
government of Russia.15 It is unclear whether or not the Vatican helped Lyssakovsky; no remarks
were made in his file. What was clear that the situation in Russia had left him without any real
material resources. Both Orthodoxy and Bolshevism had failed him, and he was left to beg for
help from the Vatican. Subsequent cases dealt mostly with women, though some men also
petitioned for aid. Often, those requesting aid had contacts who interceded for them with either
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someone in the PCpR directly, or to someone in the Roman curia who would forward the request
for aid to the PCpR.
Luisa Elena Pienkowska– living in Rome, interceded in 1927 on behalf of her sister,
Jadwiga Mankowska– living in Warsaw-- to Monsignor Raspanti, who in turn enlisted the help
of Lorenzo Lauri,16 who finally forwarded her letter to the PCpR, noting on a business card that
they should deal with the request. Mankowska had married into a wealthy Ukrainian noble
family, which was left destitute in part by the war and in part by the Bolsheviks, who had killed
her older daughter sometime in 1926. She was widowed with a teen age girl (Wanda), and
afflicted with a neurological disorder. She framed her request for money by arguing that she took
jobs, but that they were not enough to pay to keep her daughter in the boarding school of the
Benedictine Sisters in Kraków. At the end of the year, the PCpR awarded her 3,600 lira, to be
paid over time at a rate of 300 lira per month.17 The PCpR decided in a meeting on February 1,
1928 that d’Herbigny ought to convey their gratitude to the Holy Father for the money that made
such charity possible, as well as recognize two other monsignors who helped practically get the
money to Mankowska. He did so on February 12.18
Some cases were not so involved. In 1930, Alicia Baszkiewicz, a Russian refugee in
Poland, petitioned for aid, and was recognized as being a good Christian from a pious family.
After some deliberation, the PCpR recommended that she take advantage of local charity

16

AA.EE.SS., PCpR 16/101: 4.

17

AA.EE.SS., PCpR 16/101: 11-13, 15, 22.

18

AA.EE.SS., PCpR 16/101: 24.
192

organizations, and informed Francesco Marmaggi, the Papal nuncio to Poland, of their decision.19
Because Baskiewicz had contacts in Rome, the PCpR did give her individual attention.
However, because she was not part of an important family, the commission paid little attention to
her. The PCpR neither gave her money nor included a detailed biography with a pedigree, in
her file.
Overall, without regard for social status, the PCpR sincerely helped Russian refugees.
However, the so-called Soviet barbarity prompted a general exodus, prompting a need for aid;
this confirmed and reinforced soft-Orientalist attitudes. The desperation of those fleeing Russia
will be examined below, as part of the analysis of how the PCpR managed marriage cases. The
necessity of aid confirmed for the PCpR the moral bankruptcy of the Bolshevik revolution and
Soviet government, and so confirmed the necessity of the conversion of Russia to Catholicism.
The concerns of the PCpR with respect to evangelization shifted from an initial optimism
for the growth and expansion of Catholicism to a guarded hope for the simple survival of
Catholicism within Russia. Because much of this helped create and sustain the PCpR as an
independent commission, this has already been previously examined. However, it is important to
remember that Russia was portrayed as suffering under the yoke of the Bolsheviks and in need of
the Catholic Church both materially–due to the famine– and spiritually– due to its spiritual
authority, the deficiencies of the Orthodox Church, and the lies of Bolshevism. The situation in
Russia gave the Vatican, including the members of the PCpR, a sense of urgency,20 if not a
feeling of desperation.
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Yet, hope did exist. Even with the renewal of the so-called anti-religious campaign in
the early 1920s, a group of Catholic and Orthodox students desired to learn about the Catholic
faith with the explicit purpose of working against Bolshevism.21 At the same time, such requests
confirmed that the extraordinary threat to the faith was ordinary in Russia. The Pope, therefore,
granted the PCpR a rather lengthy list of dispensations which could be granted22 with
accompanying instructions and admonitions.23 Sacraments and rites concerning church
membership differed for Catholics in Russia than those outside.
In regard to the latter, the fundamental sacrament, baptism, was shortened greatly from its
regular form, which included elaborate questioning, rites of exorcism, and blessings in addition
to the baptismal formula and anointing with the oil of catechumens (O.C.) and sacred chrism
(S.C.).24 Priests in Russia asked only the most fundamental questions concerning the faith drawn
from the Apostles’ Creed. They then baptized the infant or convert according to the regular
formula and anointed him or her with the aforementioned oils.25 For those baptized into the
Catholic faith in Russia, a plenary indulgence was explicitly given with baptism,26 suggesting
that they were in peril. It is important to remember that the Catholic Church has recognized any
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baptism as valid which was performed using water and accompanied by the Trinitarian formula.
Thus, no Russian Orthodox convert to Catholicism was rebaptized. These conversions were
important, as they confirmed the importance of the Russian mission. The most important were
conversions to Roman Catholicism. However, conversions to Byzantine Catholicism also
demonstrated the superiority of Catholicism over Orthodoxy, even if the conversion were from
the Roman to the Byzantine Rite within the Catholic Church.
One such case concerned Henryk Makowski,27 a man more than 50 years old who had
converted to Roman Catholicism from Orthodoxy as a youth, and was in minor orders after
studying for four years at the ecclesiastical seminary in Warsaw. Presumably feeling more
comfortable with Byzantine Rite worship as he aged, Makowski petitioned to transfer to that rite
in October 1923. It was granted by the CEO without fanfare two months later, as PrzeŸdziecki,
his bishop, wrote to the PCpR in support of his request. On the one hand, the desire of
Makowski to revert to worshiping in the Byzantine Rite could have been interpreted as a
rejection of the better form of Catholicism, i.e. the Roman. On the other hand, he chose to
remain a Catholic rather than return to his mother church– the Orthodox Church.
The case of Anatol Arciuszkiewicz was a more powerful symbol of Catholic superiority.
Arciuszkiewicz, a 48 year old bachelor and Polish citizen, had served in the Polish armed forces
as a member of the Russian Orthodox Church. His Polish father, a Roman Catholic, married a
Russian Orthodox woman, and agreed to raise their children– including Anatol– in accord with
the Orthodox faith. Anatol petitioned the PCpR in Rome in 1933 to become Catholic, in order to
be more like his father, to blend in better with Poles, and to gain the indulgence for the 1,900th
27
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anniversary of the resurrection of the Lord.28 Of course, the PCpR did not acknowledge the
nationalist reasons for his conversion, and directed that he present himself to his ordinary in
Poland to be admitted into the Latin Rite of the Catholic Church.29
Even if the mission in Russia was precarious, conversions like that of Henryk Makowski
and Anatol Arciuszkiewicz affirmed the conviction of the PCpR that Catholicism was the True
Faith, and that hope existed for the Russian mission. The aforementioned dispensations were
the institutional expression of that hope, which did help Catholics in difficult situations. Those
Catholics in Russia who could not keep the fast were dispensed from them,30 and Viaticum could
be carried to the dying in secret,31 rather in a large burse in front of the chest of the minister
visible to all. Latin priests who did not have faculties from Byzantine bishops were given the
authority to hear confessions of Catholics of any rite who were in extraordinary need.32 The
response to the dangers to the faith and to the faithful in Russia reinforced the image of Russia as
a dangerous place in need of reform.
The rhetoric of desperation concerning Russia succeeded in moving the hearts of many
Catholics, including Elsa Wengel, a thirty-five year old German-born immigrant to the United
States. As a younger woman, she had been a member of the Carmelite order, but left it, claiming
that God had told her that this was not her true vocation. After spending time in various other
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congregations, she emigrated to the United States and began working in a tubercular hospital, St.
Anthony’s, in the Woodhaven section of Queens, NY. While there, Wengel– who had begun
calling herself Sister Mary Immaculata– claimed that God had told her to found a congregation
for the conversion of Russia, and that she should begin by going to Franklin Square (on Long
Island), where she would find a house. She did in fact find one, and purchased it.33
Convinced that this experience confirmed this as her vocation, she traveled to Rome in
the summer of 1931 to meet with d’Herbigny, with the desire to obtain permission to open a
house for third order Carmelite missionaries to Russia in Berlin, and if this were to be
impossible, in Monaco, Bavaria. He was sufficiently impressed with her social work on Long
Island and her zeal to serve the Russian mission, that he also arranged an audience for her with
Pius XI. Wengel interpreted these experiences as tacit approval of her plan; the Vatican,
however, claimed that she did not receive such approval.
The magisterium found Wengel suspicious and her work problematic because she
claimed direct inspiration from God, and did not have a religious superior. Because her house
fell within the Diocese of Brooklyn, Wengel fell under the authority of Bishop Thomas Molloy
(1884-1956), who was consecrated its auxiliary in 1920 and became its bishop the following
year. He reacted unfavorably to her plans for a Russian mission, and rather than tell her “no,” he
referred her the director of the Catholic Near East Welfare Association, Rev. James O’Reilly.
He, in turn, consulted consulted Patrick Cardinal Hayes (1867-1938), whose opinion was also
negative. He asserted that, “this woman ought not to receive encouragement. Women of her
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type... bring the church into disrepute and cause serious trouble with the civil authorities.”34
O’Reilly wrote, not to d’Herbigny under whose authority this situation fell, but to Mgr.
Cicognani, the assessor to CEO. The subsequent action of Cicognani, whatever it was, elicited a
politically expedient response from the PCpR in November 1932: Wengel would have to procure
the permission of her local ordinary for any work she would undertake.35 Thus, the PCpR neither
approved of nor forbade her work. D’Herbigny, given his initial enthusiasm, thought it best to
require local ordinaries, rather than the PCpR, to tell her that should could not proceed.
Wengel responded to this stonewalling by attempting to make herself, and therefore her
project, more acceptable to the magisterium. Early in 1933, she petitioned Mother Maria
Josaphata, the superior of a Greek Rite Convent of the Sisters of St. Basil the Great in Fox
Chase, near Philadelphia, PA, for temporary residence. Wengel desired to live and experience
Byzantine Catholicism for only a few weeks, with the hope that it would demonstrate her ability
to adapt to the cultural and spiritual requirements of the mission. The logic behind this was not
unlike that which justified the official program for seminiarians studying at the PIO and living at
the Russicum (analyzed previously).
Mother Josaphata agreed, with the proviso that Wengel bring with her a letter from her
religious superior or ordinary granting her permission. It is unclear whether or not Mother
Josaphata was aware of the church politics surrounding Wengel. Nonetheless, her demand that
Wengel produce official permission was tantamount to a rejection.
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Meanwhile, Vatican officials had kept tabs on her. Francis Peter Bucys, M.I.C.36 (18721951), the titular bishop of Olimpus residing in Rome, had earlier been charged by Pius XI to
study the situation of Russian immigrants in the United States.37 His opinion was an important
factor in permanently marginalizing Wengel. In August 1933, Bucys argued that the Franciscan
Friars and Sisters of Greymoor in Garisson, NY, already had both the people– 102 professed
sisters and 17 novices– and the means to undertake a Russian mission. He also noted that other
institutions, though not as capable, also existed: the aforementioned convent in Fox Chase, and
another in Factoryville, PA.38 By the time d’Herbigny was dismissed from the PCpR, Wengel
had been effectively precluded from establishing her version of a Russian mission in the United
States, let alone Europe. Tardini, who succeeded d’Herbigny as the president of the PCpR,
continued the policy of forcing Wengel to petition local ordinaries for permission, and made it
explicit that she did not have the support of the PCpR.39
The case of Elsa Wengel demonstrates that maintenance of Catholic structural,
institutional integrity was a concern that was prior to service. When Rev. O’Reilly confronted
Wengel with the difficulties that come with founding a new order, she rightly responded that all
new orders face such difficulties. Like Ignatius of Loyola, she began spiritual work as a
laywoman and subsequently sought approval. Like Ignatius, she experienced institutional
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resistance that highlighted her personal spiritual experiences as problematic. Unlike Ignatius, she
did not procure a bull of institution from the Holy See for approval for her newly imagined order
and its work. Likely, her practice of wearing a habit and calling herself Sr. Maria Immaculata
was off-putting to the magisterium and their functionaries. These visual and audial public
markers implied an authority the church claimed she did not have. Rather than correct her and
insist on a conformity to canon law, church officials chose instead to marginalize her without
proffering any explanation. Her public performance of piety was not meant to reject the values
of the Church; rather, it was an overzealous acceptance which, when conflated with her belief
that she was doing the will of God, could be used to label her as crazy. Ultimately, the
unwillingness of Wengel to give up ownership of and responsibility for her Russian mission
brought her into conflict with church authorities, unlike Maria Lenganeur (mentioned above),
who operated within the Roman Catholic ecclesial structure in accord with established codes of
behavior.
While the Roman curia and their appointees in various dicasteries and commissions
codify and regulate expected behavior– as with the cases noted above, the most common agents
who reinforced expected behavior have been local parish priests. The trust which has been
placed in them by their diocesan and Roman superiors comes in part from the discipline of
celibacy. The ability to remain continent, i.e. abstain from all sexual activity, has implied a
strong dedication to the Church and its mission. Once again, the stricter discipline of the
Catholic Church, in contradistinction from the “more lax” requirements of Byzantine priests,
confirmed the superiority of Catholicism.
Clerical celibacy was one socially identifiable marker which easily distinguished Roman
200

Rite from the Byzantine Rite or Orthodox priests. Celibacy, i.e. chaste continence, was a longstanding intrinsic requirement which Rome demanded of its sub-deacons, deacons, priests, and
bishops, that is, its clerics in major orders. Contrarily, the Byzantine Churches developed a
theology which required only its bishops to be celibate. The PCpR would be able to claim the
Catholic approach to celibacy was more spiritually rich, and therefore better, than that of the
Byzantine Churches.
Although the Catholic and Orthodox Churches shared a common theological heritage
until their late medieval schism, their management of clerical celibacy developed differently.
Scholars of this issue tend toward two poles of thought, established by the debate between
Gustav Bickell (1838-1906), who argued that clerical celibacy had divine origins which could be
traced to the Apostolic period, and Franz-Xavier Funk (1821-1907), who later contended that
clerical celibacy was only a matter of church order and ecclesiastical discipline.40 Both Catholic
and Orthodox thinkers tended toward the position Funk argued, and doctrinal formulations in
both churches upheld the ideal of clerical celibacy.
Celibacy was meant to nurture the spiritual and starve the carnal aspects of human nature.
While ecclesial authorities appealed to scripture as the theological foundation of celibacy, no
certain conclusions can be drawn from scripture concerning the marital status of the Apostles,41
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including Peter.42 The ideal of continence was maintained to preserve the purity of clerics who
served at Eucharistic liturgies, making them more clearly an alter Christus. Both Churches
recognized the Council of Nicea (325), and its canon 3, which is as follows:

The Great Council has strictly forbidden any bishop, priest, or deacon, or any
member of the clergy from having a sub-introduced woman (syneisaktos) unless
she be a mother, a sister, aunt, or a person who is above suspicion.43

Underlying this pronouncement was that clerics, in both major and minor orders, not only be
celibate, but also beyond the possibility of reproach. However, the Eastern Churches disagreed
with Rome concerning how to understand and to uphold clerical celibacy.
Both churches distinguished between doctrinal and disciplinary questions, and celibacy
fell primarily, but not entirely, under the latter. East and West had different structural
mechanisms to address failures of the major clerics to live in continence, in accord with canon 3.
Papal authority either itself upheld clerical celibacy, or upheld the decisions of regional or local
councils which upheld celibacy. Nonetheless, the benefice system– a product of feudalism–
allowed unworthy men to become clerics, and hold office with a great degree of assurance that
they would hold it for life. The Gregorian attempts at reform of this “Nicolaitism,”44 as well as
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simony and lay investiture,45 became a stimulus for the complex canonical efforts upholding
celibacy, which reached their maturity in the Second Lateran Council (1139).46 While the
Catholic Church portrayed the wide-spread practice of clerical marriage as “concubinage,” it was
nonetheless prolific and widely socially accepted. Roman success at instituting the discipline of
clerical celibacy upheld not only the theological values expressed scripturally and in subsequent
councils– most especially that of Nicea– but helped construct the nineteenth and early twentieth
century Catholic narrative of the superiority of Catholic ecclesiology, especially the Papacy.
The Eastern Churches addressed issues of celibacy at a more local level, without
universal promulgation of doctrinal teaching or canons governing the praxis of celibacy.
Response to lapses in the discipline of continence was therefore varied. However, the Emperor
Justinian II (685-711) convoked the Second Council of Quinsext or Trullo, which the Eastern
Churches regarded as authoritative. There is much in a name. “Trullo” refers to the great hall in
the imperial palace in which the council convened; this emphasizes imperial involvement over
doctrinal formulation and promulgation. “Quinsext,” contrarily refers to the purpose of the
council: to complete the work of the fifth and sixth ecumenical councils by promulgating
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disciplinary decrees in support of those councils.47 Although a few Roman bishops attended the
council, Rome regarded it as a Byzantine affair, and has never recognized it as an ecumenical
council,48 likely due its latent anti-Roman tone.49 While canons 3, 6, and 12 were in conformity
to Roman doctrine and praxis, canon 13 is a marked departure from the practice of the Roman
church. The inconsistencies that followed have not been a canonical concern in the east.
Canon 13 decreed that clerics in major orders could marry and utilize the rights of
marriage, except during times when they would be engaged in Eucharistic celebrations.50 Unlike
the western church, which developed the practice of daily Mass, Divine Liturgy was, and
continues to be, celebrated only on Sundays and other high-ranking feast days. The inclusion of
a reference to the apostles as having been married, with the inference that they exercised their
marriage rights, created a theology and praxis of a moderated, non-absolute clerical celibacy in
contradistinction to Rome. The claim that Orthodox practice was in accord with the more
ancient discipline reinforced the Orthodox narrative of theological superiority. The sexual
politics of both the Catholic and Orthodox churches helped to create a false dichotomy, in which
neither church admitted to error in doctrinal teaching concerning clerical celibacy or in its praxis.
This placed the Greek Catholic Churches in an impossible position. On the one hand,
they were Catholic and officially accepted Catholic doctrine. On the other, they were permitted
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to retain the practice of marriage by deacons and priests.51 Their Catholic identity made them
anathema to the Orthodox Church, while their Byzantine identity made them second-class
Catholics. In regard to the ambiguities of the canons of Trullo/Quinsext, Cholij notes that “the
discipline of absolute continence for Slav priests, if it ever was observed as a general discipline,
soon disappeared.”52
Within the context of church order and the marks of legitimate church order, it is
important to pause and consider the title “uniate.” The title “uniate” connotes a Byzantine Rite
Catholic, i.e. an Orthodox Christian who is in communion with, or united to, the Catholic
Church. Thus, reference to the west is embedded in the term, implicitly making Byzantine Rite
Catholicism valuable only in comparison to the west.53 Insofar as a Greek Catholic resembled
the west, s/he was more recognizable as a Catholic. The otherness of Greek Catholic Churches
extended beyond a lack of clerical celibacy, to include the old problem of the use of prozymite
bread as well as the general practice of wearing beards.54
Their otherness within the Catholic Church was particularly poignant within the borders
of both the United States and the II RP. The Roman Catholic bishops in the US imposed
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celibacy upon Greek Catholic clergy in an attempt to make them “more truly Catholic,” and
Greek Catholic bishops in the II RP argued over the imposition of mandatory celibacy for their
clergy.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, many Slavs immigrated to the United
States. While the cultural stresses concerning these Slav immigrants within the Roman rite were
profound,55 the stresses between the Roman and Byzantine rites were even more so. Many
Roman Rite Catholics, priests, and bishops in the United States had immigrated from, or held a
heritage from, areas that did not include Byzantine Rite Catholicism. Furthermore, Greek
Catholic priests did not immigrate in large numbers with their flocks; in 1890, only ten Greek
Catholic priests were in the United States, who had come from Austrian Galicia under the
authority of the bishops of “Lemberg, Peremysl, Munkacs, and Eperjes.”56
The ignorance of both Roman Catholic clergy and laity manifested itself in a patronizing
and intolerant attitude toward the Greek Catholic Church, such that eight of the ten Greek
Catholic priests in the United States, who had gathered in a synod in Wilkes-Barre, PA, from 1719 October 1890, begged Rome that they not be placed under the jurisdiction of the Latin bishops
and that they remain under the jurisdiction of their respective bishops in Europe. Correlatively,
they asked that their church property not be signed over to the Latin Rite bishops but be “deeded
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according to state law: two trustees, [a] local pastor, and a representative of the Bishop.”57 Two
months later, the chairman of the synod, Fr. Alexius Toth, accepted a posting in Minneapolis,
MN, and presented himself to Bishop John Ireland. He recalled the meeting later:

...acting on the advice of Bishop John Valyi, I presented myself to Archbishop
John Ireland [on] December 19, 1890, kissing his hand (without a genuflection
that was my great mistake, which I later recognized). I handed my accreditations
to the Archbishop. I well remember as he just had read that I am a Greek Rite
Catholic, his hands began to tremble. It took the archbishop about 15 minutes to
read my accreditations, after that, he firmly questioned me (the conversation was
in Latin). Do you have a wife? I replied, no, but I had one, I am a widower. When
the Archbishop heard this, he threw my documents on the table and in a loud voice
shouted: I have already sent a protest to Rome not to send such priests here. I asked
the Archbishop what kind of priests do you mean? The archbishop’s reply was, such
as you are. I replied, after all I am a Catholic priest of the Greek Rite. I am a Uniate,
[and] was ordained by a valid Catholic Bishop. The Archbishop: I do not consider
you, nor your bishop as a Catholic. Furthermore, there is no need here for a Greek
Rite Catholic priest. It is sufficient, we have a Polish priest, he can be the priest for
the Greek Rite Catholics...58

While the Polish priest, Jacob Pocholski met affably with Toth, he nonetheless read from the
pulpit the directives from Archbishop Ireland forbidding Catholics to receive the sacraments
from Toth. Toth soon left Catholic communion, and joined the Russian Orthodox Church that
would later be known as the Orthodox Church of America (OCA). Such attitudes prompted
many other such defections. Although these defections did not form the OCA, they helped
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solidify the church, as about a tenth of the members of the OCA were former Greek Catholics.59
It was clear to the Greek Catholics and to Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi that a Greek Rite
bishop was needed to tend to the pastoral needs of Greek Rite Catholics. Sheptyts’kyi involved
himself in the necessary Vatican politics, and in 1907, Propaganda Fide appointed Fr. Soter
Ortynsky, a Ukrainian nationalist. After his consecration, he arrived in America in August of
that same year. He led the Greek Catholic Churches, beset with ethnic tensions among the
Ukrainian, pro-Russian, and Rusin peoples, until his death in 1916.
A month after his arrival, the Vatican promulgated Ea Semper, which had been ghostwritten in the United States.60 Among other items, it forbade Greek Rite Catholics to have a
married clergy, to be self-governing, to make particular church laws, to keep Byzantine holy days
and fasts, to allow Latinized Rusins to return to their native Greek Rite, and to have the right to
bring children up in the Greek Rite in cases of mixed marriages, i.e. marriages between partners
of differing rites.61 In regard to mixed rite marriages, a Greek rite woman or man could follow
the rite their Latin rite partners, but not vice-versa. The marriage ceremony of the Latin rite
husband had to be in a Roman church, but for a Greek Catholic man could be married in either
the Greek or Latin rite.62 Additionally, among other items, the bull required Greek Rite Catholic
bishops to have written permission from the Latin ordinary to visit his flock, all future Greek Rite
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seminarians were required to be educated in Latin seminaries, and all Greek Catholic Church
property had to be transferred to the diocesan Latin Bishop.63 The Greek Rite Catholics in the
United States protested Ea Semper for years, but to no avail, even though Church history, as it
were, was on their side. The Council of Florence, the Union of Brzeœæ, the Bulls of Leo X
(1521), Clement VII (1526), Paul V (1615), Urban VII (1724), and Benedict XIV (1751), all of
which defended the legitimacy and richness of Byzantine Catholicism, were simply disregarded.
In the United States, outside the context of Eastern Europe, the disdain for Byzantine
Catholicism by Roman Catholics stood out more clearly than in Eastern Europe itself. However,
it was present there nonetheless.
In the kresy, the Greek Catholic Ukrainians were contending with discriminatory Polish
religious policies. Within the context of the status of Greek Catholicism, tensions were present
as early as the 1890s. The Greek Catholic bishops referred to the Poles as “our enemies” in local
synods held in Lwów in 1891 and 1897 and in Przemyœl in 1898, and characterized the Jesuits as
their greatest adversaries with respect to the Ukrainian nation and Greek Catholic Rites.64 As has
been stated before, Latinization was understood to be a means of Polonization; the Vatican
recognized this.65
In spite of the nationalist contours of Latinization, in 1920 some Ukrainian Greek
Catholic bishops met in secret in Przemyœl to consider the introduction of mandatory celibacy for
clergy of their rite; those Ukrainians opposed to the this “celibacy reform” accused those bishops
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of wanting to distance themselves from Orthodoxy in order to placate the fledgling Polish
government.66 By 1925 (after the creation of an independent PCpR), the situation had not
improved.
The Ukrainian National Committee of Eastern Galicia appealed to the Vatican Secretary
of State, Gasparri, to settle the matter in favor of maintaining the tradition. The committee
argued that the imposition of mandatory celibacy directly opposed the order and ideals of
Ukrainian society.67 Henryk PrzeŸdziecki, the bishop of Siedlce who had many ByzantineSlavonic Rite parishes within his diocese, argued that such charges were simply Ukrainian
nationalist propaganda.68 In spite of the nationalist contours present in the Greek Catholic
Churches, the Ukrainians could correctly appeal to church history.
The Ecclesiastical-National Ukrainian Commission presented Pope Pius XI with a
professionally-printed argument refuting the legitimacy of mandatory celibacy in the Greek
Catholic Church. The commission referenced promulgated the Council of Florence and papal
writings: Magnus dominus (Clemens VIII; 1595), Etsi pastoralis (Benedict XIV; 1742),
Demandum coelitus (Benedict XIV; 1743) Allatae sunt (Urban VIII; 1755), and Orientalium
dignitas (Leo XIII; 1894).69
The commission took care to note that the provincial synod of Zamoœæ (1720) and Pope
Benedict XII in Apostolatus officium (1724) confirmed the teaching of the Council of Florence
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and Magnus dominus, which explicitly confirmed the church order of the Ruthenian Episcopate
and Clergy that had come into union in Rome in the Union of Brzeœæ. Ukrainian clergy retained
the option of marriage in Eastern Europe.
In spite of the victory to retain the tradition of a married clergy in the Greek Catholic
Church, the very presence of the dispute indicates that the Roman Catholic Church regarded the
church order of the Greek Catholics to be, at the very least, a less perfect order than their own.
From the Vatican perspective, the nationalist contours of both the Polish and Ukrainian
ecclesiological positions confirmed the necessity of a Vatican-led mission to Russia.
The PCpR also worked to encourage the development of the spiritual lives of the people
entrusted to their care. In both the Catholic and Orthodox churches, prayer and meditation was
understood to be an extension of liturgical prayer, making it personal, but not necessarily private.
Both churches trace their connection between personal and public prayer to St. Irenaeus, who
taught that “‘our doctrine [of the spiritual life] is in agreement with the Eucharist and confirmed
by the Eucharist.’”70 However, it is unclear whether or not western monasticism developed in
conjunction with or without influence from, eastern monasticism.71
Operating with the Solovievan presumption that Russian Orthodoxy, including its ability
to teach authentic spirituality, was corrupted, the PCpR engaged in a spiritual mission to Russia.
It was undertaken with some urgency, given the laws passed by the Soviets in January 1918
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against religion, especially those barring youth from religious practices or instruction.72 The
youth needed both catechetical materials and teachers. In regard to the former, the Pope paid for
religious and spiritual books to be printed in Russian.73 They could be easily given to Russian
refugees outside of Russia, and only with great difficulty distributed in Russia itself.
Correlatively, the importance of a well-trained clergy was again made manifest. As
previously discussed, the PIO had an extensive syllabus which included courses on Russian
ascetism, mysticism, monastic life, and the role of a starets in spiritual direction.74 And, as
discussed in chapter 3, the atmosphere of the Russicum was meant to russify candidates, both
culturally and spiritually. In the meantime, d’Herbigny himself, though raised Roman Catholic
and thoroughly imbued with Ignatian spirituality through his Jesuit formation, gave retreats to
Byzantine Christians, including one for the seminarians at the Greek college.75
For the seminarians at the Russicum, the dedication of the college to St. Thérèse of
Liseux was a spiritual oddity which stamped them as western as much as they would be eastern.
As previously discussed, the practice of linking the dedication of a building to its financial
benefactors was a long standing practice in the Catholic world. Despite the Russification of the
“Little Flower,” rendering her as “St. Teresa Lisijskaja,” Elena Aleksandrovna Izvol’skaja76
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noted that the Little Flower and Carmelite spirituality to be too Latin for the average Orthodox
Russian. Nonetheless, St. Thérèse did have a large number of Russian followers,77 yet they were
atypical. The very existence of a cult of St. Thérèse demonstrated the fullness of the Catholic
faith. The loose resemblance of St. Thérèse to the early nineteenth century Russian St. Seraphim
demonstrated that Russian spirituality could be reshaped to accommodate the western style.78
However, this did not deter the consumption of Russian spirituality by those promoting
the Catholic mission to Russia. However, nothing Catholic would be abandoned by those
consuming Russian spirituality; Russian spirituality would be an addition. The most
fundamental item was the “Jesus Prayer.” Thomas Aquinas described as ‘the heart of
Orthodoxy,’ and it is as follows: “‘Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy upon me’ (‘a
sinner,’ the Russians add).”79 The noted church historian of Byzantine spirituality, Špidlík, notes
that western Christians came to know the prayer through The Way of the Pilgrim, acknowledged
by tradition to have been written by a late-nineteenth century80 Russian peasant who learns to
pray without ceasing (1 Thess 5:17) under the guidance of a starets.
The story is organized according to the accepted progress and maturation of prayer: from
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oral prayer to mental prayer to the prayer of the heart.81 Fedotov maintained that although the
story is told from the first person perspective of a Russian peasant narrator, the author was much
more sophisticated; he noted the presence not only of the “Russian idiom,” but elements of
Alexandrian mysticism and even Western romanticism,82 all to promote the hesychastic
method.83
The Way of the Pilgrim, translated into many languages at least since 1928,84 was
available to the seminarians of the Russicum, from which they gleaned simplistic lessons not
only of the spiritual life, but of pre-Soviet peasant life. The preface, which the recognized
spiritual authority Walter Ciszek85 wrote for a 1978 translation of The Way of the Pilgrim,86
suggests that he was at most unaware or at least dismissive of dangers and misuse which
concerned many Orthodox authorities, and naive in his understanding of nineteenth century
Russia.
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In regard to the former, many Orthodox had used the prayer as a sort of talisman, which is
contrary to Orthodox spiritual practice. Orthodox spiritual masters advocated the use of a starets
to ensure orthodoxy of prayer,87 even as many readers of the novelette missed or dismissed the
role of the starets in the novel itself. Ciszek did not mention these in his introduction, leaving
the reader of the work to face the spiritual danger on his own. In regard to the latter, The Way of
the Pilgrim presents an image of nineteenth century Russia to teach spiritual lessons, not to give
an historically accurate portrayal.88 Even with his many years in the Soviet Union, a country he
even professed to love, the early imprint of westernized Orthodox spirituality taught at the
Russicum remained.
As stated in previous chapters, by the late 1920s, it was clear the Soviet government was
not going to collapse and that they had a firm hold on their territory. The historiographical cycle
proposed by Walsh (analyzed in chap. 4) appeared to be accurate. From the perspective of the
PCpR, Russia remained a dangerous place, and in need of prayer. The Catholic faithful had been
praying for the conversion of Russia since the promulgation of the Fatima devotions, and
indulgences were offered for those who prayed for those persecuted in Russia.89 In a sense,
salvation would come from the wellspring of Catholic prayer. But it would have to be accepted
by the average Russian, who was often married.
Marriage has been and continues to be an important social institution, since it is the
structure in which legal rights for both church and state, property and other economic rights, and
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gender status intersect. Marriage is deeply personal for the couple involved, but placed within a
social matrix which includes many people who the couple does not know. Both in the metropole
and in the colony, marriage legislation was therefore an efficient means to exercise authority over
society. While legislators often understood the metropole, they did not understand the colonial
societies over which they exercised their authority. Although the insights by Marlene Dobkin
arise out of second wave feminism, they are nonetheless useful for understanding the problems
the PCpR faced when dealing with marriage questions. She observed that

the expressed purpose of this [marriage] legislation was to alter the traditional
role of women in French Africa to meet the standards of French society. Far too
often, however, the French lacked knowledge of indigenous customs and ignored
traditional patterns of behavior. They promulgated legislation which resulted in
conflict, upheaval, and disorientation in many of those same societies who were
to benefit from these laws.90

While the members of the PCpR had knowledge of Russian, Bolshevik, and Orthodox forms and
principles of marriage, the soft-Orientalist shading of their understanding caused many of the
same problems that the French colonialists had in Africa, prompting them to seek advice from
canon lawyers concerning marriage problems of Russian converts and emigres.
The Soviet Russian government was quite open about its attitudes toward marriage and
the family, as it published pamphlets on Soviet Marriage Law for western consumption. While
an official government publication on marriage laws might give the impression of both a
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unanimity among and importance for Bolshevik party leaders with regard to marriage laws,
Elizabeth Waters argues that this was not the case.91 The prevalence of traditional Russian
village life, much of which existed outside of party influence, meant that the old attitudes and
customs remained, but were eclipsed by more pressing issues such as unemployment and land
reform. Additionally, Bolshevik officials themselves were divided along various lines: higher
vs. lower party rankings, urban vs. rural, Russian vs. non-Russian, and metropolitan vs.
provincial.92 This division within the party reflected the fractured discourse in Soviet society in
general throughout the 1920s concerning love, marriage, sexuality, and the family. Opinions
tended toward diametrically opposed positions, between a liberal, open position on the one hand
and a conservative, almost puritanical attitude on the other.93
M.M. Wolff succinctly summarized and evaluated Soviet marriage law as it pertained to
creating a new social order.94 He noted that the marriage law from the old order, i.e. prerevolutionary Russia, was rooted in the canon law of the Russian Orthodox Church, the contours
of which will be discussed below, in conjunction with Roman Catholic canon law. For the
moment, suffice it to say that no civil marriages existed in Russian law, and that divorce was
difficult, but possible within a strict canonical framework. It is important to recall first that the
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religious tribunals which reviewed divorce cases fell ultimately under the authority of the Holy
Synod, which was legally a part of Russian government administration, and secondly, the PCpR
understood this arrangement to imply the problematic nature of Orthodoxy. With regard to
private property, pre-revolutionary marriage law was the mechanism which maintained
individual property rights.
The Bolsheviks began altering marriage laws in late December 1917, only a little more
than a month after they came into power. While only civil marriages were recognized as legal,
religious ceremonies were allowed– as in countries like France95– as a private affair between the
couple, both of whom now had to be at least eighteen years of age. (Under the old regime, a man
had to be eighteen years old, but the woman only needed to be sixteen.) The shift from a
religious to a civil ceremony marginalized the social influence of religious authorities, especially
the Orthodox, and the requirement that the marriage had to be registered civilly allowed the
government to compile useful vital statistics.96
The new understanding of property changed marriage laws in two ways. Firstly, the legal
rights of women were raised to be equal to that of men. Whatever chattel was hers before
marriage did not transfer to her husband as “the community of property” in the marriage.
Secondly, distinctions between the legitimacy and illegitimacy of children was abolished.
Children born out of wedlock in Soviet Russia had the same rights, in every respect, as children
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born within the confines of marriage.97 Abortion was also made legal.98
Additionally, divorce was much easier. Mutual consent or even the desire of one spouse
was sufficient grounds when presented before a local court to be granted a divorce. When the
Soviet marriage code was revised in 1926, it was even easier to procure a divorce, as it did away
even with this minimal court procedure.99 Moving religion from the public to the private sphere
also meant removing any and all religious contours from the legalities of marriage. Thus, from
the perspective of the Soviet government, religious sisters and the black clergy (i.e. monks) were
free to marry.100 Contrarily, from the Catholic and Orthodox ecclesiastical point of view, this
was not so.
If any general summary can be made in regard to Soviet marriage law, it is that with the
abolition of private property and the relegation of religion to the private sphere, the government
shifted responsibility of the relationship of marriage toward the couple, bound by nothing but
their own consciences and desires. Even with later adjustments re-establishing inheritance rights
of children in 1922 and 1926, marriage in Soviet Russia had underwent decidedly radical break
from the older, pre-revolutionary codes. However, Andrea Stevenson Sanjian maintains that

Family legislation was initially transformational in nature even though the laws
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themselves were rarely very radical: reforming pre-revolutionary practice
usually brought Soviet law into accord with Western standards rather than
exceeding them. A rare exception was the 1920 legalization of abortion.”101

The reaction of the PCpR toward Soviet marriage law was one of abhorrence, and which
was not compared to the situation in western Europe. Surprisingly, abortion was not what most
abhorred the PCpR, but the ability to divorce and remarry, a phenomenon also present in Russian
Orthodox canon law. The so-called Bolshevik attack on marriage, as the PCpR understood it,
was another expression of the ideological conflict between Christianity and Bolshevism
discussed in the previous chapter. The Bolsheviks had not only begun to undermine belief in the
theoretical foundations of religion, but also the practical practices of belief. The PCpR, which
knew Soviet marriage law well,102 thought the ability to divorce was the chief means of
undermining Christian values. This sentiment was echoed in the Jesuit journal, The Irish
Monthly, which criticized the divorce decrees in the Bolshevik Family Code as turning men into
beasts and rendering women desperate.103 In another issue released two years later, an author
goes so far to assert that, “Not only is the family not recognized as a social unit, but family life is
positively discouraged.”104
The PCpR saw a certain continuity between the lax approach to the sanctity and
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inviolability of marriage by the Orthodox Church (in comparison to the Roman Catholic), and the
licentious approach to marriage by the Bolsheviks. Although the Catholic and Orthodox
Churches share a genealogical heritage of canon law, with historically divergent contexts and
eventual schism came separate canonical codes based on separate sensibilities.
Experts of canon law of both east105 and west106 maintain that their legal traditions have
their roots in the councils and documents of the early Church, especially the Council of Nicea in
325. As the Christian church moved from disfavor to official tolerance to its Establishment in
the Roman Empire in the fourth century, its legal status with respect to the state also shifted.
While church and state maintained authority in their own realms, i.e. regnum and sacerdotium,
there were to work in harmony with one another, each mutually supporting the authority of the
other.107 However, with the fall of regnum in the west and the growing internal alienation
between Rome and Constantinople within sacerdotium, the Church of the Empire, the canonical
traditions of Rome and Constantinople developed independently from one another, and this
included the issue of marriage and divorce.
G. Robina Quale noted that beyond exhorting married partners to fidelity and the
unmarried to celibacy, the early Christian church “showed little interested in regulating

105

John H. Erickson, The Challenge of Our Past: Studies in Orthodox Canon Law and
Church History (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1991), pp. 12-18.
106

James A. Coriden, An Introduction to Canon Law (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), pp.

107

Coriden, pp. 12-13, and Erickson, pp. 46-47.

9-12.

221

marriage.”108 Much later, in the late fourth century, Christians began to desire a priestly blessing
upon a newly married couple, and that desire became universal much later, in the eighth century.
Only in the ninth century, well after the fall of the western Empire, did the Roman Church
construct a formal marriage ceremony. It is important to note that after this point until
modernity, the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches and not the state held authority over
marriage— and divorce. In the Eastern Roman Empire, a formal religious marriage ceremony
was not required until later.109 For couples who enter into marriage and remain married, the
religious and legal particulars are not as important as for those couples who desire a divorce.
The Christian scriptures emphasize the impossibility of divorce, and canon law from east
and west reflect this. Neither adultery nor many years of absence were sufficient reasons to
dissolve a marriage. Quale noted that this contrasted sharply with the Imperial legal code, and in
the sixth century, rather than the religious code adapting itself to the legal, the legal code partially
adapted itself to the religious.110 Over time, the western church recognized the possibility of the
dissolution of a marriage for impotence, five years’ absence in foreign captivity, or the desire of a
spouse to enter religious life, i.e. “return” to the celibate state. In the east, adultery was later
accepted as a reason for divorce (based on a particular interpretation of Matthew 19:4) as well as
impotence and heresy.111
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Obviously, the Russian Orthodox Church falls within the tradition of the East, but
additionally, developed its own canons with respect to marriage and divorce. Wolff noted that
while Russian Imperial marriage laws were defined civilly, they had canonical origins and all
marriages in Russia were legal only if they were performed by a Church.112 With regard to
divorce, ecclesiastical tribunals and not civil courts had jurisdiction, and divorces were chiefly
granted on the grounds of adultery, incapacity, convictions for penal offenses in which the
prisoner was deprived of civil rights, the decision to take holy orders or the veil, and unknown
absences for five years.113 Protestant marriages could be dissolved on slightly wider grounds.
Divorce for Jews and Muslims was regulated by their respective religious laws. Roman Catholic
marriages, in accord with Roman Catholic canon law, could not be dissolved, with the exception
of an unconsummated marriage.114
Theologically, for the Roman Catholic Church, the existence of a marriage was– and is–
rooted in Aristotelian metaphysics: the hylomorphic union of matter and form. The matter of the
marriage consists in the will of those contracting marriage: the understanding that the union
would be a unitive, loving, permanent union which would have the intention of producing
children. The form of the marriage is much more complicated. For those whose religions–
Christian and non-Christian alike– require a specific religious rite, then that rite is required to be
validly married. However, because marriage has been considered to be part of the natural order,
those who either do not confess a religion or those who confess a religion that does not require a
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specific marriage rite contract marriage validly in whatever form they chose. The PioBenedictine (1917) Code of Canon Law reflected these principles, laying out the practical laws of
marriage in canons 1012-1143. While the Catholic Church has denied the possibility of divorce,
it has acknowledged the possibility of annulment, reasoning that if matter, form, or both were
lacking, then the presumed marriage did not exist, and the couple was free to (re-)marry.
Whatever marriage cases came to the attention of the commission before 1928 did not
garner enough attention to warrant an extended consideration of the situation of marriage in
Soviet Russia. However, in that year, a case of consanguinity of the collateral line involving an
uncle and his nieces came to the attention of the PCpR.115 Because that relationship was of the 2º
of consanguinity, and canon law forbad marriage in the collateral line through the 3º,116 the PCpR
maintained that such a marriage would be invalid, leaving unsaid that a dispensation was simply
impossible. Furthermore, the PCpR upheld the value prohibiting such marriages in order to care
for souls and maintain the sanctity fo the family and Christian society– which Soviet Russia was
not.
The marriage, if it were to have taken place, would have been incestuous and again
suggested the barbarity of Soviet Russia and the inability of the Russian Orthodox Church to
have taught proper morals. As the anti-religious campaign in Russia became more vibrant, the
PCpR began analyzing marriage in Russia.
The overall practical concern was to determine, for couples wanting an annulment, was
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whether the marriage was contracted validly or invalidly.117 The former prevented remarriage,
while the latter allowed for it. In order to address this issue, in 1930 Michel d’Herbigny sent
letters to bishops who were caring for Russians in their dioceses and to select canon lawyers,
concerning six issues which he considered pressing:118 (1) those who were divorced with the
approval of “schismatic” Russian Orthodox clergy, (2) those who desired to separate because of a
state of unhappiness, assuming it would be possible because the “schismatic” Russian Orthodox
Church granted divorce, (3) refugees who had married only for some convenience with the
intention of divorcing after some time, a practice common among university students, (4) those
who married to legitimize children or to please their relatives, (5) those who, “during the terror of
the [Russian] revolution,”119 married for help and comfort or to get a foreign passport more
easily, and (6) whether or not dispensations for various impediments to marriage granted by the
Russian Orthodox Church were valid, especially since by 1930 the Russian Orthodox Church had
itself fell into schism, due to disagreements concerning accommodation (which were discussed in
chapter 3).
D’Herbigny asked that those responding include historical, psychological, and canonical
conditions in their responses. The PCpR, under the leadership of d’Herbigny, looked for useful
principles by which they could judge marriage cases, not for information to create a
comprehensive policy. Repeatedly, a concern for the individuals petitioning for annulment was
maintained by insisting on judging via a case-by-case basis. Yet the ability to judge and the
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actual exercise of judgment of these cases was a performance of superiority of the Catholic
Church over the Bolshevik state and the Russian Orthodox Church.
While the PCpR regarded Soviet law to be dehumanizing, as it alienated people from
contracting a genuine marriage which was their right through natural law, the commission
nonetheless held out for the possibility that a couple could contract a valid marriage. Soviet
marriages were judged to be invalid if a couple married with the understanding that this was a
legal contract valid only as long as both desired the union. However, if a couple married with the
understanding that the marriage was indissoluble, then it the possibility of validity existed.120
However, the PCpR recognized that their attitude would be difficult to establish, since at the time
of the marriage, only the legal registrar would have any meaningful interaction with the couple.121
The same logic held for those who married foreigners in order to escape “Soviet
barbarity” or for those who married for comfort in order to face inescapable “Soviet barbarity.”
For those who married without the intention of permanence, then the marriages could be judged
invalid. This sense of impermanence was more common for those marrying foreigners to escape
Soviet Russia.122 For those who married for comfort in the midst of a barbaric situation for
which there was no foreseeable end, establishing the intention of an impermanent union was
much more difficult. Linking the issue of dissolubility to validity emphasized the social
character of marriage, which in turn made the implicit judgement upon the authority which
upheld those values. The same held true with regard to the attitudes of the PCpR toward the
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Russian Orthodox Church.
Official opinions from which the PCpR formulated its attitudes varied widely. The most
hostile was a de facto dismissal of the authority of the Russian Orthodox clergy concerning the
dispensation from impediments with the claim that the Holy See had neither explicitly nor
implicitly extended faculties to dispense to the bishops or priests of the Russian Orthodox
Church.123 This claim is rooted in the belief that separation from the Catholic Church meant
separation from all ecclesial authority. It was the minority opinion, if not a singular one.
More moderate condemnations of Russian Orthodoxy came from Henryk Insadowski of
the Catholic University of Lublin, who argued that marriage in the Russian Orthodox Church was
dissoluble, and, therefore, not truly marriage. This implied the problematic nature of Russian
Orthodox theology and of the Russian Orthodox Church.124 PrzeŸdziecki asserted in a more
nuanced way that although matrimony was theoretically indissoluble, in practice, it was in fact
dissoluble,125 making the practice of divorce problematic, stopping short of condemning the
essential belief of the Russian Orthodox Church.
The most favorable opinion came, unsurprisingly, from Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi, who
countered the popular opinion by asserting that divorce within the Orthodox Church functioned,
in a practical sense, identically to annulment within the Catholic Church.126 Consequently, the
Russian Orthodox Church was not morally bankrupt, but held the same ideals and acted in the
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same manner was the Catholic Church, making Russian Orthodoxy the moral equal of
Catholicism.
Generally, the judgment concerning marriage in Soviet Russia, with respect to both
Soviet law and to the legacy of Russian Orthodoxy, was negative. The PCpR maintained that
Russian Orthodoxy had taught the people to accept a certain moral laxity concerning marriage
because of the possibility of divorce, and in a sense, the Bolsheviks brought that laxity to its
natural conclusion. This moral laxity concerning marriage was not unlike the moral laxity
concerning clerical continence. Orthodoxy was regarded as being less disciplined, and when it
gave way to the Soviet system, Orthodox Christians were morally unprepared to live properly, in
contradistinction to the moral discipline of the Catholic Church. The judgment by the PCpR in
the name of the Catholic Church demonstrated Catholic moral superiority, which in turn
reinforced the superiority and rightful authority of the Roman Catholic Church.
The accusation of the spiritual and moral laxity of the Orthodox Church and the social
depravity of the Soviets, in opposition to the self-sufficient and disciplined Catholic spirituality
and morality, confirmed the superior nature of Catholicism for the PCpR. The necessity to
provide not only spiritually but materially for the Russian people bolstered this conviction. If
Russian civilization was to progress, it needed the Catholic Church.
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Conclusion

With the discovery of Russia as mission territory in the late nineteenth century and the
concurrent bureaucraticization of the Vatican, the need for a Papal commission to oversee a
Russian mission emerged. Although it was at first a commission within the CEO which had
regular work by 1922, the PCpR was made an independent commission in 1925 primarily
through ecclesial politics. Mgr. d’Herbigny was a master at negotiating the political channels of
the Vatican, and the difficulties surrounding Metropolitan Szeptyts’kyi helped justify the
relocation of the mission center to Rome. Although the ambition of d’Herbigny and his
colleagues was real, so was their desire to convert Russia, aid Russians in need both at home and
abroad, and help those who had converted to become and remain good Catholics. With Papal
approval, the PCpR oversaw the distribution of or themselves gave away a great deal of money,
supported conversions, both individually or en masse at the parish level, created a systematic,
doctrinal, theological rationale justifying conversion, and tried to help Russian Catholics be
good Catholics, most notably by adjudicating marriage questions.
However, soft-Orientalist dynamics permeated both the creation and work of the PCpR.
The ecclesial structures which the commission managed both conveyed and themselves
symbolized soft-Orientalism. The creedal faith that the PCpR taught relied heavily on the
thought of Soloviev, who had appropriated a soft-Orientalist view of Russia, and the code of
behavior that the PCpR enforced was shaded with soft-Orientalist attitudes. While Christian
churches during the interwar period commonly assumed self-sufficiency, that did not necessarily
imply a lesser cultural status for the Other, especially when those churches existed within the
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same culture. However, the comparisons between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches which
the PCpR made rendered the Catholic Church as superior and the Orthodox Church as lesser.
Structurally, the Catholic Church in Russia, though a Christ-like suffering, was managing
to survive in opposition to the Soviet government. The Orthodox Church, contrarily, fell under
the control of the Soviets, and fell into schism because of it. In regard to both creedal belief and
codes of behavior, the Catholic Church had preserved the fullness of the “Truth” handed down
from the apostles through a strong discipline. The Orthodox Church, contrarily, had not done
so; this weakened the faith and Christian behavior of the Russian people, which allowed them to
fall victim to the corruption of the Soviet government, which d’Herbigny likened to the fall of
Constantinople before Islam.
Much of this relied on maintaining the image of the Russian people as a barbaric race,
lamented by Dostoevsky in the late nineteenth century. Rendering Russia as an exotic and
dangerous place reflected the logic, but not the depth, of Western European colonial ventures,
even to the extent that information about Russia was conveyed through the trope of a travel log.
While the aim of the colonial project was to procure raw material to be used in production, the
aim of the PCpR was, to put it bluntly, sheep steeling. Perhaps the difference between the two
projects was the publically professed aim. The “White Man’s Burden” was moral cover for
economic interest, the sincerity of which has been debated. Contrarily and in spite of the softOrientalist attitudes of the PCpR, the Catholic Church sincerely wanted to save souls and provide
aid to Russians when possible, both at home and abroad.
The shift from assuming self-sufficiency to a soft-Orientalist laden self-sufficiency lay
not in religiously generated assumptions about Russia, but social and political ones. While
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Orientalism has its roots in nineteenth century theological and archeological study, with
corresponding assumptions of religious superiority of Christianity over Islam, the soft-Orientalist
attitudes toward Russia would not have been possible without a secular disdain for Russia.
These attitudes turned self-sufficiency into self-aggrandizement. Rather than creating theological
dynamics which would encourage conversion, the existence of soft-Orientalism created or
exacerbated those cultural dynamics which would discourage conversion. Indeed, such dynamics
make the conversions of Russians heroic from a spiritual point of view, but could also make
them dysfunctional from a psychological point of view. Within a longer time frame which
includes the Second Vatican Council, the shift in ecumenical thinking from a self-sufficient
disposition to a recognition of a need for an ecclesial, almost family unity imparts a reform motif
to the Second Vatican Council a reform motif, in addition to its efforts to imbue the Church with
ressourcement theology in a spirit of aggiornomento. However, the question of soft-Orientalism
remains with respect to recent church history. While the Polish Pope Karol Wojty³a encouraged
the Church to breathe with both lungs, selections from the work of Soloviev have been reprinted.
Although the dissertation focused on religious structures and themes, the importance of
this study goes beyond religious history, and begs questions of interest to other sub-fields of
history. The cultural anthropological perspective which underlies the work, avoids the victimvictimizer paradigm essential to religious and political histories which, respectively, narrate
martyrdom or dangerous political intrigue. The fresh historiographical approach has complicated
this traditional view; we no longer can speak about heroes and villains, but about people who can
be both simultaneously. This may not be limited geographically. Perhaps such dynamics work
in other areas of Europe, where the west gives way to a Europe that is in between “civilization”
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and “barbarity”: Spain begs a re-examination, as do the Balkans.
Those histories which portray martyrdom emphasize the ideological aspects of
Communism, in effect rendering the Bolsheviks as clerics of atheistic, dialectical materialism. In
other words, those histories understand the Bolsheviks in the way the that the PCpR understood
them: as reflections of themselves, prophets thrust into the political arena. Those histories which
emphasize political intrigue and espionage distort and ignore the available evidence, also
assuming that the Soviets had a fully developed plan to secularize Russia from the beginning.
They interpret the Bolsheviks in the way that the PCpR and Edmund Walsh understood them:
ideologically committed people also committed to bringing history closer to its telos.
By analyzing the underlying attitudes and dispositions of the PCpR, it is possible to
reinterpret not only the history of the Catholic Church and Russia, but the various other aspects
involved. For example, the histories of Poland (problematic for the PCpR), Russian refugees
(whose status shifted to displaced persons and then immigrants), and Byzantine-Slavonic Rite
parishes outside of Eastern Europe can and should be recast. Lastly, while avoiding a Whiggish
interpretation, the shift in attitude of the Catholic Church in Vatican II could and should be
rethought with a consciousness of soft-Orientalism. On the one hand, a genuine respect for the
Byzantine world is present. On the other, Orientalium Ecclesiarum, the decree on the Eastern
Churches, was ghost-written by Rev. John Long, S.J., a Roman Catholic priest ordained in the
Byzantine-Slavonic Rite rather than a bishop of one of the Eastern Churches themselves.
Succinctly, the presence of soft-Orientalism extends beyond the PCpR, the specific subject of
this dissertation, not only to other related subjects, but to complimentary histories. For example,
a study of possible Occidentalist or soft-Occidentalist attitudes by the Russian Orthodox Church
232

would be useful.
This history of the PCpR is more than an historical footnote. It illuminates the historical
intersection of religious and cultural attitudes meaningful beyond Catholic interwar missionary
conduct, and it begs a historiographical shift to brighten that illumination. The history of the
Catholic Church and Russia remains a story of conflict, but we have a better sense of why.
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